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SOLONIAN JUSTICE¹

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I. THE JUSTICE OF THE *POLIS*

A. THE NATURALIZATION OF JUSTICE

SOLON's Fragment 4² is a document of the highest importance in the development of Greek political ideas. For here, as Jaeger has shown, justice is presented as a natural, self-regulative order.³ To be sure, "natural" does not mean "secular." The most self-consciously naturalistic chapters of Greek thought—pre-Socratic philosophy and Hippocratic medicine—continue to assume that natural events can be no less "divine"

than supernatural ones.⁴ Certainly, Solon thinks of justice as a divine power.⁵ But he describes its operation in Fragment 4 strictly through the observable consequences of human acts within the social order. The vindication of justice comes "like an inescapable plague upon the whole *polis*; swiftly the *polis* falls into evil bondage; bondage stirs up strife and slumbering war; war destroys many in the beauty of their youth" (ll. 17–20).

Jaeger contrasts this with the Homeric and Hesiodic sanctions of justice: famine and plague (Hesiod *Op.* 243); sterility of women (*ibid.* 225); barrenness of land (*Od.* xix. 111; Hesiod *Op.* 232 and 237) and of sea (*Od.* xix. 113). Hesiod adds war and military defeat (*Op.* 228–29 and 236–37) to his list of punitive measures. But the list as a whole clearly belongs to the order of magic.⁶ It recalls the powers of

¹ This is one of a series of studies in the philosophical foundations of Greek democracy. My grateful thanks are due to the Canadian Social Science Research Council for a grant-in-aid; and to the librarian of Harvard College and his staff for their many courtesies.

² All citations of Solon's verse refer to the latest edition by J. M. Edmonds in the "Loeb Classical Library," *Elegy and Iambus*, Vol. I (1944). (Edmonds' numbering is largely as in Bergk.)

³ "Solons Eunomie," *Sitzber. Preuss. Akad. Wiss.*, 1926, pp. 69–85, at pp. 78–80; *Paideia*, I, 139–40, of the English translation. My heavy debt to Jaeger will be evident throughout the first part of this paper. I also owe much to the following specialized studies, to which I shall refer hereafter solely by the author's name: Charles Gilliard, *Quelques réformes de Solon* (Lausanne, 1907); Ivan Linforth, *Solon the Athenian* (Berkeley, 1918); K. F. Freeman, *The Life and Work of Solon* (Cardiff, 1926); W. J. Woodhouse, *Solon the Liberator* (Oxford, 1938). On the other hand, I have had no occasion to make specific reference to a number of other works which I have found helpful, especially W. C. Greene, *Moirai* (Cambridge, Mass., 1944); and V. Ehrenberg's stimulating essays, *Die Rechtsidee im frühen Griechentum* (Leipzig, 1921), and "When Did the Greek *Polis* Rise?" *Journal of Hellenic Studies*, LVII (1937), 147 ff.

⁴ For the earlier of the pre-Socratics this must be obvious. For the more difficult cases of Anaxagoras and Democritus see, respectively, Diels-Kranz, *Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* (5th ed.; Berlin, 1934–37), 59. A. 48; and my "Ethics and Physics in Democritus," *Philosophical Review*, LIV (1945), 573 ff., at 581–82. For the Hippocratic literature the subject requires fresh treatment; meanwhile see W. Nestle, "Hippocratica," *Hermes*, LXXIII (1938), 1 ff.; and H. Diller, "Wanderarzt und Aetiology," *Philologus*, Supplementband XXVI (1934), 55–56.

⁵ Clear enough in Frag. 4. 14–16; and obvious in Frag. 13, where justice merges with the wisdom and power of Zeus.

⁶ I am not forgetting that Hesiod, too, can picture justice in natural terms (as in *Th.* 80–92). After all, it is not hard to see that a wise, "sweet-tongued" judge

the magician-kings who can procure good crops for their people no less than victory in war.⁷ It recalls, too, the similar chains of calamities superstitiously imputed to the lunar eclipse,⁸ to the unpurified pollution,⁹ or to the effect of a curse. The "imprecation and mighty curse" preserved in Aeschines iii. 111¹⁰ tallies with Hesiod almost point for point in its list of sanctions: "that their land bear no fruit;¹¹ that their wives bear no children like those who begat them, but monsters;¹² that their flocks yield not their natural increase;¹³ that defeat await them in camp and court and market place;¹⁴ that they utterly perish themselves, their houses, and their *genos*."¹⁵

is a social asset, while a "bribe-eater" is a social menace. It takes much more to reach the conception of justice as a comprehensive, self-regulative order. One must see, as did Solon, (1) that *everyone*, not merely the "godlike" dispenser of justice, is bound by this order and may respect or ignore it to the common benefit or ruin and (2) that the train of consequences that issue from just and unjust acts determines the destiny of all in the community so completely that any further appeal to magical sanctions becomes supernumerary.

⁷ M. P. Nilsson (*Homer and Mycenae* [London, 1933], p. 220) cites an interesting parallel:

"The kings of the Swedes and the Burgundians were held responsible for the luck of their people whether in the matter of victory, weather, or good crops. It is related that the Swedes sacrificed their king if the crops failed, and the Burgundian kings were deposed if the luck of the war or the crops failed."

⁸ Pindar *Paean* 9. 1-20: the eclipse is a "sign" both of social disasters, like war and *stasis*, and natural catastrophes, like frost, storms, floods. (Storm and floods as punishment for "crooked judgments" in *Il.* xvi. 388-92.)

⁹ Barrenness of land and womb for pollution in Sophocles *OT* 25-28 and 270-75; Hdt. vi. 139. 1 and iii. 65. 7; Antiphon ii. 1. 10; Paus. viii. 53. 2-4.

¹⁰ J. A. O. Larsen ("Federation for Peace in Ancient Greece," *CP*, XXXIX [1944], 145-62, at 147 and nn. 3, 4, and 6) has called attention to the same comparison and further to the striking similarity of the formula in this curse with that in the stele at Acharnae which purports to be the Plataic oath (see L. Robert, *Études épigraphiques et philologiques* [Paris, 1938], pp. 307-8, ll. 39-46, with the emendation of l. 42 suggested by Robert at p. 314). The imprecatory formula in many other Greek oaths is much the same (see examples cited by Robert, p. 313, nn. 2 and 3).

¹¹ Cf. *Op.* 237: καρπὸν δὲ φέρει γέλωτος ἄρουρα.

¹² Cf. *ibid.* 235: τίς τ' αὖτε δὲ γυναῖκες δοῖκατά τίς τε γονεῖσιν.

¹³ Cf. *ibid.* 232-34.

¹⁴ Cf. *ibid.* 246-47.

¹⁵ Cf. *ibid.* 244: μινθούσι δὲ οἶκος.

Solon is as earnest a moralist as Hesiod. But instead of turning loose upon his audience the traditional repertoire of superstitious terrors, he makes them look at history, considering cause and effect. There is no evidence that he thinks of a concept of social causality; but he certainly thinks *with* one. Snow and hail come from clouds; thunder from lightning; the ruin of the city from big men; the bondage of the *dēmos* from ignorance.¹⁶ Fragment 12 gives the opening lines of what must have been a similar comparison between nature and politics: "The sea is stirred by (ἐξ) the winds; if someone does not move it, it is the justest of all things."¹⁷ Semonides of Amorgus had pictured the sea as double-natured, capriciously shifting from one mood to its opposite: "often she stands quiet and harmless . . . ; often she is mad, borne along with thunderstriking waves."¹⁸ Solon objects: the change is not arbitrary; disturbance is not the natural ("just") state of the sea;¹⁹ if it gets into this condition there must have been a disturbing cause.²⁰

To appreciate the naturalism of this way of thinking, one should recall that it by-passes entirely a set of ideas which had recently attained wide influence over Greece generally and over Athens in particular: the conception of justice in terms

¹⁶ Frag. 9 in paraphrase. "From" is *ἐκ* with a temporal-causal sense. In the last clause the relation is expressed through the dative, *αἰσθρί*.

¹⁷ For *δικαιοσύνη* in the manuscripts Edmonds substitutes *ἀκασιότης*, without good reason, it seems to me.

¹⁸ Frag. 7. 37-40 (Diehl). *Θάλασσα ἀπῆμων* here (cf. Hesiod *Op.* 670: πόντος ἀπῆμων) is the simplest clue to *θάλασσα δικαιοσύνη* in Solon. But cf. also Hdt. vii. 16 (cited by Linforth, *ad loc.*): "winds, falling upon the sea, do not suffer it to be in accordance with its own nature" (φύσις τῇ δουρῆς χρῆσθαι): when disturbed, the sea cannot "be itself."

¹⁹ The natural state is "just": cf. *Περὶ ἀγῶν* 1: ἡ δικαιοσύνη φύσις, of the straight line in which the physician should make extensions in the treatment of dislocations and fractures; and again (*ibid.*): ἐπὶ τῇ δικαίῃ φύσει ἀναγκαζόμενος with the same sense.

²⁰ That it is the winds that agitate the sea is, of course, no invention of Solon's (*Il.* iv. 423; Hesiod *Op.* 675).

of religious pollution. We know that Draco's code of homicide—published in Solon's boyhood—is steeped in this ideology.²¹ We know, too, that the Cylonian feud—which reached a critical stage before Solon's archonship—turned about the "pollution" of one of the contending parties.²² Finally, we may recall that Solon was intimately associated both with Delphi, the official center of the theory and practice of purification, and with Epimenides, a rival prophet of ceremonial purity.²³ This was more than a religious matter; its sponsors recommended it as the means to the "justice" and "unity" of the state.²⁴ Conversely, the state must have seen in the doctrine of purification a powerful sanction of its centralized justice: the "stain," a source of public danger, creates a public interest which requires the compulsory intervention of central authority.²⁵

²¹ This is a safe inference from the interdict against the slayer, as well as from his exile and from the right of killing or arresting him should he return unlawfully. See Bonner and Smith, *The Administration of Justice from Homer to Aristotle*, I (Chicago, 1930), 113 ff., for the English translation and interpretation of Draco's law. (Hereafter I shall refer to this book, to which I am deeply indebted, as "Bonner and Smith.")

²² Hdt. v. 71; Thuc. i. 126; Plut. *Solon* 12. Plutarch adds that Solon actively intervened in the settlement which procured the exile of the "polluted" party.

²³ For the association with Delphi: Plut. *Solon* 11. 1 and 14. 4; also Aeschines iii. 108. For Epimenides: Plut. *Solon* 12. 4-6. I say "rival"—though the issue is immaterial to my argument—on the strength of Epimenides Frag. 11 (in Diels-Kranz, *op. cit.*, 3. B. 11):

οὐτὸ γὰρ ἦν γαίης μέσος ἀμφαλὸς οὐτὸ θαλάσσης
εἰ δὲ τις ἔστιν, θεοῖς ὅλος, θνητοῖσι δ' ἄφαντος.

This is clearly an attack on Delphic doctrine (so recognized by Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube der Hellenen* [Berlin, 1931], II, 37, n. 2). L. R. Farnell (*Cults of the Greek States* [Oxford, 1896-1909], IV, 297) notes that in Epimenides' lustration we find no "recognition of Apollo," in spite of the fact that the purification of the city had been ordered by Delphi (Diog. Laert. i. 10. 110). Altars which memorialized the purification at Athens were "nameless" (*ἄνομος ἀνώνυμος* [ibid.]). Why, then, does Farnell (*op. cit.*) assume that Epimenides was Delphi's choice for the lustration?

²⁴ Plut. *Solon* 12. 1-6.

²⁵ The crucial process in the transition must have been the pronouncement of the interdict. Originally this was in fact, as it later continued in theory, the business of the victim's family (*JG*, I², 115, ll. 21-22;

In Aeschylus, Sophocles, and Antiphon the orator, we see how strong a hold these ideas must have had at one time over the popular imagination. Plato accords them fulsome deference as the sanction of his own law of homicide.²⁶ Nor have we any ground for questioning Solon's own pious adherence to the rites and ideology of purification. He conserved intact Draco's law of homicide and maintained the Areopagus not only as a homicide court but also as a "guardian" of the state with broad and undefined powers to "straighten" wrongdoers.²⁷ This heritage from aristocracy, with its associated ideas of the Erinyes, blood-stain, and propitiation, he kept, but kept in its place.²⁸ He then turned to a different concept of political justice to furnish the rationale of the new democratic institutions.²⁹

The justice of pollution belongs to a realm of mystery, whose logic can be adumbrated in the form of myth but cannot be understood by ordinary human

Antiphon vi. 34; Demosth. xlvii. 69). But the effect of this pronouncement is public business, for it excludes another citizen from the city's public life on the ground that his presence there would be a public danger. The state steps in to reserve this right to itself (*Ath. pol.* 57. 2, and other references cited *ad loc.* in Sandys' edition); therewith the state becomes the compulsory judge of the guilt of the accused and assessor of the punishment which will satisfy the public interest.

²⁶ The belief in purification seems to have been weakening during the fourth century, its practice falling into disuse (see Bonner and Smith, II, 205-7). Plato's frequent references to "purification in accordance with Delphic rites" suggest a zealot's effort to reverse the trend.

²⁷ *Ath. pol.* 8. 4.

²⁸ Solon did not hesitate to invade this sacred area of Eupatrid exegesis under stress of compelling public interest, as, e.g., in his funeral regulations (see below, n. 67).

²⁹ I do not mean to suggest two watertight compartments. One could cite many magical ideas in Attic civil and constitutional law. The most obvious instance is the whole conception of the oath as a curse. Solon himself was willing to exploit the curse for so mundane a matter as the enforcement of his export regulations (Plut. *Solon* 24. 1). Such vestiges, important as they are, do not affect my thesis that Solon's judicial and constitutional reforms are inspired by a natural rather than by a magical conception of justice.

reason. Its claim to truth rests upon the authority of the oracles which support it or upon the antiquity of the tradition which certifies it.³⁰ Solonian justice, on the other hand, is intelligible in principle; its judgments are verified in the common experience of the *polis*. Though "obscure" (*ἀφανές*)³¹ and "most difficult to understand" (*χαλεπώτατον νοῆσαι* [Frag. 16]), it remains a "measure of judgment" (*γνωμοσύνης μέτρον* [*ibid.*]). The fact that this "measure" is all-comprehensive ("has the end of all things" [*ibid.*]) does not put it beyond the reach of human understanding: Theognis, echoing this very line of Solon's, thinks of "the judgment which has the end of all things" as a gift gods give to *mortals* (ll. 1171–72).³² Certainly, Solon expects it to be understood in sufficient measure to enlighten the "city-men" (Frag. 4. 5) and the *dēmos* (Frag. 9. 4) as to the ends of their political action or inaction and thus save them from disaster. What "the Athenians"³³ cannot see for themselves, they can at least be "taught" (Frag. 4. 31). And they can test this teaching in the light of their own ex-

perience;³⁴ "time" will show whether the teaching is madness or the reverse, "when the truth itself becomes public."³⁵ In this "public" universe of discourse, Solon can now explain what it is that makes justice a matter of common concern to every member of the community. He does so in terms of two ideas: the common peace and the common freedom.

B. THE COMMON PEACE

Peace (*hēsychiē*) and its opposite, disturbance (occurring in the fragments only as a verb, *ταράσσω*), are matters of ordinary experience. They can be annexed to the domain of magic, as we have seen above. But taken by themselves they belong to the common-sense naturalism of Greek thought. Thus they play an enormous role in Hippocratic medicine. There, next to *krasis* itself, *hēsychiē* is the most general attribute of health.³⁶ *Krasis* is

³⁰ Cf. Plutarch's sad explanation of the impotence of Anaxagorean meteorology against current superstition (*Nicias* 23. 2): *οὐδ' αὐτὸς ἦν παλαιὸς οὖτε ὁ λόγος ἐνδοξος*.

³¹ *Ἀφανές* here not "unintelligible" but "hard to understand," i.e., discernible, but only to the most penetrating view, as in Heraclitus Frag. 54 (Diels): *ἀφανὴς φανερός κρείττων*. To empirically minded doctors the whole of *physiologia* seemed an excursion into the *ἀφανές* (see II. *ἀρχ. ἱγρική* 1; even the dogmatic theorist of II. *φύσιος ἀνθρ.* affects the same view in chap. 1).

³² Theognis' parallel throws further light on the sense of *γνωμοσύνη* in Solon's Frag. 16; it is "practical" knowledge; through it one keeps clear of *hybris* and *κῆρος*. Like *σοφία*, *γνωμοσύνη* (or *γνώμη*) has a *μέτρον* (Frag. 16: *γνωμοσύνης . . . νοῆσαι μέτρον*); and to know this *μέτρον* is to have skill in action (cf. the poet in Frag. 13: *σοφίης μέτρον ἐπιστάμενος*).

³³ Here, as elsewhere (e.g., Frag. 10: *σῆμασι δ' ὀμνῶ*), Solon makes a significant assumption: all Athenians are expected to think about the common good. Antidemocratic regimes typically assumed the reverse: e.g., the herald in Euripides *Suppl.* 420–22: *γαπῶνος δ' ἀνθρ τίνας* (as also, no doubt, the *ναυτικός δῆλος*) . . . οὐκ ἂν εἴναιτο πρὶς τὰ κοινὰ ἀπαλλέμενοι.

³⁴ Just such a relation of expert to laymen is assumed in Ionian science. E.g., Περὶ ἀρχαίων ἱγρική 2. It is not easy for *δημόται* to understand the nature and cause of their ailments: *ὅτ' ἄλλου δὲ εὐρηγμένα καὶ λεγόμενα, εὐκέρως, οὐδὲν γὰρ ἕτερον ἢ ἀναμιμνήσκεται ἑαυτοὺς ἀκούων τῶν αὐτῶ συμβαινόντων*. The last statement fits exactly Solon's political discourse: to get his point the Athenians need only take stock of *τὰ αὐτοῖς συμβαλόντα*. Heraclitus is impatient with his fellows because they cannot understand their own experience (Frag. 17 [Diels]: *δόξοις* [so Wilamowitz] *ἐγκυροῦσιν*; Frag. 72 [Diels]: *οἱ καὶ ἄμεινον ἐγκυροῖσι*) after he has explained it all to them (Frag. 1 [Diels]: *πειρώμενοι καὶ ἐπίων καὶ ἔργων τοιοῦτων ἀκούων ἐγὼ διηγέμεναι*).

³⁵ *ἐς μέσον*. In Herodotus, *ἐς μέσον τίθημι* means to "put anything into a common pool." He uses it for the transfer of political authority from the hands of king or tyrant into the hands of the people (e.g., III. 142: *ἐγὼ δὲ ἐς μέσον τὴν ἀρχὴν τίθειμι ἱστανόμην ὅμιν προαγορεύει*; cf. III. 80 and IV. 161. 15; *ἐς τὸ κοινὸν* has exactly the same sense in III. 80).

³⁶ As the opposite of *ταραχή*. See below, n. 38. *Ταραχή* versus *φύσις* corresponds to *μετάστασις* versus *κατάστασις*: the unsettling of the normal condition versus the return to normal. E.g., 14. 26–28 ("Loeb" *Hippocrates*, Vol. II, ed. W. H. S. Jones): *ἢ μὲν οὖν παντελὸς ἔστιν ἀναταραχὴ τὸ αἷμα, παντελὸς δὲ φρόνησις ἐπαδόδλυνται*; and 14. 63–64: *καταστάσονται τοῦ αἵματος, . . . τίττανται τὸ νόσημα*. It is significant that *κατάστασις* comes to mean not only the process of "quieting down" into health but, far more broadly, the constitution itself, whether of the human body, of the seasons, or of the body politic, each of which is a *κατάστασις* (see examples in Liddell and Scott, *Lexicon*, [new ed.], s.v., II, 2, 3).

clearly the more technical concept, worked out in conjunction with Ionian and Italian physics. It is then fair to assume that *hēsychiē* is the prior notion and, as such, the earliest empirical characterization of health, emerging side by side with magical ideas and surviving when these were sloughed off. Thus Solon's only medical allusion refers to the sick as "disturbed"³⁷ (Frag. 13. 61). This reminds us of the "disturbed" sea in Fragment 12; and again of the political "stirring-up"³⁸ which gives the would-be tyrant his chance to skim off the cream of state power. As we saw in Fragment 12, *hēsychiē* was "just" for the sea, i.e., the state that keeps the measure of its proper nature; disturbance would be "excess." That *hēsychiē* has the same sense in politics is clear from Solon's exhortation to the nobles:

Still [ἡσυχάσαντες] the strong heart
within your breast,
You who have forced your way to
good things in excess [ἐς κόρον],
Put your proud [literally, "great"]
mind within the measure.³⁹

And it is further confirmed in Fragment 4, which explicitly contrasts "quietness of life" (δαῖτος ἐν ἡσυχίῃ [l. 10]) with *hybris* and excess (κόρος).

Hence the significance of Solon's reference to *stasis* and war. A lecture on the evils of civil strife would be superfluous for a Greek audience. The point of Solon's message is rather to fix imaginatively a frame of reference within which the occurrence and effects of *stasis* could be

properly appreciated. *Stasis* is not an isolated event that comes only when wilfully fomented by the "lover of dread civil strife" (*Il.* ix. 64). It is an integral part of a breakdown of the state of social well-being, which Solon called *eunomiē*. Consequently, (1) any act of injustice, impairing the "good-order," "good sense," and "soundness" of the common life, is a real, though quite likely unintentional, cause of civil strife;⁴⁰ and (2) the distemper of the body politic, evidenced by *stasis*, is all-comprehensive in its effects. It is a "plague which comes to all the city" (Frag. 4. 17); a "public calamity which comes home to everyone," invading the private security of the family. Therefore, any act of injustice, impairing the common security, threatens everyone's individual security—and family solidarity can interpose no effective protection.⁴¹

This thought has momentous implications. It says in effect: a direct injury to any member of the *polis* is indirectly, but no less surely, an injury to every member of the *polis*; for, though the initial injustice affects only one or a few, the eventual effects on the common well-being imperil everyone's welfare; hence anybody's wrong is everybody's business. That Solon himself was aware of just these implications is confirmed by the fact that we find them imbedded in his judicial reforms. For the principle of "true criminal law"⁴²

³⁷ The characteristics of *eunomia* which εὐνομία καὶ ἀρτία πάντ' ἀποφαίνει (4. 33) and makes πάντα κατ' ἀνθρώπων ἀρτία καὶ κινυρά (4. 40).

³⁸ "Ἔρκος and αἰδή for the family and its private sanctities: Schol. on Plato *Euthyd.* 302 d: ἵσταν τοῖς οἴκοις Ἀθηναῖοι φασι· ἐκ τούτου δὲ καὶ Ζεὺς ἔρκος παρ' αὐτοῖς, ἐν ἱέρειον ἐν τούτοις φυλάκῃς χεῖρ. For the family as a power which could effectively defy the common justice of the city in early times, see *Od.* xviii. 139.

³⁹ See G. M. Calhoun, *The Growth of Criminal Law in Ancient Greece* (Berkeley, 1927), chap. iv. (I shall refer to this book hereafter simply as "Calhoun.") In spite of his unwillingness to recognize the due place of the doctrine of pollution in the development of Greek criminal law, Calhoun's argument seems to me valid and illuminating. His thesis that "true criminal law" (in his sense of this expression) is a Solonian innova-

³⁷ Literally "stirred up," ἀνέμεινον. Cf. the hendiadys in Aesch. *PV* 994: κακάρω πάντα καὶ παρασείτω.

³⁸ Frag. 37: ἀνατράξας. For Hippocratic usage cf. αἶμα ἀναεταραχόμενα (*Aphorisms* iv. 70); κοιλίῃ παραχόῃσι or ἐπεταρῆσθαι (frequently in *Epid.* i and iii); τὰ τῆς γνάμης παραχόῃσι (*ibid.* iii. 8).

³⁹ Frag. 28c; with μετρίοις, the Kaibel-Wilamowitz reading, followed by Edmonds, in place of μετρίοις of the papyrus.

is precisely that certain offenses against individuals are not merely private wrongs against the immediate victim but public wrongs against the whole community. And this, as Calhoun has argued, was fully recognized for the first time in Greek history in Solon's legislation enabling any citizen (δ βουλόμενος) to bring action for offenses committed against other persons.⁴³

That certain actions menace directly the safety of the whole community had been felt from the earliest times. Those guilty of such acts were treated as outlaws and could be killed by anyone without endangering the killer ($\nu\eta\pi\omega\iota\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon\theta\rho\acute{\alpha}\nu\alpha\iota$).⁴⁴ The doctrine of pollution created new areas of concern for the public safety and justified new procedures for its protection. Hence the provision of the Draconian law which permitted anyone to slay or commit to the authorities ($\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon\iota\upsilon$ [inf.]) a man who unlawfully returns from exile for unintentional murder (*IG*, I², 61, ll. 30–31). If the second alternative were followed ($\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon\iota\upsilon$), a public inquiry would probably be held to establish the identity of the prisoner and the fact of his capture on Attic soil.⁴⁵ In this inquiry the captor would act in a genuine, though

rudimentary, sense as prosecutor in the public interest.⁴⁶ He could act so precisely because the prisoner "is not prosecuted as a murderer but as a polluted person. . . . He is a public menace."⁴⁷

Solon's originality consists in extending

"I say 'rudimentary' because the returning exile has already been condemned by previous judgment of court; the captor *could* execute the sentence on the spot. If, alternatively, he is seized and delivered to the magistrates, the captor's initiative in the matter is substantially that of seeing to the execution of the standing verdict. At the public inquiry the captor is also accuser and, in that sense, *bona fide* prosecutor; yet his contribution is that of depositing information as to matters of fact. Solonian public action, on the other hand, calls for wider initiative: δ βουλόμενος takes it upon himself to interpret the meaning of the law, judge that it incriminates the offender, and assume the responsibility (often with attendant risks) of persuading a court that his judgment is correct.

Bonner and Smith (pp. 122, 168) surmise further that the code's provision against abuse or blackmail of the returning exile, *E*, would entail prosecution by δ βουλόμενος. If this could be confirmed, it would provide a thoroughgoing anticipation of Solonian public action. But the hypothesis rests on the assumption that *E* "being [a] polluted and [β] *atimos* was debarred from appearing in court to exact the penalty" (I, 122). Now as to [a], do we know enough of the ceremonial etiquette of purification to validate this assumption? Antiphon explains that homicide courts sit in the open air so that jurors and prosecutors may not be *δυσωρόφωτοι* with the polluted defendant (v. 11). Might not a similar provision suffice to safeguard the ceremonial purity of the court in the present instance? As to [β], again the evidence seems inadequate. What do we know of what the *atimos* could or could not do in such an instance? Reasoning *a priori* from the fact that he could be killed without so much as bringing blood-guilt upon the killer (Demosth. ix. 43; and cf. the broader formula in the Eretrian inscription cited in *RIJG*, II, 49: $\acute{\alpha}\tau\iota\mu\omega\varsigma \kappa\tau\omega\iota\kappa\alpha\iota \dots \delta \acute{\alpha}\nu \pi\acute{\alpha}\theta\epsilon\iota \nu\eta\pi\omega\iota\epsilon\iota\tau\epsilon \kappa\alpha\iota\tau\omega\iota\kappa\alpha\iota$), one would assume that he had no rights whatever. But Draco's code unexpectedly assures him residual rights, such as immunity from personal abuse and blackmail. If these, why not others? Incidentally, there is a simpler reason why *E* would not prosecute of his own accord, no matter how abused, so long as he was still at large; for he could not do so without delivering himself up to the authorities for arrest under the law. So the question is, what form of action would be open (1) after apprehension, to *E*; and (2) before apprehension to any third party, *X*, who discovered *E*'s unlawful abuse by someone else? In the case of (2), *X* would surely first take steps toward *E*'s apprehension. If successful, the case reduces to (1). But if unsuccessful, how could *X* prosecute the party guilty of abuse or blackmail without *E*'s presence to give evidence? There is room here for conjecture by analogy with later procedure. But should we not have more than conjecture as a base for so revolutionary a departure in Attica as prosecution by a third party having no direct connection with the case, not even that of $\acute{\alpha}\pi\acute{\alpha}\gamma\epsilon\iota\upsilon$?

⁴⁷ Gertrude Smith, in *CP*, XVII (1922), 197.

tion gears in well with my argument that Solon's whole concept of justice was in no sense a further extension of the doctrine of pollution but a radically new departure.

⁴³ *Ath. pol.* 9. 1; Plut. *Solon* 18. 5. Thereby, Plutarch explains, "the legislator trained the citizens to feel and suffer in unison with each other like members of one body." The organic metaphor is Platonic; but would Plato have thought of applying the schema of organic unity to the judicial procedure of Athenian democracy? The Athenians themselves clearly thought of this as a distinctive feature of their democracy (cf. Demosth. xxi. 45, quoted below, p. 71; and Hyperides *Euz.* 11 [col. 8], who asks of this procedure, $\tau\iota \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\eta \pi\acute{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon\iota \beta\acute{\iota}\alpha\tau\iota\omega\iota \S \delta\eta\mu\omega\tau\iota\kappa\acute{\omega}\tau\epsilon\rho\omega\iota$). For the opposite conception see Xenophon *Const. Lac.* 10. 6: "For he [namely, 'Lycurgus'] believed that enslavement, fraud, robbery, wrong only the individuals who are injured" ($\tau\omega\iota\varsigma \beta\lambda\alpha\pi\tau\omega\mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu\omega\varsigma \mu\acute{\omega}\nu\alpha\delta \acute{\alpha}\delta\iota\kappa\iota\sigma\theta\epsilon\alpha\iota$).

⁴⁴ Calhoun, pp. 66–67.

⁴⁵ Bonner and Smith, I, 121.

the right of public action to cases in which there could be no question of a "public menace" by contemporary standards of pollution or common sense—i.e., to injuries which impinged *only* on the rights of the particular victim and did *not* obviously affect the rights of the community at large. Such offenses as these had been traditionally held to be the private business of the parties directly concerned; Hesiod warns his brother to mind his own business and keep his ears "out of the disputes of the court-house."⁴⁸ Solon's achievement was to break down this way of thinking and validate the opposite assumption that, as Demosthenes was to put it later, "every deed of violence is a common injury, affecting those also who are not directly concerned" (*καὶ κατὰ τῶν ἔξω τοῦ πράγματος* [xxi. 45]). This is a revolutionary departure. It was made possible by Solon's subtler, deeper concept of social solidarity, which discovered a public import even in private wrongs against private persons.⁴⁹ The doctrine of pollu-

tion had proved incapable of this advance—witness the fact that under its influence homicide remained through the classical period a private wrong, actionable only by the family of the victim! The advance was made possible through a clear insight into the causal connection of any act of injustice with the common peace and well-being.

Next to the right of public action, Aristotle mentions Solon's introduction of "the appeal to the *dicasterion* to which the masses have owed most of their strength."⁵⁰ This included (1) the admission of every citizen as a member of some court of justice—presumably the assembly itself, acting in a judicial capacity,⁵¹ and (2) the right of appeal to this court from the decisions of the magistrates.⁵²

We may cite precedents for both of these advances: Point 1 is rightly interpreted by Bonner and Smith as "a rehabilitation and reorganization of the

⁴⁸ Op. 27–32. I follow Bonner and Smith's rendering for *reises* ἀγορῆς.

⁴⁹ I say "made possible," not "caused," for I am discussing ideology not social dynamics. Something will be said about the latter in due course; but the paper is a study in ideology, and the references to the causal framework will be only incidental. Meanwhile, I hope that I shall not be credited with the naïve assumption which Ranulf (*The Jealousy of the Gods* [London, 1933–35]) imputes to Calhoun and others: that the cause of the institution of the Solonian *graphe* was nothing but the *idea* of the public import of private wrongs. Ideas become political realities only when backed by groups that possess political power. For a causal explanation one should look to the composition of the forces which first challenged (in the great *stasis* of *Ath. pol.* 2. 1 and 5. 1) and then destroyed (in Solon's archonship) the Eupatrid monopoly of state power.

As for Ranulf's own contribution to the problem, it is a pity that he never distinguished clearly between two problems: (1) how to explain the original institution of the *graphe* and (2) how to explain the fact that, once instituted, the *graphe* worked (on the assumption that it did). Problem 1 is essentially sociological; while 2 is mainly a psychological problem; 1 is a function of the changing relationships of social classes under changing historical conditions; 2 is a function of the probable motives of individuals under those circumstances. Ranulf's theory of "disguised envy" is largely irrelevant to problem 1; it is substantially an answer

to 2. But even here it remains to be shown that "disguised envy" is not only a motive (which I, for one, would readily grant), but the motive—i.e., so much more powerful and more prevalent than other motives impelling Athenians to take the initiative of the *graphe* that it alone "explains" why the *graphe* really worked. Ranulf makes no serious effort to consider these other motives and assess their weight; and this, because of an assumption which determines his very formulation of the problem: "What can have induced Athenian citizens thus regularly, *without benefit to themselves* [my italics], to invoke the law for the protection of others?" (I, 11). Why assume that, in the absence of a lawyer's fee or state salary, the prosecutor would get no "benefit" and be purely "disinterested" in the act—this among a people so avid for *κέρδος* *ἐσθλόν* (Solon *Frag.* 19), and for the power to be "sweet to one's friends, bitter to one's enemies" (Solon *Frag.* 13. 5)?

⁵⁰ *Ath. pol.* 9. 1.

⁵¹ *Ibid.* 7. 3, 9. 1–2; cf. *Pol.* 1274 a 3; see also Bonner and Smith, I, 153–59.

⁵² It is now the people's turn to "straighten" justice. Cf. *Pol.* 1274 a 16: *τὸ τὰς ἀρχῶν αἰρεῖσθαι καὶ εὐθύνειν* and 1281 b 35: *ἀρχαίρετος καὶ εὐθύνων τῶν ἀρχόντων*. (It is not necessary to assume that *εὐθύνειν* meant in Solon's time the regular audit of retiring magistrates [see Gillard, pp. 288–89, and Bonner and Smith, I, 164–65].) Here, once again (see, above, n. 33), Solon denies in principle a basic antidemocratic dogma (cf. Eurip. *Suppl.* 418).

Homeric *agora*" (I, 166); Point 2 may well have been inspired by contemporary experiments in the Ionian laboratory of democratic politics. The well-known Chian decree provides for appeals from the decisions of magistrates to the final judgment of a "public council."⁵³ But Solon again outdistances his precedents. Appeals to an assembly which included of right all citizens⁵⁴ is a very different matter from appeal to a court of elected officials.

The precious right of "straightening crooked judgments" now ceases to be the exclusive privilege of public officials—whether these be the nobles of the Homeric and later aristocratic period or even the elected council of more democratic times. It now belongs in principle to the people as a whole. Here again Solon's statesmanship is true to the logic of his position as here interpreted: injustice, a public evil, affects everybody; therefore, justice, a public necessity, is everybody's business. The most radical institution of fifth- and fourth-century Athens—the public dicasteries—is no more than a

literal application of this very principle. Solon certainly did not envisage anything so extreme. But history has a way of carrying the logic of an idea far beyond its author's intentions.

Without attempting a complete analysis of Solon's constitutional changes,⁵⁵ we may notice, finally, one of the oddities in his reform-program which is without known precedent or parallel: "he who will not take arms with either party when the *polis* is in a state of strife, should be disfranchised and have no share in the *polis*" (*Ath. pol.* 8. 5, and parallel references as cited by Sandys, *ad loc.*).⁵⁶ "He intends apparently," Plutarch interprets, "that no man should be insensible or indifferent to the common weal, making his private affairs secure and flattering himself that he does not share the pain and sickness of the fatherland . . ." (*Solon* 20. 1). This is flowery language; but the thought is true to the concept of civil strife as we have found it in Solon's poems: Strife is no mere private dispute; it is the end-product of *hybris*, which disrupts the common well-being; neutrality in such a matter is impossible, except for one who wilfully abstracts himself from the common life.

⁵³ No. 1 in M. N. Tod, *A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions* (Oxford, 1933). I say "final judgment" on the strength of *τελευτικός* in l. 18, which I interpret with Tod, in the active sense, "with power to inflict penalties." The "public council" of this inscription is an elective body able *τὰ ἑλὼτα πρήσσειν τὰ δέμον καὶ δίκας δύναι* (ll. 19–20).

⁵⁴ Aristotle *Pol.* 1274 a 3: *τὰ δικαστήρια ποιήσας ἐκ πάντων*. Certainly there is no property qualification; what of an age qualification? Bonner and Smith (I, 162) think it unlikely since none is mentioned in our sources. But this, of course, is not conclusive, especially (1), as Bonner and Smith themselves point out (I, 162, n. 1), no age qualification is mentioned for the Solonian *boule*, while the Cleisthenian is known to have excluded men under thirty; and (2) there was the well-known age limit of thirty for jurors later on (*Ath. pol.* 63. 3). A more "extreme" democracy would be more likely to reduce age limits than to increase them. On the other hand, Bonner and Smith's position on this point follows from their other assumption, reasonable enough (see above, n. 51), that assembly and Solonian popular court consisted of the same people. In any case, the issue is of no great consequence for my argument. An age limit of thirty, if it did exist, would scarcely affect the democratic complexion of the Solonian popular court.

⁵⁵ *Εἰσαγγελία* would be specially worthy of notice in a more exhaustive study. Before Solon it meant denunciation of private wrongs by the wronged (*Ath. pol.* 4. 4). Solon extended it to offenses which were in no sense private injuries but only threats to the security of the constitution: *τοὺς ἐπὶ καταλόγου τοῦ δήμου συνιστάμενους* (*ibid.* 8. 4; though the phrase *ἐπὶ καταλόγου τοῦ δήμου* is certainly post-Solonian; there is no reason to think that Solon would refer to the government as *δήμος*; see below, p. 82). The implicit logic of private prosecution for a public danger is, once again, the solidarity of "our" *polis*.

⁵⁶ This is sometimes rejected on the ground that it is never invoked by the orators (Gilliland, p. 292). It would then have to be an invention of Aristotle or his source. Yet fourth-century conservative circles can hardly be considered enthusiasts for universal participation in *stasis*! Their motto would be rather *φειδία, ἀπαργισμός* (Isoc. *Antidosis*, 151). Their Theramenes was held up as a man who could be a loyal citizen under any constitution: *δρεπ ὅτιν ἀγαθὸν πολίτην ἔργων* (*Ath. pol.* 28. 5).

C. THE COMMON FREEDOM

So it is with his concept of freedom. This, too, is felt as the common concern of the *polis*, because the bondage of anyone endangers the freedom of everyone. Thus the bondage of the *hektemoroi* is not viewed as their individual misfortune but as the common disaster of the *polis*. It is the "land" ("Black Earth, great mother of the Olympian gods" [Frag. 36. 4-5]), which is "enslaved" by the "ward-posts" (*δποι*) and must therefore be "freed." The point at issue here requires a clear understanding of the historical facts to which Solon refers in this poem: the interpretation of these facts, the fruit of painstaking and imaginative scholarship, may be summarized as follows:⁵⁷

The sale of the ancestral lot (the *kleros*) was prohibited in pre-Solonian Attica. But a loophole in the law had been found through what later came to be called "sale with option of redemption" (*πράσις ἐπὶ λύσει*). This permitted the peasant to borrow money, on condition that, pending redemption of the loan, he would pay the creditor a fixed proportion of the yearly produce. Thus the creditor got not only a yearly income but also a hold over the labor of the debtor, who remained on the land "as life tenant of what had been his ancestral holding."⁵⁸ Lewis points out that the peasant's promise to deliver the fixed annual payment itself required real security; since land was inalienable, the peasant had to offer his own person (and/or that of his family) as security at the time of the original contract. His creditor then could hold over him the constant threat of selling him off into slavery, and therewith

had "a control in effect if not in law of the debtor's person and actions."⁵⁹ Of this "most harsh and bitter bondage" (*Ath. pol.* 2. 3) the ward-stones were the visible sign. And this is what Solon ended when he abolished retroactively all debts on the security of the debtor. Deprived of their real security, the agricultural debts could not be enforced, ownership reverted to the peasant, and the ward-stones could be "pulled up" (*ἀνελθόν* [Frag. 36. 6]).

So when Solon speaks of the "land" as "enslaved" by the ward-stones, he thinks of the land whose incumbrance by debt entailed the subjection of the peasants. This is the peasant's land. Yet he equates the bondage of *their* land to the bondage of *the* land, i.e., the fatherland.⁶⁰ How explain this tremendous assumption? Only by comparing "enslavement" in this fragment with the different, though related, sense of "enslavement" in Fragments 9 and 10, where it clearly means the subjection of the whole city—poor and rich alike—to a tyrant. How does the city fall into such a fate? Because, as we know from history,⁶¹ it was divided within. Wherever there is "disturbance," there the would-be tyrant gets his chance.⁶² Thus the logic of history justifies Solon's assumption that the enslavement of the *hektemoroi* is tantamount to the enslavement of the *polis* itself; for history showed that there could be no peace in Attica if the peasants were oppressed. They had power enough to make *stasis*, and this would rob the whole *polis* of its freedom.

⁵⁷ Lewis, *op. cit.*, p. 150.

⁵⁸ For γὰρ with the sense "state" and/or "fatherland" see Frag. 28a: *πρωθυράργη . . . γαίαν ἱερὰν*; Frag. 32: *εἰ δὲ γὰρ ἐφείσθην καρπὸς . . .*; Frag. 34: *πείρας χθονὸς καρπὸς*. Cf. also Callinus Frag. 1. 7; Tyrtaeus Frag. 9. 34 (Diehl); Theognis 1214. Cf. also the original sense of *dēmos*, "country" (below, n. 115).

⁵⁹ *Ath. pol.* 13.

⁶⁰ Frag. 37. To be sure, in Frags. 9 and 10, Solon attributes "bondage" to ignorance; but this is elliptical, stressing one aspect of the conditions which lead to tyranny.

⁵⁸ Following Woodhouse; and Naphtali Lewis, "Solon's Agrarian Legislation," *AJP*, LXII (1941), 144-56. Their interpretation is ingenious, well thought out, and makes good sense from every point of view. Much of it rests on tenuous evidence; but it must be accepted in the absence of a more satisfactory construction of the data (see also below, n. 93).

⁵⁹ Woodhouse, p. 111.

Freedom must either be enjoyed in common, or else it would be lost in common. The *polis* is one, and its freedom is indivisible.

The most important of all of Solon's reforms is a direct application of this view of freedom: If the freedom of each is the concern of all, then the *polis* must protect everyone against personal enslavement, even to the extent of ransoming, with state funds, Athenians who had already spent many years as slaves in other lands.⁶³ Thus he "liberated the commons once for all" (*Ath. pol.* 6. 1). But more than this was required. As a protector of the common liberty the *polis* could brook no rival; it had to curb the power of the noble clans to secure a privileged freedom within their own proud circle. The judicial reforms already mentioned struck a heavy blow against their monopoly of state power. But there were others:

1. Eligibility to public office had been a matter of noble birth; Solon made it a matter of property.⁶⁴

2. Appointment to office had been made by the sole authority of the Areopagus (*Ath. pol.* 8. 2); now it became a matter of sortition from panels elected by the tribes.⁶⁵

3. The Areopagus itself was further weakened by the creation of a new council of four hundred, "one hundred from each tribe" (*Ath. pol.* 8. 4); its powers included the probouleutic function which in Sparta belonged to the senate and the kings (*Plut. Lycurgus* 6. 4).⁶⁶

⁶³ *Frag.* 36. 8-9. The use of state funds is, of course, only an inference; but how else could they be "brought back"?

⁶⁴ *Ath. pol.* 7. 3: "To each class he gave office in proportion to its *rimma*."

⁶⁵ *Ibid.* 8. 1. The mode of election is unknown. We may assume that every member of the tribe had a vote. But the *φωλοσυνιδεις* was a Eupatrid (*Pollux* viii. 111), and this would no doubt give the aristocrats advantages in the electoral process.

⁶⁶ *Plutarch* mentions its probouleutic function (*Solon* 19. 1) but says nothing to preclude other pow-

4. Conspicuous displays of the power and prestige of the noble families were scaled down in two important matters: the conduct of funerals and the public honors accorded to athletic victors.⁶⁷

ers. It seems unlikely that the earlier Council of 400 was limited to *probouleucin* (important as this was), if the Cleisthenian Council of 500 was, in its inception, "virtually the sovereign body of the state" (Bonner and Smith, I, 342). If it was the Solonian Boule of 400 that headed the democratic forces in the struggle of 508-7 B.C. (*Ath. pol.* 20. 3; *Hdt.* v. 72; P. Cloché, *Revue des études grecques*, XXXVII [1924], 1-26), it would follow that its constitutional powers were wide and that it was in some sense a democratic counterpoise to the Areopagus. *Plutarch* thinks that the Boule of 400 was conceived as a brake upon the "boldness" of the *dēmos*. But if this was Solon's object, why create a new body? The magistrates and/or the Areopagus could have served the purpose. *Freeman* (p. 73) thinks that the probouleutic function had been exercised by the presiding officer, the archon eponymus. This is a natural enough supposition. But in Sparta this power belonged to the senate along with the kings (*Plut. Lyc.* 6). By analogy we should assume that in Athens it would belong to the Areopagus along with the archon eponymus and perhaps others of his fellow-archons. Aristotle's phrase *τῶν μὲν τῶν ἐκ τῶν διαπραξίων τοῖς νόμοις* (*Ath. pol.* 6. 6) is certainly broad enough to include *probouleucin*. The Areopagus' general guardianship over the state would of itself make a good peg on which to hang the claim to examine any matter that was to come before the Assembly.

⁶⁷ The political import of Solon's regulation of funeral ceremonies has been noticed (e.g., Glotz, *Histoire grecque*, I [Paris, 1925], 434; L. Gernet and A. Boulanger, *Le Génie grec dans la religion* [Paris, 1932], pp. 160-61). But perhaps something remains to be said on the boldness of Solon's move, imposing the rules of the city upon matters which fell so definitely under Eupatrid exegesis (cf. *Athen.* x. 410 a). Less attention has been paid to Solon's "curtailment of the honors of athletes" (*Diog. Laert.* I, 55; cf. *Plut. Solon* 23. 3; *Diod. Sic.* ix. 2. 5) which included (1) fixing a scale for the city's "gift" to athletic victors and (2) regulating the public meals to which, by a widespread Greek practice (*Xenophanes* *Frag.* 2. 8-9), victors were entitled (*Plut. Solon* 24. 3 is not very definite; *Athen.* iv. 137 e suggests that the fare was simplified). Bowra ("Xenophanes and the Olympic Games," *AJP*, LIX [1938], 263) thinks it may be reasonably doubted whether "in earlier centuries athletic renown was so universally prized by aristocrats" (sc. as in the fifth century). But that it was prized highly enough is clear from his own interesting observations (*ibid.*, pp. 265-66). Solon the merchant confronted a tradition which, since Homer (*Od.* viii. 159 ff.), had exalted the aristocratic sportsman at the expense of the "greedy" merchant. It would be strange if this tradition were anything but strong during the seventh century, when new athletic events were being introduced at the Olympian games and when the Pythia, Isthmia, and Nemea were so growing in popularity that, within three decades after the turn of the century, all three

No less significant were two further classes of reforms, whose erosive effect on the old order was bound to be most damaging upon the noble families who had been its chief beneficiaries. The first of these conferred the heretofore unheard-of freedom to bequeath land outside the *genos* in the absence of legitimate male issue.⁶⁸ This, says Plutarch, "made a man's possessions his own property" (*Solon* 12. 2).⁶⁹ The second seriously reduced the father's ancient power of life and death over his children: He could no longer sell wife or child into slavery, or

expel at will a son from the household, or exact from him any deference beyond that of food, clothing, and an honorable burial.⁷⁰

To claim, as Glotz does, that "through the entirety of these laws the solidarity of the *genos* was now broken once for all, and its power received a fatal blow"⁷¹ is to indulge in rhetorical overstatement. The Eupatrid families survived the Solonian reforms with such power, sacred and profane, as only a "tyrant" could successfully oppose.⁷² The drastic measures of Cleisthenes were required to make constitutional democracy safe against the Eupatrids. Nevertheless, Glotz is right in making Solon the watershed of Athenian history. Before Solon the Eupatrid families were the state. After Solon they are only the strongest of the contestants for power within the state. Solon came far short of establishing liberty on equal terms for all; and we shall see that he had no intention of doing so. But he did break the monopoly of freedom hitherto held by the nobles. He did secure for the masses a modest and, as he believed, "sufficient"⁷³ share in the common freedom of the *polis*.

II. THE JUSTICE OF WEALTH

A. THE BIFURCATION OF JUSTICE

Does the same justice that regulates political action extend also over the pursuit of wealth? So one might think from the opening lines of Fragment 13. The wrongdoing of individual money-grabbing is described here in words which are strikingly similar to those used of the class-covetousness and *hybris* of the nobles in Fragment

were reorganized as Pan-Hellenic festivals (E. N. Gardiner, *Athletics of the Ancient World* [Oxford, 1930], pp. 357-77). Bowra's doubt is prompted by the views of Solon, Tyrtaeus, and "Pythagoras." To the last of these I can attach no weight in a matter which calls for historical evidence. As for Tyrtaeus, he was surely trying to exalt in Sparta (as Solon did in Athens) the "common good of the *polis*" (Frag. 9. 15 [Diehl]: *ἑνὸν δ' ὅσθ' ἂν τοῦτο πόλιν τε παντὶ τε ὄμω*) as against the private ambitions of the nobles and their families. Certainly the Sparta of Tyrtaeus was no democracy. But neither did Tyrtaeus speak as an "aristocrat"; he was a spokesman for the cohesive nationalism of the new Sparta of "Lycurgus" reforms; he was undercutting the system of values of the old regime, where the glory of the *genos* must have reigned supreme. As for the political implications of Olympic victory in seventh-century Athens, the only attempt at "tyranny" of which we know there was made by Cylon, an "Ὀλυμπιονίκης" (Hdt. v. 71; Thuc. i. 126. 1). Finally, it is worth noting that if, as McGregor suggests ("Cleisthenes of Sicyon," *Trans. Amer. Phil. Assoc.*, LXXII [1941], 266-87, at 280), the addition of gymnastic contests meant a certain democratization of the games, the shift apparently came only after Solon's archonship (Paus. x. 7. 5 speaks of the addition of foot races as a Pythian innovation in 586 B.C.); if so, Solon was dealing with an institution which was still solidly aristocratic.

⁶⁸ See references in Glotz, *Solidarité de la famille* (Paris, 1904), p. 342, n. 3, and p. 343, n. 1. Freeman (p. 115) thinks that "the real purpose" was "to prevent the dying-out of the family." But Solon's legislation was permissive (*ἑξίνα*), not compulsive. Its point is surely the power it confers upon the testator to cut out any member of his *ἀγχιστεία* (other than his own legitimate sons) in favor of an outsider. This adds greatly to the testator's freedom of choice, while safeguarding the continuity of the family.

⁶⁹ There is no explicit reference to sale in any of the numerous texts which attest the Solonian institution of the freedom of bequest. *δοῦναι* need not imply sale (cf. *Pol.* 1270 a 20 [of Sparta]: *ἀρεῖσθαι μὲν γὰρ ὅτι πωλεῖν τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐποίησεν ἐκ καλῶν, . . . δίδουσι δὲ καὶ καταλείβειν ἕξουσιν ἔθηκε τοῖς βουλομένοις*).

⁷⁰ Glotz, *Solidarité de la famille*, pp. 351-68.

⁷¹ *Histoire grecque*, I, 434. By *genos* here he means "family."

⁷² Woodhouse (p. 138) calls attention to the striking words of Hdt. vi. 35: *εἶχε μὲν τὸ πᾶν κράτος Παισιστρατος, ἀπὸρ ἰδὼν ἄσπετον γὰρ καὶ Μιλητιάδης δὲ Κυψέλου ὥς αἰεὶ οὐκ ἐπείχετο τρέφου*.

⁷³ *Frag.* 5. 1: *γέρας δέσσειν ἀπαρκεῖ*.

4.⁷⁴ And both are followed by justice exacting the same "inevitable" reparation.⁷⁵ But here the identity ends:

1. There is no suggestion that in the case of wealth the sequence of "injustice" and "reparation" is a natural, self-regulative process. There is no parallel here to the observable chain of consequences (injustice—bondage—strife) which we met in the account of political justice; hence no explanation as to *how* the original injustice leads to "disaster" (*ἄτη*).

2. For all of Solon's initial assurance that unjustly got wealth will not last (Frag. 13, 11–13), he is promptly forced to admit that it may well outlast the life of the unjust man himself; the pursuing justice may only catch up "with the innocent, their children or their seed after them" (ll. 31–32).

This last is a most significant admission. It harks back to a nexus of ideas which had been left behind by Solon's concept of political justice (see Part I, Sec. A). For nothing is so characteristic of the magical view of justice as the postulate that punishment descends biologically upon the sinner's posterity. We have already seen in Hesiod how a man's sin carries with it the extinction of his *genos*.⁷⁶ Almost every recorded curse calls down perdition on the *genos* as well as on the guilty man himself.⁷⁷ The hereditary

transmission of guilt is championed by Delphi⁷⁸ and figures prominently in the doctrine of purification: thus the Cyclonean stain descends to successive generations after the event.⁷⁹ Yet here is something that baffles the sense of justice of the Greeks. They cannot justify the necessity that children should "pay back" the sins of the fathers.⁸⁰ Nor can they see here one of those postulates which, groundless in themselves, at least offer ground for the orderly comprehension of other facts. On the contrary, the inheritance of guilt makes the moral equation less soluble than ever, loading it with unknowns and unknowables from the long-vanished past.⁸¹ That Solon should have to fall back on this very dogma shows how far his view of the justice of wealth has lagged behind his concept of political justice.

I see no way of getting around this bifurcation in his thought. In political justice he is a great innovator, for he thinks of it as an intelligible order of reparation. In acquisitive or distributive justice he is a traditionalist, as Maurice Croiset was the first to observe.⁸² If Fragment 13 were all

⁷⁴ E.g., the story of Glaucus in Hdt. vi. 86, quoting Hesiod's *Op.* 285 in the last line of the Delphic oracle; cf. also Hdt. i. 191, where Croesus is punished for the sins of his fifth ancestor. Other examples are cited by Glotz, *Solidarité de la famille*, p. 564.

⁷⁵ Hdt. vii. 72; Thuc. i. 126. 11–12.

⁷⁶ E.g., "Theognis" 731–52; Eurip. *Hippol.* 1378–83. Cf. also Hdt. vii. 137: if justice had fallen on Sperthias and Bulls, this would be "only justice" (*τὸ δίκαιον*); but that it should fall on their children, *ἔβλον δὲ μοι ἐπὶ θεῶν ἔλπετο τὸ πρήγμα*.

⁷⁷ For the resulting sense of insecurity see Aesch. *Eum.* 931–34: he who has not been able to propitiate the Erinyes "knows not whence come the blows that strike his life. For his fathers' crimes deliver him into their hands."

⁷⁸ "La Morale et la cité dans les poésies de Solon," *Compt. rend. Acad. Inscr. et Belles-Lettres* (Paris, 1903), pp. 581–96. However, I see no warrant for Croiset's assumption that the traditionalist ideas in Frag. 13 are due to the immaturity of Solon's earlier thinking and are presumably sloughed off in his mature view of justice. As I shall explain shortly, the philosophy of wealth in Frag. 13 becomes itself the basis of the Solonian view of the social classes in their mutual relations in the state.

⁷⁴ Cf. *ἄδικος νόος* and *ἄδικος ἔργμας* in 4. 7 and 4. 11 with *ἄδικος* and *ἄδικος ἔργμας* in 13. 7 and 13. 12; *ἔθριος* in 4. 8 and 13. 11; *κορμεῖν* in 4. 10 with *οὐ κατὰ κόσμον* in 13. 11.

⁷⁵ Cf. 4. 16: *τῷ δὲ χρεῖος πάντως ἦλθ' ἄπορος, αἰμένη* with 13. 8: *πάντως ὑστερον ἦδε δίκη* (cf. 13. 30–32), also with 13. 25: *Ζηνὸς τίσις* and with 13. 29: *ἀλλ' ὃ μὲν αἰτίαι' ἔσταιεν, δ' ὅ' ὑστερον*.

⁷⁶ See above, n. 15. Cf. also *Op.* 320 ff., where ruin of the *oikos* is attached to unjust acquisition of wealth by formally equating this with crimes against the traditional sanctity of suppliant, stranger, orphan, and parents (ll. 327–32)—all of which bring down the personal displeasure of Zeus (cf. also *ibid.* 284–85, for the perjurer).

⁷⁷ E.g., Aeschines iii. 111 (cited above, p. 66); Antiphon v. 11; Andocides i. 126; Lysias vi. 20; Demost. xlii. 67; Lycurg. *Leocr.* 79; and the curses cited by Robert, *op. cit.*, p. 313, nn. 2 and 3.

that survived of Solon's verse, we should be unable to credit him with any advance over Hesiod; for his sense of justice would resolve, like Hesiod's, into the pious faith that "justice will triumph over *hybris* in the end."⁸³ But this faith would have nothing more than piety to vindicate its truth. It would be sadly embarrassed by the fact that the unjust so often prosper more than the just. It would then have to be propped up by an appeal to the inscrutable *moira*, which gives and withholds punishment in ways which transcend our comprehension.

The best confirmation of this reversion to Hesiod is to note how faithfully it is reflected in a doctrine which may be taken as the touchstone of any Greek world view: the doctrine of *technē*. The arts of fire—which symbolize the whole of man's endeavor to change his *moira* for the better by the skilful adjustment of means to ends—appear in Hesiod as a futile effort to circumvent the omnipotence of the gods. Zeus laughs: "As the price of fire I will send them an evil [*sc. Hope*] in which they may all be glad of heart, loving their own misfortune" (*Op.* 57-58). For Solon, too, hope is self-indulgent illusion.⁸⁴ Merchant and farmer are classed with the masters of the arts—craftsman, poet, doctor, *mantis*⁸⁵—with the gloomy reflection that there is no "end" to *technē*, just as there is no "end" to wealth.⁸⁶ The end of

technē and the end of *moira* are incommensurable. The first is immanent and comprehensible; the second is transcendent and incomprehensible; and the first is always at the mercy of the second.⁸⁷ *Technē* cannot undo what is fated to be (*Frag.* 13. 55: τὰ μόρσιμα).

Wealth belongs to this realm of *moira*, whose reason, known to God, is hidden from us. God gives riches (l. 74). This does not mean that we should not go after them on our own account. It means only, as in Homer, that what we have at any moment of our life should be regarded as the will of God, and piously acquiesced in as such.⁸⁸ Man has no rational standard of his own by which to question, far less condemn, the justice of the divine dispensation.⁸⁹ Nor has he any means of knowing how long the award of fortune, good or bad, will last. A good conscience is no protection against the "ruin" which may

Greek Elegists [Cambridge, Mass., 1938], pp. 96-97) makes the interesting observation that craftsman, poet, doctor, and seer are implicitly bracketed off from merchant and farmer by references to (1) knowledge or skill and (2) divine patrons. One might add that the mechanical arts were for the Greeks the characteristic instance of *τέχνη* (e.g., *Od.* vi. 232-34). This makes the ominous reflection, in l. 58, all the stronger. With their *technē* and divine patron, craftsman, poet, doctor, and seer are in the same boat with merchant and farmer. Bowra suggests that only the latter two, because of the peculiar uncertainty of their quest for gain, are "related to the victims of *ἄρη*" (*Early Greek Elegists*, p. 97). But the lines immediately following (63-70) are perfectly general: there is no suggestion that they refer to the *technai* any less than to anyone else; "all works" (*πάντα . . . ἐν ἔργασιν* [l. 65]) refers just as much to the works of the *technai* (the *ἔργα* of Athena and Hephaestus in l. 50 and the *ἔργον* of Paeon in l. 57) as to the works of merchant or farmer.

⁸⁷ See ll. 59-70, following out the idea *καὶ τοῖς ὀδύνῃσι θεοὶ τιμὴν* in l. 58 and then passing to the complementary idea that the *telos* belongs to *moira*.

⁸⁸ E.g., *Od.* vi. 188-90.

⁸⁹ *Frag.* 15 is no exception: "Many bad men are rich, many good men are poor." This may look unjust to us, but only because our perspective is so much narrower than the divine, which spans generations. Solon concludes that "we will not exchange virtue for these men's wealth"; rightly so, for "virtue" is humanly "certain" (*ἀμερόν*), wealth humanly uncertain.

⁸³ *Op.* 217: ἐς τέλος ἐξελθούσα; cf. Solon *Frag.* 13. 28: ἐς τέλος ἐξελθόν and *ibid.* 8: πάντος ὑστερον ἦλθε Δίκη.

⁸⁴ *Frag.* 13. 36: χάσκοντες κοίφαις ἐλπίσι τετραμμένα. Cf. Hesiod *Op.* 58: τίρπονται κατὰ θυμὸν ἐν κακῷ ἀμφογάπωντες; and Semonides of Amorgos, *Frag.* 29 (Diehl): κοῖφον ἔχον θυμὸν πολλὰ ἀνέλκιστα νοεῖ.

⁸⁵ A significant omission here (and also in Aeschylus' account of *πάντα τέχνη* [PV 441-506]) has hitherto passed unnoticed: there is no mention of any political *technē* (king, judge, soldier, etc.). *Per contra*, ἀγορὰ βουλευφόροι in *Od.* ix. 112, in close association with the agricultural and industrial arts (similarly in Soph. *Ant.* 353).

⁸⁶ Cf. l. 58: καὶ τοῖς ὀδύνῃσι θεοὶ τιμὴν (of doctors and presumably also of the previously mentioned *technai*) with l. 71: πλοῦτον δ' ὀδύνῃσι τέχνη. Bowra (*Early*

lurk in the best of fortune;⁹⁰ for one may have to pay for the sins of a remote ancestor. If we may judge from the stories in Hdt. i. 30 ff., this sense of the capricious reversibility of fortune was a feature of Solon's thought that made a deep impression upon his own contemporaries and became a leading motif in the stories that gathered around his name.

Solon's pious pessimism moves finally toward a goal that had already been reached by the more profane pessimism of earlier Ionians. If the outcome of all striving is insecurity, then seek security in the enjoyment of the moment, which looks to no end beyond itself. "Rejoice your own heart," says Mimnermus (Frag. 7 [Diehl]); and Semonides of Amorgus, reflecting on how soon death cuts short men's endless designs, concludes, "thinking of the end of life, give your soul some pleasure" (Frag. 29. 12-13 [Diehl]). This hedonism has political uses, as yet unexploited; and Solon has his eye on them:

Equally rich are he who has plenty of silver
And gold and fields of wheat-bearing earth
And horses and mules—and he who has but
this,
Comfort in belly and sides and feet [Frag. 24,
translation adapted from Edmonds].

This—i.e., all that can be enjoyed at any given moment of one's life—is true "wealth" (*ἄφρο*). In this respect the peasant is the equal of the great landowner.⁹¹ For the latter's surplus (*τὰ περιώσια*) cannot be converted into immediate satisfaction and can therefore be crossed out of the equation of true wealth.

⁹⁰ I follow Linforth in taking *ἐξ αὐτῶν* in l. 75 to refer to *κίβητα* in the preceding line. The alternative attribution to *θεοῖς* seems less likely on stylistic grounds and, in any case, solves nothing: for if we rationalize *ἐγγύς* here, we are still left with the fateful mixture of good and evil in the "unrefusable gifts of the gods" (ll. 63-64).

⁹¹ Cf. Solon to Croesus in Hdt. i. 32: "The very wealthy is no better off (*ἀβιόωτερος*) than he who has sufficient for the day (*τοῦ ἡμεῖς ἔχοντος*)."

And since the increase of wealth may not keep pace with an even greater increment of desire (Frag. 13. 72-73), the quotient of satisfaction may decrease with the accumulation of property and the *pentakosiomedimnos* may be actually "poorer" than the contented *thē*s. Here, in all essentials, is a subjective conception of economic value. Democritus and others will elaborate but scarcely advance upon it.⁹² At the very dawn of political thought Solon is driven to it, so as to fill as best he can the vacuum left in his sense of order by the apparent lack of intelligible order in the acquisitive society.

B. UNEQUAL *moira*

Economic justice became a political issue with the demand for a "re-division of the land" (*Ath. pol.* 12. 3; Plut. *Solon* 13. 3). Behind the slogan "equal shares" (*isomoiria*) pressed the imperious need of the peasants, particularly those who held marginal land on the eroded hillsides.⁹³ The impossibility of scratching out a living from their wretched holdings had driven them to borrow before. It would drive them to borrow again, this time on the security of their land. With no better prospect of repaying the debt,⁹⁴ they

⁹² Democ. Frags. 283 and 285; cf. Xenoph. *Hiero* 4. 8.

⁹³ The *ὀρεφάκιοι* of Hdt. i. 59; the *διάκριοι* of *Ath. pol.* 13. 4 and Plut. *Solon* 14. 1 and 29. 1. The problem would be further complicated by the existence of some who would be altogether landless. J. L. Myres (*Mélanges Glots*, II, 666) seems to assume that all the *diakrioi* would be "outside the hereditary *kleroi* of the Plain" and thus unprotected by the old rule against the alienation of the *kleros*. This goes much too far and is, in any case, unverifiable: we have no means of knowing how soon after coming under cultivation new land would assume the status of *kleros*. However, I see no reason why the Woodhouse-Lewis interpretation should exclude the possibility that the outermost patches had not become *kleroi* in time to prevent expropriation by the nobles; their former possessors would then find themselves after the *Selachthela* without a legal title to their land, and the demand for the "re-division of the land" would include their own need of resettlement.

⁹⁴ The tradition that Solon reduced the interest rates (Plut. *Solon* 15. 4) is untrustworthy (see Gillard, pp. 192-94).

would now lose their land, as they had formerly lost their freedom. Hence the demand to augment their holdings at the expense of the larger estates. The claim was based on "equity" (*τὸ ἴσον*): equality of allotment must have been an old, deep-rooted tradition, for we see it cropping up later in strange places.⁹⁵ Thus Isocrates, whom no one could charge with equalitarian prejudices, declares flatly in a tirade against Sparta that "by right every man should have had [sc. in Sparta] an equal share of the land" (*Panath.* 179).

The importance of the issue is clear both from Solon's own words and from what we know of history. He had given the commons, in his political reforms, "more than they would have dreamed of" (*Frag.* 37. 2); yet they turned against him, "looked at him askance as an enemy" (*Frag.* 34. 5), when he refused them land. The pressure was so great that anyone else in his place, he declares, would not have succeeded in "holding the people down."⁹⁶ Judged by his own "judgment of time" (*δίκη χρόνου* [*Frag.* 36. 3]) Solon's work ended in failure. The people would not be held down. *Stasis* continued long after he had left office, and finally led to the "foul bondage" of tyranny. By an irony of history it was Peisistratus the tyrant, not Solon the liberator, who solved the agrarian problem of Attica, giving the people, if not what they asked for, at least enough to transform them into a reasonably prosperous and therefore "tranquil" part of the state.⁹⁷

⁹⁵ *Plut. Solon* 14. 2. Theognis could say: "order has perished, equal distribution for all is no more" (ll. 677-78). Needless to say, *isos* here, as so often later in reactionary social thought, is suffering semantic violence.

⁹⁶ *Οὐκ ἄν κατέχευε τὸν δῆμον* (*Frag.* 36. 22 and again in 37. 7). Cf. also *ἡπάρατο* (sc. τὸν δῆμον) in *Frag.* 37. 7. Both words, *κατέχευε* and *ἡπάρατο*, are charged with moral connotations (cf. *κατέχευε ἄβρον* in *Frag.* 4. 9 and the thrice repeated *ἡπάρατο* in *Frag.* 4. 35-39).

⁹⁷ *Ath. pol.* 16. 7. It seems reasonable to assume that, in addition to the measures enumerated in *Ath.*

What we have already seen of Solon's views would nevertheless explain the logic which prompted his decision. The peasants' claim to freedom falls under the rational justice of the *polis*; it can be recognized as a matter of common concern and protected with the pooled resources of the state. But the claim for a redistribution of land falls under the irrational (or super-rational) justice of wealth and cannot be adjudicated by the state. In the fragments Solon goes actually further. He does not say merely that the state can have no good reason for changing the peasants' god-given *moira*. He says, in effect, that the state has a good reason for preventing such change, for this would produce "excess" (*κόπος*) and *hybris*⁹⁸—the very terms by which the injustice of the nobles was described in Fragment 4. Hence Solon's horror of *isomoiria* between "the mean and the good"—a demand which would strike him as axiomatically self-refuting, since it carried the implication "equal *moira* between those of unequal *moira*." "Equal laws" and "straight justice" must be "adjusted" to these inequalities.⁹⁹ Thus property is the absolute precondition of political justice. It fixes inequalities of "privilege" and "honor" which must be respected and preserved as a matter of political justice: "To the *dēmos*

pol. 16, some of the estates of the Eupatrid opposition were divided up among Peisistratus' "hill-men" (so Adcock in *CAH*, IV, 65-66, and others).

⁹⁸ *Frag.* 6. 3-4. Solon adds: *ἀνθρώποις ἄριστος μὴ νόος ἄριστος* §. But this moralistic flourish does not qualify the class determination of "sufficiency." Solon does not offer to give more land to any of the *dēmos* who, by moral standards, do have a "whole-some mind."

⁹⁹ *Frag.* 36. 18-19: *εἰς ἕκαστον ἀρμόδιον δίκην*, "awarded to each his due" (Liddell and Scott, *Lexicon* [new ed.], s.v. *ἀρμόδιον*, I, b). Linforth's comments *ad loc.* are significant, though his interpretation of *ἀρμόδιον* (the "adaptability of the new constitution to its multifarious purposes") is much too general for the context: *ἀρμόδιον* in l. 19 refers to *κατὰ τὴν ἀνάγκην* in the preceding line. The "adjustment" to the unequal privilege of the different social classes is on all fours with Solonian timocracy.

I gave such privilege [γέρας] as suffices;¹⁰⁰ I have neither added nor taken away from their honor [τιμή (Frag. 5)]."

In this, as in his whole concept of wealth, Solon is a traditionalist. His precedents are Homer and Hesiod, where "privilege," "honor," and "wealth" are assigned in unequal portions by *moira*;¹⁰¹ this dispensation is neither open to question nor capable of justification; it is thus prior to political justice and the ground of all its claims. So Poseidon's grievance that he has suffered "violence" at the hands of Zeus turns on whether or not he is Zeus's "equal" (*Il.* xv. 167). Iris says that he is not; Poseidon insists that he is, countering Zeus's superiority in force (*βίη φέρτερος* [*Il.* 165]) and priority in birth (*γενεῇ πρότερος* [*Il.* 166]), with the fact that his own "lot" or "domain"¹⁰² is comparable to that of Zeus: He is Zeus's equal in "portion" (*ισόμορος* [*Il.* 209]) and must be treated as his "equal in honor" (*δμότιμος* [*Il.* 186]). Man or god, everyone has his place in the order of "honor" established by *moira*; and the essence of justice is to deal with others in accordance with their place in this order, not to covet their

"honor" or encroach upon it.¹⁰³ This is how Solon thinks of the "noble" and the "mean."¹⁰⁴ Each class has its own share of "privilege" and "honor" which only "excess" and "*hybris*" would disturb. "Noble" and "mean" are the old aristocratic categories. Solon preserves them with a single innovation: he cancels aristocratic birth from the prerequisites of status. *Moira* can now be simply equated with property: "to each class he awarded political office in proportion to their rateable property" (*Ath. pol.* 7. 3).

Solon's fragments do not allude directly or indirectly to this change from aristocracy to timocracy. The four income classes are not mentioned. Only two classes are in evidence, reminding us of nothing so much as of Anaximander's opposites,¹⁰⁵

¹⁰⁰ Cf. *Od.* xiii. 141-45. Zeus to Poseidon: *ὁ γὰρ σ' ἐτιμῶσαναι θεοί*, for "the gods are not unjust to you." The context brings out clearly the interconnection of *τιμή*, *βίη*, and *τίσις*. It is "violence" which refuses to "pay" due "honor" and must therefore be compelled to "pay." Compare also the terms in which Prometheus' sin is presented in Aeschylus: he has "robbed" the "honors" and "privileges" of the gods and has thus gone "beyond justice" (*PV* 30 and 38).

¹⁰¹ Frags. 34. 9 and 36. 18.

¹⁰² With one striking difference: Anaximander's opposites are equal. I am justifying this interpretation elsewhere. Meanwhile, suffice it to recall that the "equality" of the basic components of man and the cosmos is a broad feature of early Greek scientific thought: e.g., Alcmaeon Frag. 4; Empedocles Frag. 17; Parmenides Frag. 9: *φάος καὶ νύκτας . . . ἴσων ἀμφοτέρων*, with which compare Alexander Polyhistor on Pythagorean doctrine in *Diog. Laert.* viii. 26: *ισομοίρα τ' εἶναι ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ φῶς καὶ σκότος*, etc. In the Hippocratic treatises this *ισομοίρα* of components is the heart of the doctrine of *krasis*: e.g., *Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου* 3. 7-14 ("Loeb" *Hippocrates*, Vol. IV [Jones]), where *καλὸς ἔχειν τῇ κρήνῃ πρὸς ἄλλα* is equivalent to *μετρίως πρὸς ἄλλα ἔχειν καὶ ἴσως*; and *Περὶ αἵρων* 12. 14-99 ("Loeb" *Hippocrates*, Vol. I [Jones]), where *κρήνη τῶν ὀρίων* exists wherever *παρὸς ἰσμοίρῃ δυναστείᾳ*. Empedocles' words, *τιμὴ δ' ἄλλῃ ἀλλο μῦθε* (Frag. 17. 28), have been misunderstood as a negation of *ισομοίρα* (R. Hirzel, *Themis, Dike und Veruandtes* [Leipzig, 1907], p. 314, n. 6). But they should be read in the light of the following line, *ἐν δὲ μέρει κρατῖνος περιτλομένοιο χρόνῳ*. We know that *ἐν μέρει κρατῖνος* is a typical democratic assumption (Eurip. *Suppl.* 406: *ἄνθρωποι δ' ἀνάσσει διαδοχαῖσιν ἐν μέρει ἐναυταῖσιν*; and Bonitz, *Index Aristotelicus*, 455 b 13-23: *κατὰ μέρος καὶ ἐν μέρει ἀρχεῖν*). For the same assumption of successive supremacy between equal opposites see *Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου* 7.

¹⁰⁰ "Sufficiency" clearly implies a measure. Cf. Eurip. *Suppl.* 555: *τὰ γ' ἀρκούνθ' ἱκανὰ τοῖς γε σώφροσιν*; the context relates *τὰ ἀρκούντα* negatively to *πλεονεξία*, and positively to *δίκη* (*Il.* 548) and *μέτρα* (*Il.* 539 ff.).

¹⁰¹ Sometimes *moira* is personalized as the will of Zeus, e.g., Hesiod *Th.* 73-74 (cf. *ibid.* 885: *ἔας διέδασσαντο τιμὰς*; and Aesch. *Suppl.* 360: *Διὸς ἐλαρίου*; and *PV* 229: *δαίμονιν νίμει γέρα ἄλλοισιν ἄλλα*). There is a deep-lying connection here between *moira* and the land lot which is the primitive basis of wealth. See F. M. Cornford, *From Religion to Philosophy* (London, 1912), pp. 15-21; and cf. Wilamowitz, *op. cit.*, I, 360, n. 1: "*μόρος als κλήρος*, Landparzelle, was auch bei Hesych neben anderen Erklärungen steht, ist lebendig in Lokris, Sitz.-Ber. Berl. 1927, 15, und Lesbos IG. XII 2, 74." However, *moira* is broader than landownership. It includes other ways of making one's living, e.g., *technē*. So, e.g., Hdt. i. 53: *τοῖσι θεοῖσι . . . τιμὰς τε καὶ τέχνας διέλοντες*. (Cf. Aesch. *PV* 48, where Hephaestus thinks of his *technē* as *moira* [λαχεῖν]). This throws further light on the association of the *technai* with wealth in relation to *moira* in Solon's Frag. 13.

¹⁰² *Moira* in l. 195 means both. The notion of the lot is underlined through the thrice repeated *λαχάωω* (*Il.* 190-92).

encroaching upon each other and then compelled to render "justice and reparation to one another according to the ordering of time."¹⁰⁶ First, the rich were guilty of "hybris," "excess," and "robbery" (Frag. 4. 8-13). Justice exacted reparation, the ward-stones which they had planted over the *dēmos'* land were pulled up, and the old—"just"—dispensation of land was restored. Then came the turn of the *dēmos* to seek encroachment upon the rich; if unrestrained, they, too, would have committed "hybris," "excess," and "robbery."¹⁰⁷ Solon's place is in the middle ground between these aggressive extremes to keep them from overstepping the line which *moira* has fixed between them:

I stood betwixt them as a boundary-mark
[*ōpos*] in the middle-ground between two
armies [ἐν μεταίχμῳ] [Frag. 37].

Like a wolf at bay amidst a pack of hounds, I
turned,
Defending myself against attacks from every
side [Frag. 36, text and translation following
Linforth].

Holding a mighty shield over both groups, I
stood,
To neither would I grant unjust supremacy
[Frag. 5].

In all this Solon speaks in the first person singular. Yet clearly he was not alone in the "middle ground."¹⁰⁸ Between Eu-

patrids and hectemors was the trading class, whose chief article of export, the amphora, Solon stamped on the new coinage of the public mint.¹⁰⁹ This class would be dead set against any "re-division of land," yet equally opposed to the old aristocratic order. One can imagine its impatience with the Eupatrids' endless feuds,¹¹⁰ their preoccupation with the advancement of their own house at the expense of the public,¹¹¹ their proved incapacity to pursue the far-sighted, aggressive foreign policy required by the interests of trade. The merchants needed the conquest of Salamis, the reform of the coinage, the reform of the system of weights and measures, the influx of skilled workers from abroad. Implemented by Solon, these policies gave Athens a running start in its race for foreign markets against its powerful rivals, Aegina and Megara.¹¹² Not only these specific measures but the whole of Solon's polity, with its peculiar blend of radicalism and conservatism, answers admirably the needs of this "middle" class: the judicial and political reforms broke the Eupatrid stranglehold on state power; yet the timocratic "adjustment" of office to property

pol. 11. 1; Plut. *Solon* 2. 1. Plutarch's description of the men of the Shore (Plut. *Solon* 13. 1) fits precisely the role which Solon adopted between the two extremes (cf. also *Ath. pol.* 13. 4).

¹⁰⁹ C. T. Seltman, *Athens, Its History and Coinage* (Cambridge, 1924), chap. III. To be sure, this was not a Solonian innovation: the oil amphora appears also on Athenian coins of the Phleidian standard. But it is significant that Solon had scarcely left Athens before Eupatrid badges displaced the amphora.

¹¹⁰ Plutarch says that Salamis and Nisaea were lost during the Cylonian feud (*Solon* 12. 3).

¹¹¹ Solon accuses them of stealing temple funds and public property (Frag. 4. 12-13).

¹¹² Witness the leap in the export of pottery in the first two decades of the sixth century (B. L. Bailey, "The Export of Attic Black-figured Ware," *JHS*, LX [1940], 62-64). Cf. Seltman's interpretation of the reforms of weights, measures, and coinage: "a far-sighted reform that would open the way to world-markets and to prosperity for Athens" (*op. cit.*, p. 16).

40-52: ὅς δὲ τῆς περισταμένης ὥρης πρὸς μὲν πλεῖον γύνεται αἰτὰ λωρίων (sc. the humors in the body) πρὸς δὲ ἐλάττω, ἑσθια κατὰ μέρος καὶ κατὰ φύσιν.

¹⁰⁶ Cf. τοῦ χρόνου τάξιν in Anaximander with Solon's ἡγὰρ χρόνου (Frag. 36. 3) and τῶ χρόνῳ πάντως ἤλθ' ἀποτετασμένη (Frag. 4. 16).

¹⁰⁷ Frags. 6. 3 and 34. 1.

¹⁰⁸ Cf. Plut. *Solon* 14. 3, and the Delphic oracle (*ibid.* 14. 4), promising that "many in Athens will be your allies." "Ἦο μίσην κατὰ ἥη in this oracle underlines the "middle" position at the expense of an awkward metaphor: the middle of the ship was no place for steering (Aesch. *Suppl.* 717: οἶκος εἰδωρῆτος βερίων ῥέος and *Theb.* 2.f: ἐν πρύμνῃ πόλεως οἶκος ῥαμῶν). For Solon himself as a man of the "middle" see *Ath. pol.* 4. 3; Plut. *Solon* 1. 2; as merchant, *Ath.*

would keep the new executive free from the rural masses.

It would be an oversimplification to think of Solon planning his policies in the interests of the merchants alone. In the case of Salamis his appeal was intensely patriotic: the honor of the "fatherland" was at stake; all Athenians were "intolerably dishonored" by the loss of it (Frgs. 1-3). He achieved the reconquest of the island in the face of sternly repressive measures from the Eupatrid authorities by mobilizing wide popular support (Plut. *Solon* 8. 2). Later, the manifesto of his reform program opened with the words "Our city" and charged the nobles with threatening to destroy it.¹¹³ It won the support of the *dēmos* by merging the cause of their personal freedom with the common freedom of the *polis*.¹¹⁴ But it did not say that *dēmos* and *polis* are one. Solon's fragments never use "*dēmos*," as Callinus had used it in Ionia, to mean the whole community, the "little" man as well as the "big."¹¹⁵ For Solon the *dēmos* remains a fraction of the *polis*, and a troublesome one, no more content with its *moira* than the nobles had been content with theirs. Only those who could be counted on to oppose both these turbulent extremes and to make common cause with either in order to hold the other in check could be said to stand for the good of the *polis* as a whole. That is why, perhaps, Solon never mentions or alludes to the men of the "middle" as a distinct

class, alongside of the nobles and the commons. Their interests merged with the interests of the Solonian *polis*.

III. CONCLUSION

The main result of this study has been to untangle two strands in Solonian justice and connect each with its counterpart in Solonian policy. One is the rational *dikē* of the *polis*; this is the dynamic principle of Solon's reconstruction of Athenian institutions. The other is the superrational *moira*¹¹⁶ of private wealth; this is the restraining principle in Solon's conservatism. Thus Solon's *eunomiē* is the resultant of two opposing tendencies. One of them, most clearly seen by Freeman, is the "negative principle of universal moderation," whose maxim is "let none encroach," and whose purpose is not reform but restraint.¹¹⁷ From this point of view the Solonian *polis* looks like a formidable array of balanced negations, checks, and counterchecks, everyone on his guard against encroachment by anyone else. But there is a mainspring which keeps this system in motion, and this is the initiative of every member of "our" *polis* in the interest of the common well-being. Here is a positive, creative principle, even when conceived under the aspect of *hesychiē*: for this is the law not of mechanical stability but of organic health; it is not a curb upon growth and development, but the reverse. *Eunomiē* could—and did—sponsor far-reaching change, subject only to two conditions: that the motive be the

¹¹³ Frg. 4. 5: *φείλειν μεγάλην πόλιν βόλονται*.

¹¹⁴ See above, Part I, Sec. C.

¹¹⁵ Frg. 1, where *dēmos* in l. 16, *ὅλγος καὶ μέγας* in l. 17, and *λαφὸν σέμναι* in l. 18 are parallel expressions. However, the adjective *δημόσιον* in Solon (Frg. 4. 12 and 27) shows how difficult it was for any Greek to keep *dēmos* and *polis* apart. As has often been remarked, in Homer *dēmos* means not only "land" but also "people" (e.g., *Il.* iii. 50: *πάντ' τε παντὶ τε δῆμω*; cf. *ibid.* xvii. 250: *ἔθμια πύουσι*, and ix. 64: *πόλεμος ἐπιδόμος*). The aristocratic tradition sublimates "*dēmos*" to describe its own "peers," e.g., the Spartan rhetra in Plut. *Lyc.* 6, and Tyrtæus Frg. 9. 15 (Diehl).

¹¹⁶ Solon's diction does not observe a hard-and-fast distinction of *moira* as "fate" and *dikē* as "justice." So much is clear from Frg. 13. Yet this same fragment also shows that Solon is more likely to use *dikē* when he thinks of destiny as an intelligible principle of moral reparation, as he does in the opening lines; then, under the growing sense of the inscrutability of destiny and the insecurity of man's endeavor, he shifts to *moira* (ll. 30 ff.).

¹¹⁷ Pp. 83-84 and 201-3. Freeman concludes that there is nothing more in Solonian justice than this negative ideal: no "creative idea, not even a political bias" (p. 83).

common peace and the common freedom and that the existing *moira* of property be not disturbed.

In the crucial instance of the *Seisachtheia* there was no redistribution of land. The ward-stones were pulled up from land which had belonged to the peasant and still did, however incumbered. Indeed, the *Seisachtheia* said nothing about land; it only canceled debts on the security of the person. And it did so because the common freedom of the *polis* was here at stake. Thus the most important of Solon's social and economic reforms was prompted by his concept of political justice. Therein lies his greatness: that, despite the traditionalism of his concept of wealth, he was able to envisage this revolutionary conception of justice based on the solidarity of the *polis*.

The nobles had claimed the giving of justice as their exclusive prerogative.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁸ Cf. Eurip. *Suppl.* 430:

δπου τὸ μὲν πρόστατον οὐκ εἰσὶν νόμοι
κοινοί, κρατεῖ δ' εἰς τὸν νόμον κερταμένος
αὐτὸς παρ' αὐτῷ.

substituting *ἐνταρπιδαι* for the "one" (sc. "tyrant") in this passage. Incidentally, the immediately following lines here (443-47) bring out another point which I have kept out of the text to simplify the argument: written law had been the first inroad into the nobility's monopoly of justice: it was the first bridgehead of "community" or "publicity" of law. But it did leave them a residual area of "privacy" both (a) in their

So long as justice remained shrouded in mystery and magic, their claim was incontrovertible; for they were themselves the accredited representatives of the oracles. They "had knowledge of divine things . . . and were interpreters [*ἐξηγηταί*] of things sacred and holy."¹¹⁹ Solon raised no questions about their *expertise* in the supernatural. He conceded their authority in the unwritten law of ceremonial sanctities and its great annex in the written law, homicide. But he then cleared a wide area in which justice was "the immanent righteousness of events,"¹²⁰ and as such a matter of "common" or "public" truth. This could never be claimed as the guild secret of a closed corporation. It was open to all men of understanding who could follow the sequence of events and "teach" it to others. Thus the naturalization of justice meant its socialization: it became the common possession of the *polis*, for it defined the common peace and the common freedom of all.

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interpretation of the written law and (b) in the unwritten law.

¹¹⁹ Plut. *Thucyd.* 25. 2.

¹²⁰ Jaeger's phrase, "Die immanente Gerechtigkeit des Geschehens," in "Solons *Eunomie*," p. 79.

CLASSICAL LATIN NOUN INFLECTION

ROBERT A. HALL, JR.

THE statement was made in *Classical Philology* (XXXIX [1944], 220): "Let our linguist set to work to analyze and then describe the Latin language. The result will not differ materially from Hale and Buck, which even the 'linguists' have not yet dared to maintain is a work of fiction, or, if it does, it will do so by being incomplete and erroneous." As I reflected on this statement, it seemed to me, nevertheless, possible to make a materially different analysis and give a more economical description of Latin than is customary, without sacrificing completeness or accuracy. To test this assumption, I noted down the chief features of classical Latin noun inflection;¹ this description, checked against "traditional" works,² is presented here as a sample of an

approach which might profitably be used in future Latin grammars.

There are certain points which, in a complete grammar, would be treated in chapters preceding the one on inflection but which will be mentioned here for the sake of completeness and clarity. The description of Latin forms will be on the basis of their phonemic structure, and forms will be cited in phonemic transcription.³ For Latin the traditional spelling is almost wholly phonemic and will be used here, with a few exceptions made for the sake of attaining phonemic accuracy. Traditional *v* is replaced by *u*;⁴ *c* = the phoneme [k] throughout (even in the group *cs*, traditionally spelled *x*); the phoneme [kʷ] is represented by *q*, instead of the traditional *qu*. Vowel length is indicated by a raised dot (·) written after a vowel letter.⁵ The colon, preceded and followed by a space, means "grammatical-

¹ Since the framework of this description is designed to cover only the phenomena observed in noun inflection, it is, of course, incomplete from the viewpoint of other types of substantive inflection (adjectival, pronominal), and to cover them certain categories would have to be expanded and others added. In order to obtain as nearly synchronic material as possible, only forms of classical Latin, primarily prose, of the Golden Age are covered; archaic, late, and unassimilated Greek forms (e.g., *lampados*) are specifically excluded. (They could, of course, be included by making enough extra statements to cover them.)

² Especially the grammars of Hale and Buck, Gildersleeve, and Allen and Greenough; and Neue-Wagener, *Lateinische Formenlehre*, and Stolz-Schmalz, *Lateinische Grammatik* (5th ed.). It must be emphasized that this paper does not represent an effort to attack or deny the validity of these or other "traditional" grammars, but it is rather an attempt to present an alternative and (it is hoped) equally valid approach. It is intended primarily as an exercise in linguistic analysis; discussion of its pedagogical application would belong in journals devoted to problems of teaching.

This paper was submitted before publication to a number of Latinists and workers in linguistics and was read at the 1945 session of the Linguistic Institute (University of Michigan). It has benefited greatly from all the criticisms offered; I am especially indebted to G. M. Bolling for thorough discussion of the whole

analysis, and I have adopted a number of the features of his rephrasing of my original statement of Parts I and II.

³ A phonemic transcription is one in which there is a one-to-one correspondence between graphic symbols and the phonemes of the language being cited. The phoneme may be defined as a "class of significant phonetic features, phonetically similar and never contrasting with each other ('in complementary distribution')."

⁴ On the assumption that the sounds [w] and [j] were positional variants ("allophones") of the phonemes *u* and *i*, respectively, in diphthongs. If the reader does not accept this assumption and considers [w] and [j] independent consonantal phonemes, he should, of course, change the transcription wherever necessary; additional statements should then, of course, be made to cover the alternations in inflection between *i* and *j*, *u* and *v*.

⁵ The traditional macron over the vowel letter seems somewhat less desirable because, as will be noticed throughout this paper, vowel length functions in inflection just as if it were a consonant and is better indicated by a mark following the vowel letter.

ly related to." *Zero* (0) means the absence of a or any sound, in contrast with its presence in other forms of the same word.

Certain phonemes do not occur in certain positions: in these positions, they are automatically lost or replaced by other phonemes. Once these automatic replacements have been stated, their occurrence need not be treated as a special irregularity. At the end of a word:

1. In absolute final position:
 - a) Syllabic *i* is replaced by *e*: *mare*, "sea" = *mari-* + 0.
 - b) The second consonant of certain groups (double consonant, *rd*, *ct*) is lost: *mel*, "honey" = *mell-* + 0.
 - c) After another consonant, *r* is replaced by *er*: *pater*, "father" = *patr-* + 0.
2. Before *i*, *i* is (optionally) lost: *imper(i)i* = *imperio*, "command," with the substitute stem-vowel *i* and the ending *-i* (vowel length).
3. Before *r*, a long vowel is shortened: *amor*, "love" = *amo-r-* + 0.
4. Before *s* or *-s*:
 - a) *d* and *t* are lost: *seges*, "crop" = *seget-* + *s*; *pes*, "foot" = *ped-* + *s*. When this takes place, an immediately preceding *n* is replaced by *-n-*: *dens*, "tooth" = *dent-* + *s*.
 - b) *b* and *g* are replaced by *p* and *k*, respectively: *rex*, "king" = *re-g-* + *s*.
 - c) *m* is (optionally) replaced by *mp*: *hiem(p)s*, "winter" = *hiem-* + *s*.
5. Before *s* or *m*, *o* is replaced (at least in the current normalized spelling) by *u*: *dominus*, *dominum*, "master" = *domino-* + *s*, *m*, respectively.

All substantives (nouns, adjectives, pronouns) show the categories of number (singular, plural), gender (masculine, neuter, feminine), and case (genitive, dative, ablative, accusative, nominative, vocative, and a combining form).⁵ Nouns are substantives belonging to not more

than two genders; their gender is lexically determined, i.e., must be stated separately for each form. The neuter is a subclass of the masculine; it differs from the masculine at most in accusative, nominative, and vocative; its nominative is always identical with its accusative. In the plural the dative and ablative are identical, as are the nominative and vocative.

Each noun-form is assumed to have the structure *root* + *stem-vowel* + *ending*; thus, in *domus*, "house," the root is *dom-*, the stem-vowel is *u*, and the ending is *s*. Wherever a form has less than all three of these elements, the missing elements will be considered to be *zero*: thus, *consul*, "consul" = the root *co-nsul* + stem-vowel 0 + ending 0. The term "ending" will be specifically restricted to those phonemes following the stem-vowel: thus, in *domu-s* the ending is *s*. A "substitute stem-vowel" is a different vowel (or zero) appearing in place of the normal stem-vowel of a word. The term "stem" will mean "root + stem-vowel." The stem is normally that portion of the noun appearing before *-um* or *-rum* of the genitive plural⁷ (§ 1.1), e.g., *stella-*, "star": *stella-rum*; *turri-*, "tower": *turri-um*; *consul-*, "consul": *consul-um*.

Nouns are to be grouped in six classes according to their stem-vowel: I, *a*; II, *o*; III, *i*; IV, *u*; V, *e*; VI, 0. Masculine and feminine nouns of III fall into two subdivisions: III^a, in which a substitute stem-vowel *e* occurs only in nom. pl.; III^b, in

⁷ In a few words, it is necessary, on the basis of the other forms of the words, to recognize as the basic stem-vowel a different one from that occurring before *-um* or *-rum* of the genitive plural. Thus *mar-*, n., "sea" must be ascribed to III rather than to VI, on the basis of the acc. pl. *maria* and the abl. sing. *mar-*, even though the single attested occurrence of its gen. pl. is *marum*.

Note, moreover, that we are not defining the stem as "anything which comes before *-(r)um* of the genitive plural"; such a procedure would lead us into difficulties and would force us to assume, for example, a nonexistent stem *hono-* for the gen. pl. *honorum*, "of honors."

⁵ The "locative" case is, from the descriptive point of view, identical with other cases, the use of which in locative meaning is a matter of syntax.

which it occurs also in acc. pl., abl. sing., and acc. sing. The Roman numerals will be used when referring to the noun classes as wholes, but need be cited with individual noun stems only in III^a and III^b, and with stems of VI ending in vowel or diphthong.

Certain nouns are used as examples throughout and will be listed and glossed here: *stella*-, f., "star"; *domino*-, m., "master"; *bello*-, n., "war"; *turri*-, f., III^a, "tower"; *fi-ni*-, f., III^b, "end"; *anima-li*-, n., "living being"; *manu*-, f., "hand"; *cornu*-, n., "horn"; *die*-, m., "day"; *co-nsul*-, m., "consul"; *cada-uer*-, n., "dead body." Other examples will be glossed on their first appearance.

The following phonemic features occur as primary endings: *m*, *s*, *a*, *;*, and *0*. A primary ending may be preceded by one or more *pre-final* phonemic features. The following sections will treat of the inflection of nouns, in this order: I, inflection of the plural; II, inflection of the singular; III, alternations in roots. The cases will be treated in the order mentioned in the fourth preceding paragraph.⁸

I. INFLECTION OF THE PLURAL

1.1. Genitive: ending -m.

1. With pre-final, -um in III, IV, VI: *turrium*, *manuum*, *consuluum*.

Some words of I and II use the ending -um with zero substituted for the stem-vowel: *agricolum* : *agricola*-, m., "farmer," and other compounds

⁸ This order has been chosen, in preference to the customary order, for certain definite reasons. The best form to start from is the gen. pl., as it is the form in which the stem normally appears most clearly. The dative and ablative are simplest to analyze next. Of the remaining cases, the accusative should be treated before the nominative, as in many instances the nominative may be stated as identical with the accusative, leaving only a residue of divergent nominative forms to be described. For the same reason the vocative should be treated after the nominative. The same order of cases is followed in the singular for ease of description and for parallelism; and the combining form is added at the end.

of -cola-, "dwelling in," and of -gena- "descendant of"; usually in designations of coins and measures: *nummum* : *nummo*-, m., "coin," and likewise with *sestertio*-, n., "sesterce," *modio*-, m., "measure"; frequently in *deum*, "of gods," *socium*, "of allies," *li-berum*, "of children," and *ui-rum*, "of men"; and in the phrase *praefectus fabrum*, "chief engineer."

2. With further pre-final, -rum in I, II, V: *stella-rum*, *domino-rum*, *die-rum*.

1.2. Dative-ablative: ending -s.

1. With pre-final and with substitute stem-vowel *i*, in I, II: *stelli-s*, *domini-s*.

In a few words where distinction of *sex* is to be made, homonymy between I and II is avoided by patterning forms of I on 2b (below): *fi-lia-bus*, "daughters" (as opposed to *fi-lii-s*, "sons"), and likewise *ega-bus*, "mares," *dea-bus*, "goddesses," and other words.

2. With pre-final -bu-:

- a) Without further pre-final, -bus in III, IV, VI (with substitute stem-vowel *i* in VI and most words of IV): *turribus*, *fi-nibus*, *manibus*, *consulibus*.

In IV, the stem-vowel persists always in *arcubus*, m., "bows," *tribubus*, f., "tribes," *gercubus*, f., "oaks"; frequently in *artubus*, m., "limbs," *lacubus*, m., "lakes," *partubus*, f., "births," *uerubus*, n., "spits"; and occasionally in other words.

- b) With further pre-final of vowel length, -bus in V: *die-bus*.

1.3. Accusative.

1. Ending -s in m. and f. nouns (with substitute stem-vowel *e* in III^b and VI): *stella-s*, *domino-s*, *turri-s*, *fi-ne-s*, *manu-s*, *die-s*, *consule-s*.

Many nouns of III show, in the acc. and in the abl. sing., forms of III^a and III^b in competition: acc. pl. *fi-ne-s* and *fi-ni-s*, *turri-s* and *turre-s*; abl. sing. *imbre* (: *imbri*, m., "shower") and *imbri*, *turri* and *turre*; acc. sing. *turrim* and *turrem*.

2. Ending *-a* in all neuters (with substitute stem-vowel *o* in II): *bella*, *ma-ria*, *cornua*, *cada-uera*.

1.4. Nominative and vocative.

1. Homonymous with acc. in all neuters, and in m. and f. nouns of III, IV, V, VI. But in III^a only the form *turre-s* (with substitute stem-vowel *e*) is used.
2. Zero ending with substitute stem-vowel *ae*, in I: *stellae*.
3. Ending *-i* (vowel length) with substitute stem-vowel *i*, in m. and f. nouns of II: *domini*.

II. INFLECTION OF THE SINGULAR

2.1. Genitive.

1. Homonymous with nom. pl. in I, II: *stellae*, *domini*.

In I an archaic *familia-s* survives in the phrase *pater familia-s*, "head of the household," and the like; and an archaic genitive in *-a-i* is found in poetry: *stella-i*.

2. Ending *-s*:

- a) Without further pre-final, *-s* in III, VI (with substitute stem-vowel *i* in VI): *turris*, *finis*, *consulis*.
- b) With pre-final of vowel length, *-s* in IV: *manu-s*.

3. Ending *-i*, in V:

- a) With pre-final *i*, *-i* for roots ending in a consonant: *rei* (: *re-*, f., "thing"); *fidei* (: *fide-*, f., "faith"); *spei* (: *spe-*, f., "hope").
- b) With further pre-final of vowel length, *-i* for roots ending in

i: *die-i*, *facie-i* (: *facie-*, f., "face").

An optional alternative is *die-*.

2.2. Dative.

1. Homonymous with gen. sing. in I, V: *stellae*, *rei*, *die-i*.
2. Ending *-i*:
 - a) Without pre-final in II, III, VI (with substitute stem-vowel *i* in VI), and in all neuters of IV: *domino*, *turri*, *fi-ni*, *cornu*, *consuli*.
 - b) With pre-final, *-i* in IV m. and f.: *manui*.

2.3. Ablative.

1. Ending *o*, with substitute stem-vowel *e*, in III^b and VI: *fi-ne*, *consule*.
2. Ending *-e* elsewhere: *stella*, *domino*, *turri*, *manu*, *die*.

2.4. Accusative.

1. Ending *o* in neuters of III, IV, VI: *mare*, *cornu*, *cada-uer*.
2. Ending *m* in all other nouns (with substitute stem-vowel *e* in III^b and VI): *stellam*, *dominum*, *turrim*, *finem*, *manum*, *diem*, *consulem*.

2.5. Nominative.

1. Homonymous with acc. in all neuters. The endings given in sections 2-4 are used only with m. or f. nouns.
2. Ending *o*:
 - a) With substitute stem-vowel *o*, in:
 - i) Certain nouns of III: *assi*, m., "copper," *carni*, f., "flesh," *mari*, m., "male": *as*, *caro*, *ma-s*; and in four roots ending in consonant + *r*: *imbri*, m., "shower," *lintri*, f., "skiff," *uentri*, m., "belly," *u(-)tri*, m., "bag": *imber*, etc. (For alternations in the roots of

these and words in following sections see Part III).

- ii) Nouns of II with root in consonant +*r* or in *-ir-*, e.g., *ager*, m., "field" : *agro-*; *uir*, m., "man" : *uiro-*; and also certain stems in *-ero-* (all m.).

Among these stems are *adulter*, "adulterer" : *adultero-*; and likewise with *genero-*, "son-in-law," *li-bero-*, "Liber," *puero-*, "boy," *socero-*, "father-in-law," *uespero-*, "evening"; and compounds in *-fero-* and *-gero-*, e.g., *signifer* : *signifero-*, "standard-bearer."

- b) With no change in stem-vowel, in I and in roots of VI not mentioned in § 3. 5. 3: *stella*, *consul*, *pater*, m., "father" : *patr-*.

3. Ending -s:

- a) Without further pre-final, in II, IV, and nouns of III not mentioned in § 2. 5. 2: *dominus*, *manus*, *turris*. Also in roots of VI ending in a stop consonant: *rex*, m., "king" : *reg-*, etc.; and in *hiem-*, f., "winter" : *hiem(p)s*.

- b) With pre-final of vowel length, -s in V: *diēs*; and in certain nouns of III (with substitute stem-vowel *e*) and of VI: *aedēs*, f., "temple" : *aedi-*.

Among these stems are *caedi*, f., "slaughter," *fami-*, f., "hunger," *nu-bi-*, f., "cloud," *se-di-*, f., "seat," *tabi-*, f., "wasting," *ua-ti-*, m., "bard," *uerri-*, m., "boar"; and *abie-s*, f., "fir" : *abiet-*, and likewise *ariet*, m., "boar," *patriet*, m., "wall," *ped-*, m., "foot."

Also in roots of VI ending in vowel or diphthong: *su-*, m. f., "swine," *gru-*, m., "crane,"

bou-, m. f., "ox, cow" : *su-s*, *gru-s*, *bo-s*; and in *ui-s*, f., "force" : *ui-ri-* (cf. § 3. 2).

2.6. Vocative.

- Ending *-i*, with substitute stem-vowel *o*, in masculine stems of II in *-io-*: *fi-li-*, m., "son" : *fi-lío-*.
- Ending *o*, with substitute stem-vowel *e*, in other masculine stems of II: *domine*.
- Homonymous with nom. sing. in all other nouns: *stella*, *turris*, *finis*, *mare*, *domus*, *cornu*, *diēs*.

- 2.7. Combining form. Ending zero, with *i* replacing stem-vowel: *tubi-cen*, m., "trumpeter" (: *tuba*, f., "trumpet"); *agri-cola*, m., "farmer" (: *agro-*, m., "field"); *fra-tri-ci-da*, m. f., "fratricide" (: *fra-tr-*, m., "brother"); *corni-gero-*, "horned" (: *cornu-*).

III. ALTERNATIONS IN ROOTS

In most nouns the root remains unchanged in all the case forms. In some, however, variant forms of the root are used in certain cases. These may conveniently be listed according to the cases in which the alternations occur:

- 3.1. Cases of the plural. The root *bou-* is replaced by *bo-* in gen. pl. and by *bo-* or *bu-* in dat. and abl. pl.: *boum*, *bo-bus* or *bu-bus*.
- 3.2. All cases of the singular. The stem *ui-ri-*, f., "force," is shortened to *ui-*.
- 3.3. Accusative singular (of neuters), nominative singular (of masculines and feminines).

1. Before ending *o*.

- a) Roots of VI in *-in-*:

- In certain roots *-in-* is replaced by *-o-*: *homo-*, m., "man" : *homin-*, and likewise for *ne-min-*, m. f., "no one," *turbin-*, m., "whirl-

- wind," and m. f. stems in *-din-*, *-gin-*, e.g., *uirgo*, f., "maiden" : *uirgin-*; *origo*, f., "source" : *origin-*.
- ii) In *femin-*, n., "thigh," *-in-* is replaced by *-ur-*: *femur*.
 - iii) In other roots, *-in-* is replaced by *-en-*: *no-men*, n., "name" : *no-min-*; *cornicen*, m., "horn-blower" : *cornicin-*, etc.
- b) Roots of VI in *-er-*, *-or-*, *-ur-*:
- i) The root *iecinor-*, n., "liver," is replaced by *iecur-*.
 - ii) In the neuters *ebur-*, "ivory," and *robur-*, "oak," *-ur-* is replaced by *-or-*: *ebor*, *robor*.
 - iii) In *ciner-*, m., "ashes," *puluer-*, m., "dust," *cucumer-*, m., "cucumber," *-er-* is replaced by *-is-*: *cinis*, *puluis*, *cucumis*.
 - iv) In *uener-*, f., "desire, Venus," *lepor-*, m., "hare," and neuter stems in *-er-* and *-or-* not previously mentioned, *-er-* or *-or-* is replaced by *-us-*: *uenus*, *lepus*, genus, n., "kind" : *gener-*, *corpus*, n., "body" : *corpor-*.
 - v) In *flor-*, m., "flower," *lepor-*, m., "charm," *mor-*, m., "custom," *ror-*, m., "dew"; *crur-*, f., "leg," *mur-*, m., "mouse," *telur-*, f., "earth"; and (optionally) *honor-*, m., "honor," *r* is replaced by *s*: *flos*, etc.
 - vi) In *cerer-*, f., "Ceres," optionally in *arbor-*, m., "tree," and also in *mari-*, m., "male," *r* is replaced by *s*: *cere-s*, *arbo-s*, *ma-s*.
- c) Neuter roots of VI in *-at-* and m. or f. roots in *-on-* lose the final consonant: *poe-ma*, n., "poem" : *poe-mat-*; *leo*, m., "lion" : *leo-n-*.
 - d) Neuter roots of III in *-al-* lose the element of vowel length: *animal* : *anima-li-*.
 - e) The root *carn-*, f., III, "flesh," is replaced by *caro-*; *capit-*, n., VI, "head," by *caput*; and *itiner-*, n., VI, "march," by *iter*.
2. Before ending *s*.
- a) In roots of VI ending in *p* and *t* and in certain roots ending in *c* and *d*, an immediately preceding *i* or *u* is replaced by *e*: *princeps*, m., "chief" : *prin-cip-*; *mi-les*, m., "soldier" : *mi-lit-*; *pontifex*, m., "pontiff" : *pontific-*; *opses*, m., "hostage" : *opsid-*; *auceps*, m., "fowler" : *aucup-*.
 - b) The root *sen-*, m., VI, "old man," is replaced by *senec-*, and *supellectil-*, f., VI, "furniture," by *supellec-*: *senecs*, *supellecs*.
 - c) The root *niu-*, f., III, "snow," is replaced by *nic-*: *nics*.
3. Before ending *s*: the root *bou-* is replaced by *bo-*: *bo-s*.

IV. CONCLUDING REMARKS

The foregoing presentation covers all the significant features of classical Latin noun inflection, in a relatively brief space (as compared with, for instance, 24 pages in Allen and Greenough, or 21 pages in Gildersleeve or in Hale and Buck). Certain points discussed under noun inflection in most grammars, such as heteroclitic, metaplastic, redundant, or defective nouns, are really lexical matters, and

some space has been saved by their omission. The rest of the saving in space is due to the omission of repetitive paradigms, and to the gathering-together of all similar features of inflection (e.g., -s of the acc. pl. ending in one place instead of five or more).

What is the usefulness of a treatment of this type? It is, I believe, brief and clear and, at the same time, emphasizes the main structural features of the language. It is of use in understanding historical development, e.g., of the Romance languages, and in comparing Latin with languages of different structure. It would

serve as a basis for the pedagogical presentation of Latin and for the mention of forms in dictionaries and grammatical discussions. In dictionaries, nouns could be listed in their stem-form (as done in this article), without indication of specific case-forms except where true irregularities in inflection occur: thus, *domino-*, m., "master"; *sen-*, m., "old man," nom. sing. *senecs*; *capit-*, n., "head," acc. sing. *caput*; *mul-*, f., "she-mule," dat.-abl. pl. (opt.) *mulabus*. Such listing would be clearer and more informative than that currently practiced.

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THE ACHARNIANS AND THE PAY OF TAXIARCHS

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THE purpose of the present study is to see whether any valid information can be deduced from the *Acharnians* of Aristophanes on the question whether or not taxiarchs and other Athenian officers received pay. The impetus came from a reference by Ehrenberg to the salary of Lamachus.¹ This seemed to contradict a common impression that high military officers elected by vote were unpaid. Since some of the passages that are important for the problem have been discussed at great length, the task proved unexpectedly difficult and complicated. However, no effort has been made to cover all the huge literature on the *Acharnians* or even to cite what has been covered, except in so far as it is necessary for the following argument.

Everyone who has dealt seriously and conscientiously with the subject of pay for government services at Athens has found himself faced with almost insuperable difficulties. It is relatively easy—though even here all details are not certain—to give an account of pay for jury service, for *bouleutai*, for attendance at meetings of the assembly, and for a few magistrates. It is much more difficult to determine how commonly pay was given for other services, though two statements in our sources imply that it was used very extensively. In the first place, there is the passage in which Pseudo-Xenophon² contrasts unpaid elected military officials (*strategoi* and *hipparchoi*) with the paid magistrates selected by lot and implies

that the latter were numerous. It is not stated in so many words that the officers mentioned were unpaid, but this clearly is implied. In the second place Aristotle,³ in the famous passage in which he claims that, after the development of democracy in the fifth century, over twenty thousand Athenian citizens were supported by pay, includes approximately seven hundred officials serving at home. These officials do not include the *bouleutai*, who are listed separately. Though the accuracy of the passage has been questioned and though the calculations involved—whether original with Aristotle or not—obviously seek to make the system of pay appear as extensive as possible, nevertheless the statement confirms the conclusion drawn from Pseudo-Xenophon.

Our particular problem involves the added difficulty that it is entangled with the question of pay for military service.⁴ By the time of the Peloponnesian War it is certain that Athenian soldiers and sailors received pay when on active service. But was pay given not only to privates but also to officers? And, if the officers received pay, did they receive a salary throughout the year or only pay when on active service? The passage from Pseudo-Xenophon already cited implies that the generals and hipparchs were unpaid. The implication seems to be that high military officers—and that would

¹ *Ath. pol.* 24. 3.

² August Böckh, *Die Staatshaushaltung der Athener*, ed. Fränkel (Berlin, 1886), I, 340–58; Otto Schultze, s.v. *μισθός*, in P.-W., XV, 2084–85, and s.v. *στρατιώτης*, *ibid.*, IIIA, 382–88; G. T. Griffith, *The Mercenaries of the Hellenistic World* (Cambridge, 1935), chap. x, "The Pay and Maintenance of Mercenaries."

³ Victor Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes* (Oxford, 1943), p. 247.

⁴ *Ath. pol.* I. 3; cf. the commentary in the edition of Ernst Kallinka (Leipzig, 1913).

include the taxiarchs too—were unpaid. Yet this cannot be considered entirely certain, for the two hipparchs stood in the same relation to the cavalry of the state as the generals did to the entire army. Below them were the ten phylarchs, who commanded the tribal contingents of cavalry as the ten taxiarchs commanded the tribal contingents of infantry. At least in the time of Aristotle⁵ these officers were elected by show of hands; and their importance was such that it seems safe to conclude that they were always selected in this manner and never chosen by lot. To return to Pseudo-Xenophon, it is natural to take his statement to mean that all military commanders thus elected were unpaid and that generals and hipparchs are mentioned only as illustrations. On the other hand, it is possible to argue—though this is less likely—that the statement applies only to these particular officers and does not exclude pay for taxiarchs and phylarchs. This second conclusion, at first glance, seems to have the support of the references in the *Acharnians* to the pay of Lamachus, but this may prove misleading.

In the play, Lamachus, though he once refers to himself as a *strategos* (l. 593), is represented as a taxiarch.⁶ This is indicated by the passage in which he receives orders from the generals to take his companies and go to guard the mountain

passes facing Boeotia (ll. 1073–77).⁷ This position, subordination to the generals combined with the command over several companies, shows that he was neither a general nor a *lochagos* but must have been a taxiarch. The reaction of Lamachus to the command is typical of an immediate subordinate with a good opinion of himself. He implies that the generals ranked higher in quantity than in quality (l. 1078). In representing Lamachus as a taxiarch, it is likely that Aristophanes is historically accurate. The entire impression of his life is that he definitely had chosen a military career. He appears as a general in 424,⁸ and it would be perfectly natural to find him early in 425 in the next highest military position. In all likelihood he actually was the taxiarch of the tribe of Oeneis, to which the Acharnians themselves belonged.⁹ Hence he was the obvious choice for a character to represent militarism in a play in which the chorus consisted of Acharnians. Probably it should be put the other way, that the men of the largest deme in his tribe were the natural choice for the chorus of a play in which Lamachus is represented as a typical warmonger.

Before taking up in detail the evidence for the pay of Lamachus, it may be well to consider somewhat more fully the manner in which he and the general background are treated by Aristophanes, in order to

⁵ *Ath. pol.* 61.

⁶ In regard to the controversy about the generalship of Lamachus (see p. 95 and n. 18) it has been maintained that ll. 566–71, in which the semichorus calls for the aid of Lamachus or any stray taxiarch, siege-expert, or general, prove that Lamachus was not a general. This is based on the supposition that none of these titles can apply to him. If so, the rank of taxiarch, as well, is excluded. But surely this conclusion is unwarranted, and the point is merely that the help of any qualified and important officer will be welcomed. It can be argued, however, that when Lamachus in reply asks where he is to charge and who has called for his help (ll. 572–74), this fits a subordinate officer better than a general.

⁷ J. Kromayer and G. Veith (*Heerwesen und Kriegsführung* [Munich, 1928], p. 49, n. 3) think this passage proof that Lamachus is represented as a taxiarch; cf. also Rennie's commentary on l. 1073. In l. 1074, τοῖς λόχοις καὶ τοῖς λόφοις is a phrase which Aristophanes loves (cf. l. 575), but this does not alter the fact that Lamachus is represented as having several *lochoi* under his command.

⁸ Thuc. iv. 75.

⁹ Lamachus is thought to have been a member of the deme of Oa, in which at a later date there appears another Lamachus, who is taken to be a descendant of the general (*Prosopographia Attica*, Nos. 8980 and 8981). This evidence is not completely conclusive but gains support from the fact that the Acharnians address Lamachus as a fellow-tribesman (l. 568).

see whether the evidence can be allowed to carry any weight. A study of the meaning of his name will suggest that the historical Lamachus has very little to do with the play except to lend his name. On the other hand, it will appear that the reference to his position as taxiarch and the general treatment of details of public life are such that we should expect Aristophanes to be accurate also with regard to pay.

The name, Lamachus, in spite of its simplicity, has caused so many difficulties that recently lexicographers have seemed to prefer to remain discreetly silent on the subject. It contains two elements, of which the second obviously is related to μάχη and μάχουαι. It is the first that has caused trouble. Two suggestions have been made, the intensive prefix λᾱ- and derivation from λᾱός. The first would give the meaning "very warlike, very bellicose," or something of the kind; the second, "champion of the people." The prefix λᾱ- has survived attacks directed against it and is recognized by lexicographers,¹⁰ but that does not settle the question of the derivation of Lamachus. The derivation from λᾱ- long held undisputed sway. Later the derivation from λᾱός was adopted, though the other was not entirely abandoned. Recently there has been a conspiracy of silence.¹¹ Under

the circumstances it seems safest for the amateur to conclude that the question has not been settled and that either of the two derivations suggested is possible.

But the actual origin and derivation of the name are much less important than the question of what it meant to contemporaries and, specifically, what it meant in the *Acharnians*. In all likelihood, both meanings—and probably even more—were intended and were understood by the audience. "Champion of the People," though in this meaning the name is Doric rather than Attic, is so obvious that it cannot have been overlooked and certain-

adopted by August Fick (*Die griechischen Personennamen* [Göttingen, 1874]). It is preferred also by Benseler in the third edition of Pape's *Handwörterbuch* in his revision of Vol. III ("Dritter Abdruck" [Braunschweig, 1884] [first published, 1863-70]) though both etymologies are listed (s.v.; cf. also p. xxiv). The derivation from λᾱ- is retained in the fifth edition of Passow, Vol. II, Part I (1852) and in the dictionaries of C. Berg (Copenhagen, 1864) and A. Chassang (Paris, 1872), and in A. Vanček's *Griechisch-lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch* (Leipzig, 1877), p. 770. A. Bailly, with admirable impartiality, lists the one etymology under λᾱ- and the other under Λάμαχος (checked in the 5th ed. [1906] and the 11th ed. [n.d.]). In the revised edition of *Personennamen* by Fick and F. Bechtel (Göttingen, 1894), Λάμαχος is not given in the normal positions in the lists of names but is included on p. 187 as an example of a name beginning with Λα- instead of the more usual Λεω-. Boisacq has nothing to say about the word. The new Liddell-Scott-Jones *Lexicon* is non-committal and under Λάμαχος merely quotes the definition of Hesychius (but cf. below, n. 13). The strangest treatment is that of Bechtel in *Die historischen Personennamen des Griechischen bis zur Kaiserzeit* (Halle, 1917). In this work, though, in addition to the general, another Athenian Lamachus is known (*IG*, II², 1556.30; cf. above, n. 9), he omits the Athenians but lists another Lamachus from Doric Carpathus under Λεω- (Λαο-, Λα-) and -μαχος. The reason probably is that this form is correct for Doric but not for Attic, in which the name should be Λεώμαχος as in *IG*, II, 1894; but even this name, which is given in Fick-Bechtel, is omitted from the later work. Bechtel's treatment of Lachares is similar. Apparently, he does not wish to venture an etymology for either the Athenian Lamachus or the Athenian Lachares. The omissions cannot be accidental. Also Λεωχόρος, which is a common Attic name (*Proa. Att.*, Nos. 9165-76), is omitted. At the same time, Bechtel includes a group of compounds of Λα- (related to λᾱ-) not found in the earlier works of Fick and himself and suggests that the same element probably is found in λακαρατίγων and λακαραστος. These two compounds are the normal illustrations of the intensive prefix λα-. This is where Lamachus belongs if derivation from this prefix is accepted.

¹⁰ Liddell-Scott-Jones, s.v.; Boisacq, p. 579, s.v. λᾱ-; Walde-Pokorny, II, 393; cf. also E. Schwyzler, *Griechische Grammatik*, I (1939), 434; and Bechtel as cited in n. 11.

¹¹ It is unnecessary to trace this history in detail. Derivation from λᾱ- is implied in the entry of Hesychius. Notice that the word is treated as an adjective. In the 1840's the derivation from λᾱός was adopted by several scholars. W. Pape in his *Handwörterbuch der griechischen Sprache* adopted it in III (*Wörterbuch der griechischen Eigennamen* [Braunschweig, 1842]), 13, in his discussion of the formation of names. H. L. Ahrens (*De Graecae linguae dialectis*, II [Göttingen, 1843], 200) lists Lamachus and Lachares as examples of words showing Doric vowel contraction in Attic. Liddell and Scott, at least as early as their second edition (1845), while listing the derivation from λᾱ- as the one usually accepted, add "yet the deriv. from λᾱός, μάχη . . . deserves attention." The latter was

ly fits much of the play. On the other hand, "the mighty fighter," "the invincible," or, with pejorative meaning, "the superbellicose" or even "the supercantankerous" fits the play fully as well. Several considerations make it clear that this meaning was uppermost in the mind of the poet not only in the *Acharnians* but also in the *Peace*.¹² Some passages in the latter play offer the easiest starting-point. When the boy who has been singing warlike songs is made the son of Lamachus (l. 1290), the poet obviously means the son of an extremely warlike father. Immediately afterward he almost defines the name, when he refers to Lamachus as ἀνὴρ βουλόμενος (l. 1293), "a man desirous of fighting."¹³ Likewise, when the day of peace is called μισολάμαχος (l. 304), the meaning certainly is not that champions of the people, but rather that the bellicose and irreconcilable, are detested. The same meaning of the name appears also in the *Acharnians* when Dicaeopolis connects with peace a riddance from Lamachus (l. 270) or, one might almost say, Lamachus. ¹⁴ Likewise, the messenger's cry, ἰὼ πόνοι τε καὶ μάχαι καὶ Λάμαχοι (l. 1071), is most effective if Λάμαχοι is taken as an intensive noun connected with μάχαι. Even some of the adjectives applied to Lamachus in the *Acharnians* (l. 964) are

¹² A compound of λα-, λακαταπύγων, occurs in the *Acharnians* (l. 664), where it is applied to Cleon. The audience obviously understood the force of the prefix. Starkie (commentary on l. 220) considers Lakrateides a similar compound.

¹³ ἀνὴρ βουλόμενος καὶ κλανσιμάχος (l. 1293). The second adjective should mean "bewalling fighting." Liddell-Scott-Jones gives "Rue-the-fight, parody on the name of Lamachus (Ready-for-fight)." This seems to accept for the latter name the derivation from λα-. The idea may well be that Lamachus loves fighting but has lived—or will live—to rue it.

¹⁴ Starkie remarks in his commentary that the name has been chosen here on account of its etymology. He clearly has derivation from λα- in mind; cf. also his commentary on l. 566, where he states that the name means "the mighty fighter." Similarly, H. Müller-Strübing (*Aristophanes und die historische Kritik* [Leipzig, 1873], p. 500) translates "starker Kämpfer, Fechtbold."

applied to Polemos in the *Peace* (l. 241). It is almost as if Aristophanes had written his own commentary and told us that Lamachus is the personification of war. Hence it is appropriate—more appropriate than some commentators realize—when Dicaeopolis does not use the name of Lamachus' real father but coins a mythological name, Gorgasos.¹⁵ Lamachus is the mighty warrior or, as Hesychius defined the word, the "invincible." Surely, one of the major points of the plot is that the invincible was vanquished.

If this is the meaning given to the name by Aristophanes, why does he not pun on λάμαχος, "the very lewd"?¹⁶ It is true that it might have been necessary to coin the word—at least it is not given in dictionaries—but that would hardly have stopped Aristophanes. It is also true that μάχος normally was applied to women, but this would have made its application to a great warrior more piquant. Is the answer that the pun was so obvious that it need not be expressed? There is one noteworthy exception to the normal usage of the word, its application by Aeschylus to Ares.¹⁷ Here the meaning probably is "insatiable" or "bloodthirsty." This use of the word may well have created a

¹⁵ *Acharn.* 1131. It is correct to connect the name with the Gorgon, as is commonly done, but Starkie misses the point when he believes that it "was a well-known proper name at Athens." It is not found in *Prosopographia Attica*. The only parallels seem to be the mythical or divine Gorgasos worshiped at Pharae in Messenia (Paus. iv. 3. 10; 30. 3; cf. Hiller von Gärtringen in P.-W., VII, 1596, s.v.) and the perhaps equally mythical artist said by Pliny (*HN* xxxv. 154) to have helped decorate the temple of Ceres (cf. Rossbach in P.-W., IV, 2076 f., s.v. "Damophilos" [8]).

¹⁶ Neither this word nor the uncompounded adjective is found in his extant works (O. J. Todd, *Index Aristophaneus* [Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1932]). The failure to use μάχος is intelligible. There were so many more vigorous and more sonorous words for the same idea.

¹⁷ *Suppl.* 636. J. Vürtheim in his commentary states: "μάχος heisst Ares seit Homer (θ)." Unfortunately, the adjective is not used by Homer, but it is easy to sympathize with the feeling that *Od.* vii contains material which would make it appropriate to call Ares "lewd."

sensation and may have been remembered by Aristophanes and his hearers. Thus Lamachus would appear a human counterpart or incarnation of the insatiable war-god. For comic effect it is suggested that he was insatiable also in his love of good food. From the point of view of the plot, this means that not only was the invincible vanquished but also the insatiable got his belly full of war, though it went empty so far as good food was concerned. Yet, even if this play on words is excluded, the meaning of the name is enough to make it clear that the Lamachus of the *Acharnians* is no more real than the Nicias and the Demosthenes of the *Knights*. It was just a happy accident that there existed a prominent officer with such a convenient name.

All this might seem to lead to the conclusion that nothing in the play can be used as evidence on any specific point. Such a sweeping conclusion is not warranted, for all that has been proved is that we cannot rely on its picture of Lamachus. Other things suggest reasonable accuracy—for instance, the procedure in the assembly. The question of pay for government services belongs to a category for which we can expect accuracy possibly tempered somewhat with comic exaggeration. To a certain extent even the representation of Lamachus is accurate. He was a well-known officer, and, in all likelihood, he was the taxiarch of his and the *Acharnians*' tribe. The only difficulty here is the reference to Lamachus as *strategos* (l. 593), which has led to a lengthy discussion involving also the problem of the time of the election of the Athenian generals and the time of their entry into office. The effort to fit the comedies of Aristophanes into a structural strait jacket led to the conclusion that the *Acharnians* lacked a proper *agon*. As an explanation it has been suggested that

the poet expected the play (performed at the Lenaea of 425) to be produced shortly before the election of generals and to serve as propaganda against the election of members of the war party. When the elections were held unusually early and actually a short time before the production of the play and resulted in the election of Lamachus and other members of the war party, the poet found that the work as it had been written was inappropriate and hurriedly substituted, for the *agon* of the original draft, lines 593-619 of the present version.¹⁸ But even

¹⁸ H. B. Mayor ("The Strategi of Athens in the Fifth Century," *JHS*, LIX (1939), 45-64) tries to prove that the generals assumed office soon after their election in the seventh prytany instead of in midsummer. In his treatment of *Acharnians* 593-619, Mayor revives the theory of the revision of the play after the election of the generals and the hurried substitution for the original *agon* of ll. 593-619 propounded by Müller-Strübing (*op. cit.*, pp. 498 ff.) in his ingenious and interesting study of the passage. His theory of the later insertion of these lines was accepted by Th. Zielinski (*Die Gliederung der altattischen Komödie* [Leipzig, 1885], pp. 54-58) but he explained the circumstances somewhat differently. Otherwise it has found little favor. A. W. Pickard-Cambridge (*Dithyramb Tragedy and Comedy* [Oxford, 1927], p. 299; cf. also pp. 312-13) does not find excessive irregularities in the *Acharnians*. Mayor's theory concerning the term of office of the generals is attractive but not proved. W. K. Pritchett ("The Term of Office of Attic Strategoi," *AJP*, LXI (1940), 469-74) has pointed out that it is difficult to explain the generals known in connection with the Samian revolt except on the "orthodox" theory that the term began in midsummer. The same is true for the generals of the year 424, though Pritchett's statement concerning this year is less satisfactory. He lists, as serving during the year, Nicias, Lamachus, Hippocrates, Thucydides, Nicostratus, Autocles, Eurymedon, Pythodorus, Sophocles, Demodocus, Aristides, and Cleon. This, to be sure, gives twelve names, and the added difficulty is mentioned that Eurymedon and Cleon may have belonged to the same tribe, Pandionis. However, on any theory it is necessary to postulate that generals serving abroad remained in command until relieved. Hence it can be argued that, since Athens sent no new forces to Sicily in 424, Eurymedon, Pythodorus, and Sophocles, who all had been sent out in 425, continued to serve in 424, as it were, as propraetors. The fact that they are called *strategoí* in connection with their return to Athens and trial (Thuc. iv. 65) need not be considered conclusive proof that their normal term of office had not expired. Thus the list is reduced to nine, and Cleon's fellow-tribesman, Eurymedon, disappears from it. There are, however, two other generals mentioned in connection with operations in 424—Demosthenes (Thuc. iv. 66, 3 and 76. 1) and Eucles (Thuc. iv. 104. 4). With these

aside from the suggestions made above on the basis of the name of Lamachus, it is difficult to see in the play a personal attack of a kind that would lose its point if he were elected general. Nor is it easy to see what would be gained by making him a general in this particular passage but later, at a crucial point in the action, have him appear as a subordinate officer. It is more likely that the word is used less technically for a commander or that its use is due to parody of Euripides' *Telephus*¹⁹ or even that it is a hit at the "cock-sureness" with which Lamachus at the time was electioneering for the office.²⁰ Fortunately, this makes little difference for the present problem. Lamachus is accused of having been a seeker or receiver of pay (*μισθαρχίδης* [l. 597], a *hapax legomenon*) since the war began. Obviously, even if he had just been elected general, the reference would be to pay received for his earlier services—in all likelihood, for services as an officer in the army.

Is it possible to conclude from this that officers received pay? The references of Aristophanes to contemporary institutions are, as a whole, so accurate that it seems safe to answer in the affirmative. Yet, in all likelihood, it is inaccurate to speak of his "salary." The pay probably was not given to the taxiarch for every

day of his term of office but only for the periods spent on active service. This would be completely in accordance with the common meaning of *μισθός*, which seldom means "salary." Certainly, the *dikastikos* and the *ekklesiastikos misthos* were fees paid on specific days for services rendered the same day. It is natural to believe that this was true also of the *bouleutikos misthos* and that the members of the council did not receive pay on days on which they failed to attend meetings. When applied to pay for soldiers, *misthos* would come closer to meaning "salary," particularly in connection with mercenaries, who often were paid by the month. In the case of Athenian citizens, however, whether sailors or soldiers, *misthos* normally was pay reckoned by days of service rather than salary. A citizen did not receive pay for the entire period during which his name was entered on the roster of hoplites but only for the time when he was mobilized for active service.²¹ According to the *Acharnians* (ll. 66 and 137) the *misthos* of ambassadors was likewise reckoned by the day. Consequently, they could increase their income by procrastination. Of course, the eleven years of the embassy to Persia is a comic exaggeration. Whether the pay of ambassadors was computed in the same manner in the fourth century does not concern us.

The question of pay in general is treated in a one-sided manner in the comedy. The pay for soldiers during wars

two added, the number of generals recorded for the season again becomes eleven, even when the three serving in Sicily are counted out as holdovers from the previous year.

For a recent discussion of other problems connected with the Athenian generals see Ehrenberg, "Pericles and His Colleagues between 441 and 429 B.C.," *AJP*, LXVI (1945), 113-34. He considers Pritchett's refutation of Mayor's argument convincing (*ibid.*, p. 128, n. 39).

¹⁹ Starkie, commentary on ll. 566 ff.; cf. Pritchett, *op. cit.*, p. 473.

²⁰ Rennie, commentary on l. 593. This explanation appeals to me personally. Naturally there have been attempts to remove the "inconsistency" by emendation. The interpretations given above are enough to show that this is unnecessary.

²¹ Aristotle (*Ath. pol.* 27. 2) indicates that this was the case during the Peloponnesian War. Likewise, Aristophanes (*Birds* 1367) implies pay for service in garrisons and on expeditions. Service in a frontier guard on the boundary toward Boeotia (*Acharn.* 1073-77) undoubtedly involved pay. Apparently certain kinds of troops (*Arist. Ath. pol.* 24. 3 and 49. 1) and the crews of the "Paralos," the "Salamina," and its successor, the "Ammonis" (Busolt, *Staatskunde*, p. 1208) received pay throughout the year. Such a regular salary, however, was given only to special groups and not to the ordinary soldier and sailor.

could be satirized as a source of income just as well as any other form of pay for government services and actually is so treated in the *Birds* (l. 1367). The point of view in the *Acharnians*, however, is that of the men who served in the ranks and rowed the ships. From their point of view their own pay is perfectly legitimate, and what is attacked is the ambassadors' and officers' privilege of receiving higher pay. In the scene in the *ekklesia*, attention is centered on ambassadors; and it is stated that, at least in one case, their pay was 2 drachmas a day (ll. 66 and 90). The 3 drachmas of line 602 cause more difficulty and sometimes have been taken as referring to ambassadors. It is more likely that the young men who had fled—probably a reference to the Aetolian campaign of 462²²—and yet were receiving 3 drachmas a day were taxiarchs like Lamachus himself. Hence, in all likelihood, the mysterious names in the following lines refer to prominent officers rather than to the generals elected either in 426 or in 425. Naturally, some of these officers may later have been elected to that office, and so some of the names may refer to men known to us as generals. Later, when the sinecures of such men are referred to, Ecbatana is mentioned (l. 613), and this suggests an embassy. In other words, all soft jobs with good incomes are attacked; but the emphasis is first upon officers, and the 3 drachmas belong to them and not to ambassadors. In the case both of himself (l. 598) and the others (l. 607) the retort of Lamachus is that they were elected. For officers this does not mean that they were paid throughout the entire year of office. As far as pay is concerned, they must have been in the position of reserve officers in a modern army. They performed their ordinary duties at home without pay but received pay when mobilized for active

service. This may have included garrison duty of such a kind that it could be represented as a sinecure. During the war able officers—and Lamachus was such an officer—may well have been called on so frequently that they could be represented, without too much exaggeration, as having drawn pay continuously from the beginning of the war (l. 597). Nor is it too great a distortion to represent these tasks as due to election, since it was election that made the officers eligible for the service.

The pay of taxiarchs on active duty may actually have been 3 drachmas a day. In a chapter of Thucydides (iii. 17), which frequently has been declared spurious, the pay of hoplites serving at Potidaea is given as 2 drachmas a day, 1 for the hoplite and 1 for his attendant. The same scale of pay, undoubtedly 1 drachma for each sailor, applied also for the fleet. In the light of other examples of relatively high pay during the Peloponnesian War,²³ this does not seem excessive.²⁴ If 2 drachmas was the pay of a hoplite and his servant, 3 drachmas would not be excessive for a taxiarch. At any rate, it would be natural that he should receive more than a hoplite. Something is known concerning the relation of officers' pay to that of soldiers in mercenary forces. When

²² The sailors in the fleet leaving for Sicily in 415 received 1 drachma a day from the public treasury, and the thranites and petty officers additional pay over and above this from the trierarchs (Thuc. vi. 31. 3, following the text of Jones-Powell; for the meaning see particularly the commentary of Arnold). Two years later the Athenians had engaged 1,300 Thracian peltasts at a drachma a day. Apparently they were ready to pay this for service in Sicily but considered the pay too high for service in Attica (*ibid.* vii. 27. 1-2). Tissaphernes also for a time paid sailors at the same rate (*ibid.* viii. 29. 1, 45. 2).

²³ This is the view of Griffith (*op. cit.*, p. 294 and n. 3), who, however, does not believe that the 2 drachmas were divided equally between the hoplite and the servant. This is possible, though the text is clear on the point that the allowance was 1 drachma for each and that the rate of pay for the crews of the ships was the same. The hoplite, however, apparently received the 2 drachmas, 1 as his own pay and 1 as an allowance for the maintenance of a servant.

²⁴ Müller-Strübing, *op. cit.*, p. 506

Thibron in 399 opened negotiations with the former mercenaries of Cyrus the Younger, he offered the *lochagoi* double and the *strategoï* quadruple pay.²⁵ There is reason to believe that this proportion was widely used,²⁶ but this may have been only for officers of mercenary troops. Certainly, there is no proof that it was applied in the payment of Athenian citizens serving as officers. However, if a similar scale was employed and if we start from the 1 drachma which each hoplite at Potidaea received for himself, we should expect an Athenian *lochagos* to receive 2 drachmas a day for himself and a taxiarch somewhat more.

If hoplites and taxiarchs received pay, it is safe to draw the further conclusion—already implied—that the other subordinate officers, the *lochagoi*²⁷ and the *phylarchoi*, the tribal commanders of the cavalry, received pay. It may be more dangerous to draw the same conclusion concerning generals and hipparchs, who may well have been too superior to receive pay of any kind. Yet the adoption of such an attitude would result in closing these offices to all except men of means, and that would hardly be in accordance with the spirit of Periclean democracy.

²⁵ Xen. An. vii. 6. 1.

²⁶ Undoubtedly this was the proportion meant when Seuthes offered the *lochagoi* and *strategoï* τὰ νομισμα (ibid. vii. 3. 10). The expression implies a well-recognized scale (cf. Griffith, *op. cit.*, p. 295).

²⁷ Since the *lochagoi* were appointed by the taxiarchs (Arist. Ath. pol. 61. 3), they may be included among those that owed their pay to the favor of others (Wasps 683).

Worse still, it might result in depriving the state of the service of able officers who were not sufficiently wealthy to finance themselves when abroad on expeditions. There is also the consideration that men of such dignity as ambassadors received pay or expense money. Hence, in all likelihood, even the generals and hipparchs received some kind of remuneration when on active service.

The upshot of all this is a paradox. Both the conclusion drawn from Pseudo-Xenophon that the taxiarchs were unpaid and the implication of the *Acharnians* that they received pay are correct. They were unpaid in the sense that they were not salaried throughout the year; they were paid in the sense that they received pay when on active service. This conclusion may be confirmed or refuted by additional evidence but seems natural in the light of the evidence now available. It may be objected that, according to this hypothesis, there is little difference between the "paid" magistrates who received pay only on the days on which they actually performed their tasks and the "unpaid" officers. Yet there is a real difference. The magistrates were remunerated for their normal work and could look forward to pay many or most of the days of the year; the officers received no pay for normal peacetime activities but only when they were called upon to perform special services.

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NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

Ὁ ΦΙΛΟΜΗΡΟΣ ΣΟΦΟΚΛΗΣ AND EUSTATHIUS

Of the multitude of ancient authors to whom the learned Byzantine, Eustathius, refers in his voluminous *Παρεκβολαὶ εἰς τὴν Ὁμήρου Ἰλιάδα—Ὀδύσσειαν*, none is more frequently encountered than Sophocles.¹ Eustathius quotes, paraphrases, refers or alludes to the dramas of Sophocles actually more than 525 times; and the greater number of these references consists of quotations of the text of Sophocles, not simply citations of words or usages. The proportion of citation of the extant dramas* is as follows: *Ajax*, 153; *Electra*, 54; *Oedipus Rex*, 69; *Antigone*, 65; *Trachiniae*, 31; *Philoctetes*, 42; *Oedipus Coloneus*, 27. In addition, the *Commentaries* contain 60 quotations and citations of dramas no longer extant and 25 allusions to the dramas of Sophocles in general.

One reason for the very extensive reference to Sophocles is the recognition by Eustathius of the close literary relationship existing between Homer and the great tragedian. Eustathius perceives clearly the debt Sophocles owes to Homer and stresses it constantly. The word *φιλόμηρος* is an epithet he applies to Sophocles repeatedly;² the same idea is expressed when he calls Sophocles *ὁ τοῦ Ὁμήρου ζηλωτής*,³ and when he says the dramatist composed a passage *Ὀμηρικῶς ζήλω*.⁴ Further, one of the chief purposes for which he quotes Sophocles is to point out that the tragedian, in composing, imitated (*μιμούμενος*) a passage from Homer, that he paraphrased (*παραφράζων*) Homeric expressions, or that he received his inspiration

from Homer (*ἐντεύθεν λαβὼν*;⁵ *ἐντεύθεν μεθοδεύεις*,⁶ and similar expressions). Eustathius everywhere betrays thorough knowledge of the extant tragedies of Sophocles, particularly of the *Antigone* and the favorite triad of Byzantine times, the *Ajax*, the *Electra*, and the *Oedipus Rex*. The description of Eustathius' citation of Sophocles, presented below, will make clear the extent and the depth of his familiarity with Sophocles. An analysis of the citations reveals that Eustathius most frequently quotes Sophocles with complete accuracy, though in some cases the quotation is not precise and sometimes the original passage of Sophocles is paraphrased. The content and context of many of the citations suggest that they were made independently by Eustathius, while others are clearly extracted from earlier sources.⁷ However independent Eustathius' scholarship may have been, much material valuable for the constitution of the text of Sophocles and for the elucidation of words and passages has been preserved.

Some 136 passages are found in which Eustathius introduced into his commentary quotations of the extant tragedies which agree precisely with the reading preserved in the best manuscripts.¹⁰ These verbatim quotations

¹ E.g., 1142. 24, and frequently.

² 754. 21.

³ In three places, Eustathius mentions the evidence of manuscripts in discussion of variant readings: τὰ ἀκριβῆ ἀντίγραφα (957. 19) (on *Antigone* 1167); πολλὰ τῶν ἀντιγράφων (156. 33); τινὰ τῶν ἀντιγράφων (279. 1). Jebb, *Antigone*, Introd., p. lii, assumed the remark of Eustathius on *Antigone* 1167 to be original with him, while A. C. Pearson, *Sophocles fabulae* (Oxford, 1924), p. ix, takes the opposite view. Though the sources of Eustathius are not recoverable, it is more likely that Eustathius' remarks are here based on earlier scholarship.

¹⁰ The references to Sophocles and to Eustathius (the latter in parentheses) are: *Ajax* 34-35 (805. 27); 87 (1312. 19); 157 (1093. 50); 214 (728. 55, 1461. 31); 245-46 (237. 14); 249 (1468. 15); 293 (1423. 29); 302 (679. 64); 322 (1145. 2); 342 (1313. 17); 343 (501. 25); 414-15 (250. 39); 475 (906. 38); 501 (17. 4); 579 (742. 43, 1532. 61, 1937. 64); 581-82 (648. 19, 1147. 9); 596 (306. 20); 648-49 (336. 24); 667 (21. 21, 1429. 26); 675-76 (173. 20, 1297. 16); 770 (897. 2); 775 (621. 55);

¹ Fabricius (*Bibliotheca Graeca*, I, 494) gives several hundred references but leaves his list incomplete.

² The reference is marked with an asterisk where Eustathius cited the play by name. The *Ajax* is not infrequently cited by the title *Μαστιγοφόρος* (e.g., 757. 17, 1139. 60, 1778. 21, etc.) as in the hypothesis to the play.

³ E.g., 756. 18, 814. 23, 890. 24, 902. 3, 1100. 29, 1133. 50, 1140. 27, 1317. 54, etc.

⁴ E.g., 714. 64, 891. 26, 1461. 66.

⁵ 1440. 40.

⁶ E.g., 1364. 48; cf. 1473. 20, 1547. 13, etc.

⁷ E.g., 126. 40, 668. 39, 698. 26, 1461. 66.

illustrate sufficiently the accuracy of which Eustathius is capable, when it is his intention to quote precisely, as the context and the manner of introducing the quotation generally indicate. In some 88 passages, Eustathius introduces a formal quotation from Sophocles, which, however, contains a variation from the *textus receptus*.¹¹ These variations are usually very slight, and it is likely in some cases that Eustathius, intent upon his own point, purposely omitted an unimportant word or changed the quotation slightly. In other cases the text of Eustathius' quotation has pre-

served a variant reading superior to and perhaps older than that found in the *codices*.¹² His testimony on *Antigone* 1167 (957. 19 f.) illustrates this superiority and, incidentally, his method of workmanship. None of our manuscripts contains this line; but Eustathius, citing the authority of τὰ ἀκριβῆ ἀντίγραφα, insists that the line must be inserted.¹³ In the following references, Eustathius furnishes a variant of value for the constitution of Sophocles' text: *Ajax* 45 (571. 10, 1564. 20), ἐξέπραξεν (with A) for ἐξεπράξατ'; 245 (237. 14), κῆρα (with A) for τοὶ κῆρα L, κάρα later *codices*; 379 (415. 19), πάνθ' ὁρῶν (with *codd.*) for πάντα ὁρῶν (Wakefield);¹⁴ 445 (1848. 52) ἀνδρὶ for φωτὶ; 579 (742. 44*, 1532. 61, 1937. 64), δῶμα πᾶκτον for δῶμ' ἀπάκτου; 758 (415. 13), κἀνόνητα (with LA) for κἀνόνητα late *codices*; 761 (415. 13), γεγῶς for βλαστῶν; 1120 (851. 61), σμικρά for σμικρόν; 1227 (723. 29), ἀνοιμακτεῖ for ἀνοιμοικτεῖ; 1352 (800. 9), the order of words is changed, with κλῖεν coming after χρεῖ. *Electra* 52 (692. 59), λοιβαῖσι (with L) for λοιβαῖς τε A; 381 (1839. 62), κατόψε for προσόψε; 706 (83. 1, 335. 20, 524. 31), Αἰνιάν for Αἰνιάν; 709 (419. 2), βραβεῖς (with A) for βραβῆς L; 1090 (1083. 19), καθύπερθεν for καθύπερθε. *Oedipus Rex* 49 (1305. 49, 1332. 18), μεμῶμεθα for μεμῶμεθα; 317 (626. 54) λῦει (with A) for λῦ; 695 (661. 45, 1282. 19), οὐρισας for οὐρησας. *Antigone* 100 (161. 17), ἀέλιου for ἀέλιος; 292 (824. 32),¹⁵ νῶτον εὐλόφως for λόφον δικαίως; 487 (1930. 31), ἐρκείον for ἐρκίον; 629 (699. 24),¹⁶ μελλονύμφου τάλιδος for μελλογάμου νύμφης

786 (706. 58); 794 (843. 49); 811 (1295. 58); 842 (1867. 41); 845 (557. 10); 922 (229. 11); 966 (1521. 42); 1003 (165. 40); 1004 (410. 1); 1079–80 (111. 33, 1036. 14). 1135 (1601. 51); 1154 (681. 6); 1177–79 (413. 44, 649. 10); 1182 (705. 6); 1286–87 (361. 27). *Electra* 10 (674. 62); 12 (410. 35); 45–46 (405. 45); 78 (642. 33); 159 (440. 37); 219 (1887. 16); 281 (1809. 13); 302 (1072. 42); 382 (634. 11); 385 (694. 26); 416 (623. 30); 452 (1835. 54); 457 (623. 60, 1769. 54); 640 (723. 24, 1439. 55, 1650. 1); 706 (83. 1); 709–10 (419. 2); 727 (432. 17); 929 (645. 18); 977 (723. 15*). *Oedipus Rex* 4–5 (1085. 48); 58 (383. 21, 645. 18, 1451. 1); 80 (1154. 28, 1484. 52); 148 (694. 23); 317 (626. 54); 334–35 (792. 36); 374 (675. 52); 617 (127. 20); 695 (661. 45); 701 (694. 26); 840 (666. 39); 961 (1266. 40); 1275 (634. 11*). *Antigone* 88 (1140. 29); 100 (161. 17); 134 (1701. 19); 286 (706. 23); 404 (148. 34); 415–16 (698. 26); 488 (710. 59); 493 (1931. 5); 505 (1391. 62); 530 (768. 40); 541 (1444. 44); 621 (189. 25, 1728. 22); 677 (59. 27, 759. 39); 712 (1409. 39, 1612. 18); 962 (219. 37); 974 (757. 38); 1008 (680. 25); 1168 (1606. 24); 1267 (548. 43); 1275 (625. 22, 796. 5). *Trachiniae* 441–42 (792. 19); 620 (808. 20); 678 (751. 51); 754 (149. 10); 782 (976. 9*); 943–45 (801. 1). *Philoctetes* 33 (806. 57); 237 (1717. 58); 304 (290. 36, 917. 40, 1374. 18); 391–92 (46. 11); 605 (790. 35); 650 (905. 7, 981. 45); 771 (1694. 8*); 827 (981. 12); 927 (1187. 22, 1463. 35); 1314 (737. 6). *Oedipus Coloneus* 144 (479. 16); 159 (775. 18); 189 (713. 31); 234 (488. 34); 676–77 (1547. 13); 1147 (694. 30); 1237–39 (790. 64); 1551 (581. 26); 1590–91 (156. 33*).

¹¹ Quotations differing from the *textus receptus*: *Ajax* 15–16 (198. 2*); 161 (864. 34, 970. 34, 1125. 27); 381 (1441. 19); 448–49 (361. 31); 634 (567. 31, 651. 47); 693 (452. 10, 1419. 43); 699 (1166. 19); 1063 (19. 10); 1122 (851. 59); 1156 (1364. 7); 1182 (668. 39, 1261. 65); 1287 (675. 32); 1348 (1047. 29); 1350 (1514. 28). *Electra* 59–60 (1701. 64); 61 (752. 33); 66 (1260. 1); 147 (725. 55); 305–6 (191. 29); 625 (14. 2, 24); 781 (632. 31); 933 (666. 65); 993–94 (479. 26); 1078–79 (645. 18); 1310 (455. 44); 1390 (533. 12). *Oedipus Rex* 65 (795. 64); 158 (714. 64); 161 (1158. 3, 1335. 61); 267–68 (601. 40); 316 (1722. 16); 336 (441. 26); 338 (755. 15*); 914–15 (143. 15); 921 (1112. 39*). *Antigone* 80 (1303. 40); 479–80 (55. 28); 563 (720. 6); 678 (759. 39); 707–9 (237. 22); 965 (11. 20); 1037 (1483. 29); 1170–71 (757. 31); 1314 (548. 43). *Trachiniae* 379 (792. 22). *Philoctetes* 33 (778. 55); 97 (486. 26, 779. 14); 354 (756. 18); 645–46 (236. 38); 683 (763. 1*); 696 (806. 55); 791 (1396. 8); 1081 (944. 28). *Oedipus Coloneus* 134 (694. 30); 313–14 (803. 1); 681–82 (492. 4); 1097–98 (394. 29); 1463 (692. 54); 1490 (505. 38).

¹² Eustathius sometimes agrees with L against A or vice versa, sometimes with the later manuscripts against both L and A.

¹³ Eustathius is discussing the athetizing of lines in Homer and remarks that the same thing is found in other authors. As an illustration, he continues: παρὰ Σοφοκλέϊ γούν, ἵνα τὸ Ζηροδότειον ὑποδείκῃ, προσθήται στίχος ἐν τῷ (quoting *Antigone* 1165–66, 1168); ἐν τοῖς τοῖς γὰρ μετὰ τὸ, οὐ τίτμη' ἐγὼ, ἔχονσι τὰ ἀκριβῆ ἀντίγραφα τὸ (quoting *Antigone* 1167), ἵνα λέγῃ τ' ἀκριβῆς εἶναι, etc. (paraphrasing and explaining the passage). Eustathius' testimony is independent of and superior to that of Athenaeus, who quotes, without remark, *Antigone* 1165–71, with 1167 included (Athen. 280c, 547 c).

¹⁴ The emendation of Wakefield is widely accepted. Since Eustathius is paraphrasing the passage, the actual form found is τὰ δὲ ὁρῶν, because of the syntax of his sentence.

¹⁵ The same reading recurs in Eust. 1313. 32, 1336. 50, 1653. 5.

¹⁶ Cf. Eust. 962. 56. Because he adapted the words to his sentence, Eustathius has the words in the nominative case.

τάλιδος; 1275 (625. 22), λαξπάτητον for λακπάτητον L, λεωπάτητον A. *Trachiniae* 238 (789. 17), τέλη (with L) for τελει A; 396 (811. 22), ἀνανέωσασθαι for νέωσασθαι; 584 (799. 4), που for πως; 602 (599. 45), εὐαφή for εὐνφή. *Philoctetes* 134 (758. 45), 'Αθᾶνα for 'Αθηνᾶ. *Oedipus Coloneus* 213 (709. 44), γεγώνω (with L) for γεγωνῶ A; 1578 (1201. 23), αἰένυπρον for αἰένᾰνυπρον.¹⁷

Besides those many places where Eustathius quoted Sophocles accurately or with minor deviations from the original, there are 54 passages¹⁸ in which he very plainly had no intention of introducing an exact quotation; rather, his intention was to paraphrase the original words of Sophocles, explaining their meaning. Sometimes the original words are adapted to the syntax of his sentence.

The largest single category of references to Sophocles by Eustathius consists of 160 passages in which he does not quote at all but simply cites or alludes to a Sophoclean word or expression or idea in an extant tragedy. These references include exegesis of rare words, explanation of the motivation of the action and of Sophoclean characterization, and the drawing of Homeric parallels. The same four plays as previously are treated much more fully than the others, 65 passages referring to the *Ajax* alone.¹⁹

¹⁷ Eust. 429. 32 and 1867. 41 quote parts of *Ajax*, 841-42, lines first rejected by Hermann, who has been followed, in general, by later scholars.

¹⁸ Paraphrases, adaptations: *Ajax* 4 (826. 53); 103 (481. 2); 160 (955. 30); 245-46 (1100. 29); 247 (1464. 54); 249 (828. 38, 1041. 31); 379-80 (415. 19); 381 (108. 32); 420 (890. 24); 424 (126. 40); 424-25 (1133. 51); 428-29 (914. 35*); 665 (757. 17); 1023 (999. 61); 1165 (1019. 65). *Electra* 137 (1364. 48); 151 (1368. 27); 737 (1462. 55). *Oedipus Rex* 56 (1046. 34); 57 (638. 12); 173 (1020. 24); 204 (33. 3); 617 (1317. 54); 914 (1007. 52); 961 (1821. 9); 1028 (1398. 41); 1306 (1097. 25, 1558. 53). *Antigone* 392 (1959. 34); 629 (699. 24, 962. 56); 1022 (229. 12); 1074 (768. 56); 1146 (514. 46); 1168 (681. 6); 1284 (1691. 46). *Trachiniae* 94-95 (22. 31*); 550 (1374. 44*, 1384. 58); 602 (599. 45*); 678 (1071. 9); 762-63 (49. 8*); 781 (757. 45*); 848 (217. 4*). *Philoctetes* 117 (753. 60); 298 (1523. 33); 443-44 (205. 26); 440 (205. 3); 480 (756. 21*); 827 (974. 26). *Oedipus Coloneus* 371 (694. 16); 691 (309. 35).

¹⁹ *Ajax* 4 (792. 49); 14 (1473. 20); 15 (611. 16); 17 (1139. 60); 29 (348. 42, 788. 31, 1762. 57); 90 (610. 8, 1455. 6); 190 (1701. 61); 217 (923. 2); 221 (1072. 8); 228 (927. 3); 309 (1383. 9); 363 (1761. 2); 381 (352. 36); 408 (674. 14); 430 (776. 50); 434 (637. 12); 445 (29. 31, 524. 39); 481 (106. 7); 512 (533. 34); 570 (600. 13, 782. 14, 1456. 24); 629 (716. 54); 665 (682. 45); 674 (732. 24); 675 (180. 7, 347. 9, 982. 34); 675 (981.

A number of references, because of the general nature of their subject, cannot be restricted to only one play of Sophocles and will be listed with reference to Eustathius only. The range of subjects treated illustrates typically the catholicity of Eustathius' interests. These citations are: on the form *Λαέρτιος* in Sophocles, 13. 36; on the use of *ῥῆδη*, 50. 33;²⁰ on the form 'Αθᾶνα, 84. 1;²¹ on the occurrence of *κλάδος*, 250. 29; on the meaning of *σταθμά*, 257. 8; use of the form *Δωδών* by Sophocles, 286. 44;²² on *θυριαῖος*, 333. 45; on the expression *φορβὰς γῆ*, 539. 12; on the meaning of *ἄκνος*, 546. 7; on the application of *χθόνιος* to *Hermes*, 561. 35; on *ἔγχος*, 604. 12; on the expression *ἀναγκαῖα τύχη*, 651. 30 and 1089. 39; on the use of *ἐργάτης*, 660. 18; the etymology of *δεννάζω*, 668. 47; on *θήρ*, 697. 36; on the prevalence of *κῶτα*, 700. 63; on the common use of *πάλαι*, 702. 6; on *χρῶν*,

12*); 722 (64. 31, 690. 41); 801 (50. 18); 842 (1961. 30); 847 (583. 43, 637. 19); 892 (1157. 55); 907 (644. 47); 914 (640. 35); 982 (442. 8, 1385. 24); 1023 (1911. 2); 1031 (150. 33, 622. 24); 1063 (687. 59); 1165 (1376. 30); 1227 (1778. 21); 1239 (885. 10); 1279 (684. 28); 1285 (674. 38); 1286 (418. 44); 1311 (754. 21); 1414 (62. 46, 1792. 8); general references to the *Ajax*: 95. 1; 115. 41; 656. 46; 891. 26; 961. 26; 995. 9; 1140. 27*; 1956. 27. *Electra* 7 (354. 17); 19 (854. 64); 242 (1514. 24*); 284 (1507. 63); 385 (1326. 58); 446 (1857. 4); 635 (789. 18); 670 (274. 34); 722 (700. 47, 754. 26); 745 (598. 14); 894 (351. 9); 977 (517. 19); 1153 (702. 38). *Oedipus Rex* 17 (452. 30*, 1419. 44*, 1929. 2); 52 (805. 15); 70 (572. 44); 163 (439. 42); 205 (1142. 24); 227 (1053. 29); 402 (1704. 7); 480 (1390. 45); 484 (47. 43, 533. 14); 515 (562. 27); 588 (611. 22); 709 (1440. 40); 795 (1535. 59); 840 (58. 41); 891 (543. 15); 900 (279. 1); 911 (1425. 48); 1063 (725. 33); 1139 (726. 28); 1227 (1231. 10); 1410 (79. 39*); general references: 47. 36; 775. 22*; 777. 53; 902. 3; 1190. 54; 1839. 11. *Antigone* 80 (1109. 36); 81 (652. 30); 106 (1270. 23); 114 (1055. 25); 144 (686. 20*); 160 (732. 54); 246 (666. 59); 347 (135. 25); 418 (1196. 50); 487 (1930. 31); 631 (711. 61); 831 (1368. 25); 834 (859. 63); 985 (1037. 67, 1539. 29*); 1008 (955. 65); 1022 (1248. 48); 1126 (786. 14); 1169 (157. 17). *Trachiniae* 2-3 (361. 30*); 69 (811. 26); 94 (814. 23); 14 (575. 11); 354 (1899. 38); 542 (602. 41); 550 (420. 35*); 695 (1399. 64*, 1414. 29); 782 (1193. 11); 1168 (335. 44, 1057. 47*); general references: 1430. 2*. *Philoctetes* 33 (434. 10); 194 (330. 1); 343 (310. 42); 391 (71. 14, 978. 4); 411 (275. 36); 434 (558. 35); 707 (789. 11); 828 (1500. 34); 848 (1837. 63, 1843. 37); 937 (335. 3). *Oedipus Coloneus* 131 (723. 30*); 337 (31. 12*); 478 (603. 22); 1129 (492. 8); 1464 (1188. 31); 1564 (718. 35); 1578 (1201. 23); 1685 (102. 41); general reference: 1323. 49.

²⁰ In *Electra* 1018, 1185; *Antigone* 18, 448; *Oedipus Rex* 433; *Oedipus Coloneus* 944, *ῥῆδη*, the reading of the *codices* has been corrected by various scholars.

²¹ As in, e.g., *Phil.* 134, where 'Αθᾶνα (*cod.*) has been corrected from Eustathius.

²² Cf. *Frag.* 455, 460.

751. 54; on *ἐδράνων*, 769. 25; on the meaning of *δαίμων*, 780. 30; on Agamemnon in Sophocles, 851. 21; on the form *εὐρύμην*, 1144. 23; on the source of the expression *πῆμα ἄρης*, 1461. 66; on the plot of the *Philoctetes*, 1695. 59.

Considering the large number of Sophoclean fragments which have survived, Eustathius' references to lost plays (27 quotations, 33 citations) are not so abundant as might be expected. It is likely that Eustathius derived all these citations from earlier sources, since he expressly names some of the works which he used, and otherwise the context and the presence of devices of indirect quotation suggest that they are not independent, as would be unlikely also on general grounds. Even so, his citation of fragments is significant. Besides the places where Eustathius alone now preserves the quotation for us,²³ the citations are valuable for variants,²⁴ explanation of the meaning of the fragment,²⁵ and description of plots. Eust. 1479. 11 is a main source of information on the plot of the *Hermione*, and 1796. 52 records a significant fact about the *Euryalus*. The *Commentaries* furnish quotations from the following plays: *Aegeus*, Frag. 19²⁶ (881. 24); *Aethiopians*, Frag. 28 (752. 32); *Alexandros*, Frag. 94 (533. 39); *Alcmaeon*, Frag. 108 (1448. 6); *Amycus*, Frag. 111 (1534. 15); *Andromeda*, Frag. 127 (1205. 58); *Achilleos Erastai*, Frag. 154 (1872. 13); *Thamyras*, Frag. 237 (358. 40); *Ichneutai*, Frags. 314, 275 (899. 16); *Cedalion*, Frags. 329 (1404. 13) and 330 (1023. 2); *Larisaiōi*, Frag. 378 (1319. 48); *Lemniai*, Frag. 387

(1405. 58); *Manteis*, Frag. 395 (835. 9); *Nauplius*, Frag. 429 (1397. 28; cf. 1396. 60); *Odysseus Acanthoplex*, Frags. 454 (1675. 52) and 458 (66. 34); *Palamedes*, Frag. 479 (228. 5, 1397. 9); *Banqueters*, Frag. 565 (1828. 29). Unknown plays: Frags. 760 (1944. 26); 776 (980. 45); 790 (1237. 23); 791 (1495. 45); 793 (1625. 46; cf. 777. 62); 794 (1923. 62); 885 (1493. 35); 1121 (1538. 15). In addition to quotations, there are these references to lost plays: *Aichmalotides*, Frag. 43 (1017. 10); *Marriage of Helen*, Frag. 181 (1205. 3); *Inachus*, Frag. 272 (302. 26); *Iphigenia*, Frag. 311 (870. 29); *Triptolemus*, Frags. 596 (914. 36) and 611 (870. 27); *Phineus*, Frag. 716 (1496. 53*); *Phoenix*, Frags. 718 (1822. 18) and 720 (1088. 36); *Chryses*, Frag. 730 (1564. 32). Unknown plays: Frags. 756 (1136. 58); 906 (1023. 15); 929 (692. 12); 1006 (1405. 31); 1046 (1562. 39); 1048 (1856. 13); 1049 (1439. 36); 1056 (407. 37); 1062 (1761. 28); 1069 (877. 59; 1648. 63); 1084 (948. 20); 1086 (295. 5); 1087 (890. 15); 1093 (1908. 41); 1105 (1496. 35).²⁷ Finally, there are remarks on the *Antenoridae* (405. 30); a detail about the *Niobe* (1367. 22); and information about the *Nausicaa* (381. 10, 1553. 66).²⁸

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²⁷ In 1135. 19, Eustathius records a word *παυερπρελος*, as used by Sophocles. The word does not occur in the extant tragedies, nor is it listed by Nauck or Pearson. Elsewhere, it is found only in Pindar O. 2. 37.

²⁸ Eustathius sometimes errs. Thus, in 867. 62 and 1389. 9, he attributes to Sophocles words which actually come from Xenophon (*Mem.* iii. 13. 4) and the *Tiānomachia* (Frag. ep. 4 [Kinkel]), respectively. His source for both was apparently Athen. 277d. In 1872. 66 he quotes and attributes to Sophocles a line which probably refers to Aeschylus Ag. 270. In 436. 44 he attributes to Sophocles, Euripides' *Medea* 746. In 264. 21 he attributes to the *Trachiniae* a form which doubtless derived from the elegy written by Sophocles for Archelaus.

²³ E.g., Frags. 237, 479, 716, 720, 790, 791, 793, 794, 1006, 1046, 1062, 1069.

²⁴ E.g., Frags. 154, 330, 395, 885.

²⁵ E.g., Frags. 181 (where he paraphrases), 272, 387, 479, 776.

²⁸ The fragments are cited according to Pearson's edition.

THREE NOTES ON STATIUS

The apostolic precept "Quod bonum est tenete" is one which all students of Statius should take to heart. For the more carefully we trace the interpretation of his poems, especially the *Thebais*, the more clearly do we see that it has suffered from a peculiar tendency to backslide. Well-grounded explanations which were common property a century or more ago have repeatedly been discarded for

novelties—novelties which, upon the most charitable estimate, betray a degree of carelessness that is out of place in serious scholarship.

A passage in Book x of the *Thebais* will serve as a first example. Tiresias declares that, if Thebes is to be saved from the Argives, the latest-born of the Spartoi must be sacrificed

to atone for the blood-guilt which Cadmus incurred by slaying the famous *anguis Martius*. In accordance with this oracle, therefore, Menoeceus, Creon's son, stabs himself on the Theban ramparts and, as he does so, flings his body into the midst of the forces fighting on the plain below:

iamque intra muros nullo sudore receptum
gaudentes heroea ferunt; abscesserat ultro
Tantalidum venerata cohors. . . .¹

The *interpretatio* provided in the Delphin edition of Statius² correctly paraphrases these verses as follows: "Thebani exultantes portant intra moenia Heroem nullo labore recuperatum: acies enim Argivorum venerata ultro discesserat."³ And the eighteenth-century verse translation by W. L. Lewis shows a clear grasp of the poet's meaning:

Now to the walls of Thebes with joyful care
The hero's corse, with ease obtain'd, they bear.
The Greeks with decent reverence survey
The solemn pomp, and willingly give way.⁴

The gist of the passage, then, is that, although the Thebans might have expected a bitter struggle with the Argives to recover their benefactor's body,⁵ the Argives were filled with such awe at Menoeceus' *devotio* that they voluntarily withdrew and made no effort to capture and withhold his corpse.

This interpretation remained undisputed until late in the nineteenth century.⁶ In 1884,

¹ Vss. 783-85.

² Paris, 1685. It is reprinted in various later editions.

³ A note in the Delphin edition (*ad loc.*) alludes to a previous discussion of this passage and shows that it had rested on misunderstanding: "*Nullo sudore* Corrigit Peyraredus [Jean de Peyrardé, a seventeenth-century French scholar] *multo*, quia per medias acies perumpere illis [the Thebans] opus fuit, ut corpus extraherent; nam se supra medias acies jecerat. Sed fallitur; dicit enim infra Poëta veneratum Argivorum exercitum ultro abscessisse."

⁴ Oxford, 1767. Although the modern reader naturally regards the Thebans, too, as Greeks and may, therefore, feel that "Greeks" is not a happy rendering of *Tantalidum*, one may point out that in the *Thebais* the word *Graivus* is generally used to designate the Peloponnesian forces as opposed to the Thebans, who in many respects are given the character of *barbari*.

⁵ Cf. the numerous struggles over the dead bodies of fallen warriors in Homer and other ancient epics, *passim*. For an example in the *Thebais*, cf. ix. 86 ff.

⁶ J. A. Amar and N. E. Lemaire (in their edition [Paris, 1825-30]) reprinted the Delphin note without further comment, and Wartel's translation (in *Nisard's Collection des auteurs latins avec la traduction en français*, Vol. XXIII [Paris, 1878]) is quite satisfactory.

Philip Kohlmann's edition appeared.⁷ Kohlmann made no comment on the passage in his apparatus, but his "Index nominum" suggests a novel exegesis.⁸ In it he lists *Tantalidum* (vs. 785) under *Tantalus* and says "*Tantalidum* X 785 cohors (*mulierum Argivarum*)," confusing *Tantalidum*, the genitive plural of *Tantalides*, -ae, with *Tantalidum*, the genitive plural of *Tantalus*, -idis. Several years later, Alfred Klotz produced a new edition.⁹ It represented a great improvement upon Kohlmann's work. But in the revised "Index nominum," which a reviewer hailed as "ein rühmliches Zeugnis für die Sorgfalt des Editors,"¹⁰ we read, again under *Tantalus*, "*plur. mulieres Argivae*: Th. 10, 785 *Tantalidum venerata cohors*."¹¹ Klotz had revised Kohlmann's wording. One wonders whether he had checked the passage. Finally, in the recently published *Concordance*¹² the form *Tantalidum* is once more listed under *Tantalus*.¹³

If this new explanation of *Tantalidum* is due solely to negligence, it is reprehensible. For scholars who make Statius their specialty should be expected to provide us with sounder information about his poetry than is obtainable elsewhere.¹⁴ If, on the other hand, this explanation is made in all seriousness, one can only say that it is absurd. For what is this "cohort" of Argive women doing on the battlefield before Thebes at this moment? Various passages in the poem¹⁵ make it quite clear that

⁷ Leipzig: B. G. Teubner.

⁸ P. 463. Lemaire's "Index" (p. 605) had listed *Tantalidae* (with a reference to the present passage) apart from *Tantalus*.

⁹ Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1908.

¹⁰ R. Helm, in *Berl. phil. Wchnschr.*, XXIX (1909), 977.

¹¹ P. 570.

¹² Roy J. Deferrari and Sister M. Clement Eagan, *A Concordance of Statius* (Brookland, D.C., 1943), p. 827.

¹³ Since the authors seem to have based their work exclusively on Garrod's text, it is unlikely that this particular error is due to the influence of Kohlmann or Klotz.

¹⁴ It is interesting to note that Raphael Kühner listed *Tantalidum* as gen. pl. of *Tantalides* in his *Ausführliche Grammatik der lateinischen Sprache*, I (1st ed.; Hannover, 1877), 260 (sec. 95, 8 [c]). The seventh ed. of Georges' Latin-German lexicon (1880) likewise classifies the form correctly. I mention these books rather than others because they must have been available to Kohlmann and Klotz.

¹⁵ Cf., e.g., *Theb.* iii. 374 f., 707-10; iv. 16-31, 89-92; ix. 570 ff.; x. 49-53; xi. 140 ff. Assuming, however,

the Argive women remained at home when the men set out for Thebes. There were no Amazons or Camillas in the Argive camp; the mother of Parthenopaeus, Atalante the huntress, who might have assumed such a role,¹⁶ did not leave Arcadia. Not even a Briseis accompanied the Argives.¹⁷ The interpretation of *Tantalidum* which was current over two hundred years ago is still valid, and it is a pleasure to see that J. H. Mozley's version accepts it.¹⁸ The *mulieres Argivae*, one hopes, will not be mentioned again in connection with this passage.

In the third book of the *Thebais*¹⁹ the relatives of the men whom Tydeus slew in nocturnal combat²⁰ pour forth from Thebes to recover their bodies and cremate them. Among the mourners is a woman named Ide, whose grief is described at some length.²¹ Of this woman, Mozley says: "A Theban mother, not elsewhere mentioned; the names of her sons are not given."²² The first part of Mozley's comment is correct: this Ide is not mentioned elsewhere. But the second part is mistaken. Any one who compares verses 629-43 of Book ii with verses 133 f., 147-49, 151-53, and 165 f. of the present episode will see that Statius is referring to the same pair of brothers in both cases. Since this is so, we may state²³ that the name of one of the Thespiadae, Ide's sons, was Periphas.

This observation is by no means new. It can be traced back—beyond the seventeenth cen-

tury this time—to the commentary of "Lactantius Placidus," who says of Ide: "nomen est mulieris, cuius duos filios geminos a Tydeo diximus interemptos."²⁴

Although Mozley's note on Ide betrays a somewhat less intimate acquaintance with the poem—in this respect, at least—than the medieval commentator possessed, nevertheless his slip is trifling in comparison with the one which the authors of the *Concordance*²⁵ have made in connection with these same brothers. They have listed *Thespiadae* (ii. 629 and iii. 14) under *Thespias*, thereby transforming them into women!²⁶ Could they have been thinking of the Muses?²⁷

Facilis descensus Avernī. Our final illustration takes us from the battlefield to the Styx. In *Silvae* v. 1, Statius consoles Abascantus, who is mourning over the death of his wife, Priscilla. Toward the close of the poem he addresses the young husband as follows:

Quid nunc immodicos, iuvenum lectissime, fletus
corde foves longumque vetas exire dolorem?
nempe times, ne Cerbereos Priscilla tremescat
latratus? tacet ille piis! ne tardior adsit
navita proturbetque vadis? vehit ille merentes
protinus et manes placidus locat hospite cumba.²⁸

The Delphin editor paraphrased "ne tardior . . . vadis" thus: "[Nempe metuis] ne lentior adveniat navita [Charon], repellatque eam ab aquis [of the Styx]?"²⁹

Vollmer makes no comment on *proturbetque vadis*, but in his collection of Statius' *auctores* he includes Verg. *Aen.* vi. 411 f.: "inde alias animas . . . deturbat."³⁰ The parallelism between *deturbat* and *proturbet* is interesting, but

that the Argive women were actually present, why, one wonders, should they alone withdraw and leave the Argive men in the ranks? Why, too, should their retirement facilitate the recovery of Menoeceus' body?

¹⁶ Cf. *Theb.* iv. 248-50, 322-27; and H. J. Rose, *A Handbook of Greek Mythology* (New York, 1929), p. 259.

¹⁷ During the games at Nemea, Adrastus gives his defeated son-in-law a *famula Achaea* as a consolation prize (*Theb.* vi. 549). But she is simply a reminiscence of Hom. *Il.* xxiii. 704 f., and plays no further part in the poem.

¹⁸ Cf. his translation (London, 1928) in the "Loeb Classical Library": "of its own accord the Tantalid host in reverence withdrew." It would have been better to render the tense of *abscesserat* more accurately. Furthermore, the average reader, for whom this series was designed, needs a short note on "Tantalid." If the note is omitted, "Argive" would be a more intelligible translation.

¹⁹ Vss. 114 ff.

²¹ Cf. iii. 133-68.

²⁰ Cf. ii. 527 ff.

²² *Op. cit.*, note on vs. 134.

²³ On the basis of ii. 631.

²⁴ *Ad* iii. 134. Cf. his comments on ii. 635 and 642. Lactantius' inference was accepted by Beraldus, the Delphin editor (cf. his notes on iii. 134, 147, 148, 149, and 152) and by Klotz (cf. his "Index nominum," s. vv. "Periphas" and "Thespiadae").

²⁵ Cf. n. 12.

²⁶ *Thespiades*, -ae (nom. pl., *Thespiadae*) and *Thespias*, -adis (nom. pl., *Thespiades*) are not the same. The authors of the *Concordance*, one might add, have also classified *Thespiaden* (*Theb.* ix. 293) under *Thespias*.

²⁷ Cf. *Ov. Met.* v. 310: "Thespiades, certate, deae."

²⁸ Vss. 247-52. Italics mine.

²⁹ D. A. Slater's version (Oxford, 1908) is good: "Or [do you fear] that the Ferryman will be slow to approach, or else drive her from the ferry?" But *vadis*, as the Vergilian parallels show, implies more than the skiff itself.

³⁰ Cf. Vollmer's ed. (Leipzig, 1898), p. 180.

there the similarity ends. Asbascantus is afraid that Charon will refuse to ferry Priscilla across the Styx promptly and will keep her waiting on this side of the river. The notion is the same as that which underlies Verg. *Aen.* vi. 315 f.:

navita sed tristis nunc hos nunc accipit illos,
ast alios longe summos arcet harena.³¹

In Mozley's hands, verse 251 undergoes a curious transformation: "[Fairest thou] lest the sailor be slow to draw nigh her, or *disturb her on the waters?*"³² In the light of the Vergilian parallels, it is not worth while to spend time refuting this interpretation, but one can hardly refrain from speculating how it arose. Was it caused by a confusion of *proturbet* and *per-*

turbet? Did the translator visualize Charon as a reckless navigator? Or—*pro pudor!*—was he thinking of Landon's "Dirce"?

Stand close around, ye Stygian set,
With Dirce in one boat conveyed!
Or Charon, seeing, may forget
That he is old and she a shade.³³

But however we account for Mozley's odd rendering of verse 251, his mistake is one more proof that, where Statius is concerned, modern scholarship has often failed to "hold fast that which is good."

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³¹ Italics mine. Cf. Norden's comments on this part of Book vi; and Henry W. Prescott, *The Development of Virgil's Art* (Chicago, 1927), pp. 379-81.

³² *Op. cit.*, I, 287. Italics mine.

³³ Landon's conception of Charon may have its origin somewhere in Greek or Latin literature, but I cannot cite a parallel. However, even if parallels were forthcoming, they would not affect the meaning of the present passage.

THE RETURN OF PERSEPHONE

The Eleusinian mysteries—the ancient fertility rites of the Attic village of Eleusis, held at the time of the autumn sowing and symbolizing or seeking to assist the rebirth of the dead plant-world each year—were transformed into a ritual that symbolized the hope of human immortality. The beautiful *Homeric Hymn to Demeter* (ii) is in part an aetiological myth, in which the institution of the cult is connected with the story of the loss, by the goddess Demeter, of her daughter Persephone and of her recovery.

Martin P. Nilsson has convincingly argued¹ that Demeter is not, as has often been supposed, the "earth-mother" but is rather a vegetation goddess and, in particular, is the "grain-mother."² Sir J. G. Frazer held a similar view and pointed out that, in the *Hymn*, Demeter is strongly opposed to Earth. Her daughter, "the maid," or Kore, is compelled to dwell during one-third of the year in the nether world, though she is allowed to come up and spend the remaining two-thirds of the year in the upper world. During which

third of the year is the Maid below? The usual interpretation is that she is below during the cold winter months and above during the warmer months. Thus Allen-Halliday-Sikes (ed. *Hom. Hymns* [2d ed.; Oxford, 1936], pp. 115-17) write of "the annual decay of winter and the resurrection of spring" and of cults whose object is to insure "the rebirth of vegetation in spring"; and Frazer writes of the "return in spring" of Persephone. This, however, as Nilsson further argues,³ and as F. M. Cornford had already suggested,⁴ is the error of scholars dwelling in a northern climate. The months when Kore is absent are not the winter season, when, as a matter of fact, the fields in Mediterranean lands are green with grass and winter wheat (sown the previous autumn); they are rather the parched summer months after the spring harvest, when the seed is stored in silos underground—in the realm of Plouton (= Plutos, "wealth," the garnered grain kept for food, also stored underground in jars). One might almost say of these lands that in winter the trees, except for certain evergreen varieties, seem dead, while grass and cereal crops are growing, whereas in summer the seed of the grain will not sprout and grow

¹ *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, XXXII (1935), 79-141; *Greek Popular Religion* (New York, 1940), pp. 50-55; cf. also p. 24.

² For the opposite view ($\Delta\mu\eta\tau\epsilon\rho = \Gamma\eta\varsigma \mu\eta\tau\epsilon\rho$) see H. Diels, "Ein Orphischer Demeterhymnus," *Festschrift für T. Gomperz* (Wien, 1902), pp. 1-15; O. Kern, *Orph. frag.* 47.

³ *Archiv*, pp. 105-8; *Greek Pop. Rel.*, pp. 51-53.

⁴ *Essays and Studies Presented to W. Ridgeway* (Cambridge, 1913), pp. 153-66.

(*Hom. Hymn to Demeter*, ll. 306 f.; cf. ll. 332 f. and 450-53). Then in early autumn Kore, the seed-grain, is brought up once more for a happy reunion with her mother and planted. This is the season of the Thesmophoria (early October), a festival intended to promote fertility. Shortly afterward Kore has a second "ascent," when the seed sprouts.⁵

Cornford's and Nilsson's arguments seem to me valid, though they have not met with universal acceptance.⁶ Yet if one re-reads the *Hymn* with this illuminating interpretation of the Eleusinian religion in mind, there is a passage, which I shall presently specify, that gives one pause. Persephone was carried off while gathering flowers in full bloom (ll. 6-16, 425-28); and I cannot share Cornford's view (p. 166, n. 3) that the occurrence of "the Rape at a time when all the flowers are in bloom . . . suits neither the harvest nor the seed-time [i.e., the time when the seed is brought up to be planted], the two moments when the corn really does disappear," and that the presence of the flowers "must be due to a ritual enactment of the whole story in spring." To me it seems clear that it is precisely the season when the grain is being harvested and threshed and stored underground (viz., April-June) that the spring flowers are first blooming and then withering. I have seen barley cut in Argos on April 13, when the spring flowers were still in blossom. Adonis, with his "annual wound," is another symbol both of the drooping flowers and, at least at a late period, of the cut grain; his festival in Attica was probably in spring.

It was at the height of spring, then, or in early summer that Persephone "by gloomy Dis was gather'd"; there is no difficulty about that. But the reader of the *Hymn* will observe that when she has been restored to her mother, Demeter tells her that if she has tasted food in the world below she may spend henceforth only two-thirds of each year in the world above, returning "when the earth blooms with all manner of fragrant spring flowers" (*ἀνθεσι . . . ἡαρίβο[ις]* [l. 401]). Does not this men-

tion of spring flowers seem to contradict the contention of Cornford and Nilsson that the return of Persephone is in the autumn? Later, to be sure, after Zeus has confirmed this pledge, it is said that the fields are presently to be waving with long ears of grain "as springtime waxes" (*ἦρος ἀεζομένοιο* [l. 455]) and the rich furrows are to be laden with grain and with sheaves. And presently, indeed, Demeter makes fruit to rise up and the whole earth to be laden "with leaves and flowers" (ll. 470-73). These last two passages refer to the harvest of the following spring; but what of the first passage (l. 401)?

The answer which I propose is simple and can be briefly stated. In Mediterranean lands the parched fields and hills of summer rapidly regain their freshness after the autumn rains, and wild flowers shoot up again, in Italy earlier than in Greece. This season, in fact, is sometimes called in Italy the "second spring." My diary for the autumn of 1931, spent in central Italy, records a dry summer, followed by fourteen rainy days between September 11 and December 10; green grass, wild cyclamens, and other wild flowers were seen during this period, the time of the autumn plowing and planting and the sprouting of the winter wheat. One entry (November 4, Cori) reads: "springlike display of wild flowers." My visits to Greece have been only in spring and in summer. From my reading and from what I have been told by friends, however, I gather that, although there is never in Greece any considerable expanse of green fields and the look of the landscape in autumn and winter is not so fresh as in Italy, there are, nevertheless, some blossoms: for example, a variety of crocus in the early autumn and anemones from December on. Probably ancient Greece, being far less deforested, had more rainfall than modern Greece and therefore showed more revival of vegetation in autumn. Accordingly, I suggest that line 401 of the *Hymn* refers to the season of the autumn planting and of the sprouting of fields, attended by the appearance of springlike flowers, as the time when Demeter's daughter returned from her captivity to gladden her mother and to gladden the earth.

If the proposed explanation is not accepted,

⁵ *Archiv*, pp. 131 ff.; *Greek Pop. Rel.*, pp. 53 f.

⁶ Allen-Halliday-Sikes (p. 174) call Cornford's view "much less probable" and cite ancient writers, representing possibly Stoic doctrine, in support of the opposing view.

however, the necessary alternative would seem to be to admit great freedom of treatment in the *Hymn* and a failure of the myth to accompany cult step by step. And, in fact, the *Hymn* ignores, among other things, the birth of Ploutos, which was represented in works of art. Nilsson explains the flowers as "a commonplace," without special significance.⁷ One might then say that "spring," in the *Hymn*, is not so much a period of the year as a condition; remembering Lucretius i. 7-20 or Botticelli's "Primavera," one might argue that in literature and art the advent of a kindly goddess is always accompanied by flowers. On

⁷ *Archiv*, p. 107.

this assumption, the calendar becomes unimportant. Furthermore, even ritual does not necessarily follow in detail the cycle of nature but may foreshorten it; thus the cycle of Adonis was compressed into three days. So it might be argued that in Eleusinian ritual the ascent of Persephone in autumn has been fused with the reawakening of plant life in spring, but that what cult has thus joined the *Hymn* has kept asunder. Whatever explanation be accepted, the *Hymn* makes Persephone return amid flowers, while Eleusinian cult was based on an autumn festival.

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A NOTE ON THE MACEDONIAN MERIDES

In his important article, "Representation and Democracy in Hellenistic Federalism," J. A. O. Larsen has demonstrated, as against the *communis opinio*, that the four Macedonian *merides* continued to exist as late as the Flavian period.¹ This conclusion receives decisive support from the evidence of the coins.

1. That *meris* was the official designation for each of the four "sections" of Macedonia created by the senatorial commission and Aemilius Paulus in 167 B.C. is now confirmed beyond any possibility of doubt by W. Schwabacher's publication of a unique didrachm having on the obverse a Macedonian shield with thunderbolt in the center between the two portions of the legend, MAKE—ΔΟΝΩΝ and on the reverse ΤΡΩΤΗΣ/ΜΕΡΙΔΟΣ, club in oak wreath, monogram, and star.²

2. In 158 B.C., according to Gaebler,³ the right of coining money was restored to the Macedonians. Coins were struck by the First, Second, and Fourth *Merides*.⁴ Apparently it continues to be generally held that the coinage of the *merides* is limited to the eight years between 158 and 150 B.C.,⁵ although, as Gaebler

states, "in Anbetracht des kurzen Zeitraumes von nur 8 Jahren (158-150 vor Chr.), über den sich die Prägung erstreckte, ist die Menge der auf uns gekommenen πρῶτη-Tetradrachmen als ganz ausserordentlich gross zu bezeichnen"; and he also describes the tetradrachms of the First *Meris*, within which, of course, lay the silver mines of Pangaeum, as belonging "zu den häufigsten Münzen des Altertums." Schwabacher has already remarked that it seems "at least a problem for future discussion whether this immense coinage could really have been produced during eight years only." In view of Larsen's demonstration of the continued existence of the *merides* after the revolt of Philip VI-Andriscus and the organization of the province of Macedonia by Metellus (148-146 B.C.), there is now no longer any reason whatsoever to force the "immense coinage" of the First *Meris* into the eight years before 150 B.C. This coinage itself is further evidence for the correctness of Larsen's conclusion, which, in turn, makes understandable the enormous number of tetradrachms coined by the First *Meris* and surviving to the present day.

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¹ *CP*, XL (1945), 65-97; particularly 67-69, with nn. 13 and 14 on 67.

² *Numismatic Chronicle*, Fifth Series, XIX (1939), 2-3 and No. 1 on Pl. I.

³ H. Gaebler, *Die antiken Münzen von Makedonia und Paionia*, I (Berlin, 1906), 3 and reference there cited.

⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

⁵ This was still Gaebler's view in 1935 (*ibid.*, II [Berlin, 1935], 6).

⁶ *Ibid.*, I, 4.

⁷ *Ibid.*, I, 3.

⁸ *Op. cit.*, n. 2 on p. 2.

BOOK REVIEWS

A History of the Roman World from 30 B.C. to A.D. 138. By EDWARD T. SALMON. New York: Macmillan Co., 1944. Pp. xiii+363. \$5.50.

This volume, which completes the Methuen (and Macmillan's) *History of the Roman World*, is not only, as the author hopes, a reasonably up-to-date synthesis of the history of the Early Empire, but a thoroughly respectable job. Respectable, that is, in the good old orthodox manner, which consists, first, in taking the rough material just about as it comes from tradition; second, in putting it together, as tradition also does, according to the biographical method. Within this framework, Professor Salmon's treatment of the Early Empire lacks neither clarity nor fulness nor balance.

But orthodoxy exacts its price. As to the material, it overprizes that which seemed important to the authors of the vulgate and for the reasons, true or false, for which it seemed important. By the same token, it underrates, if, indeed, it does not wholly neglect, those other problems of which the vulgate makers were unaware, or so dimly aware as scarcely to do them justice. The chapter "Anarchy" is a good example of the futility of the canonical treatment. It relates the amazing succession of four Emperors in the space of a little more than one year; it tells of the generals and legions who declared for one or the other; it describes the movements and battles of the contending armies; and it gives much other military and personal or political matter. But, as a piece of meaningful history writing, it leads nowhere. It provokes the heretic to a series of questions at practically every line, questions which do not seem to bother the orthodox. Let one illustration suffice. The Praetorians, on accepting or elevating Otho as emperor, "only with difficulty were . . . restrained from massacring the whole [Senate]." This is, in journalese, gripping copy; yet of the reasons for their impulse to wipe out the ruling class, there is

no hint whatever. One page attempting to explain this problem in political, social, or economic terms, whichever or whatever they were, would contribute more to the understanding of this period than the thirteen aimless pages before us. But if Professor Salmon's account of the revolutionary period, as of other events, seems shallow and pointless, it is, let us hasten to say, the vulgate's fault; it is the price one pays for regarding as historical material of the first line that which is given by the vulgate and in the form in which it is given.

The trouble with our history of the Roman Empire is that it never had a Thucydides. The penetrating rationalism of the Greek historian diagnosed the forces at work in fifth-century Greece so accurately that moderns can do little to improve on his work. Or maybe it is his genius which has made the version of the events he narrates artistically so attractive and intellectually so satisfying that the fascinated reader can see the story in no other terms than those set forth by the master. But Tacitus, the principal authority for the study of the Early Roman Empire, is no Thucydides. For one thing, he never heard the saying, "Let the dead bury the dead." In his pages the dead hold the stage, unwilling to yield it to the living. Masking behind other actors, they persist in their little plots, their petty ambitions, unable to understand the ultimate cause of their fall, namely, that there can be no legitimacy where there is no ability and honesty.

For another thing, although Tacitus, too, by the power of his art has dominated the subsequent view of the Roman Empire, unfortunately for the perpetuation of this view, the quality of his historical powers does not rise to the height of his literary merit. He does not, like Thucydides, compel intellectual acceptance. When Tacitus injects in his account a sneer, a little heat, an obvious exaggeration, an unproved and unprovable assumption—

and that on almost every page—the critical reader is goaded into doing some checking on his own.

Something else might be suggested, although with some hesitation. The dialectic conception of history, present or implicit in Thucydides, is totally absent from Tacitus. As scientific explanation of the struggles and life of a people, dialectic, especially the kind fashionable in our age, may be abominable, but it does attempt to explain. It is perhaps refreshing that Tacitus is not guilty of it; but he, on the other hand, does not explain much.

Although Professor Salmon clings to the vulgate for his main material, he is not of the company of scribblers who think they can fill the areas untouched by the vulgate with only a cursory mention of the problems belonging thereto. He bravely tries to make room for those problems in his biographical plan. He does this best for the Augustan period, partly because the larger space he allots this period (one-third of the volume) gives him a good chance, partly because it is here he rightly lays the groundwork for the whole structure, but chiefly, of course, because he is a good architect who knows the rules of the craft.

It is a different story when he deals with the succeeding emperors. Here he pays the other part of the price every orthodox historian must pay who casts his material in the biographical mold. He finds himself in *una selva oscura*, where he cannot see the wood for the trees. For he must cut short and leave unconnected, undeveloped, and dangling those serviceable threads which, if followed through, might give unity and cogency to his story. Few governments, least of all the Roman, have lived by improvisation; and even where improvisation has been frequent, it has seldom shaped the history of a state more thoroughly than basic policy. But the biographical arrangement, handy in taking account of improvisation, disperses, often never to recapture, basic and long-term policies as well as those trends which rise, independent of government, from the nature of society itself. In the case of the Roman Empire, such policies and trends are clearly discernible in the imperial

bureaucracy, in the interests of the army as a powerful social group capable of expressing and asserting itself, in the ideals of the municipal bourgeoisie, in the conflict between the senate and the throne, in the growing importance and influence of the provinces. These are only a few examples. Perhaps the clearest inadequacy of the biographical method, even in the excellent handling of it by Professor Salmon, is to obscure the view of the line of action of the different ruling houses. The Julian dynasty, the Claudian, the Flavian, the Spanish come and go; but what new sets of ideas and interests each represents as distinct from other dynasties the reader is not shown.

This reviewer has often wondered at the persistent assumption that the historiographical methods and principles for the study of the Roman Empire must differ from those which seem well suited for the treatment of modern history—for example, the history of the United States. During the hundred and sixty-two years of national independence, this country has been under fifteen party regimes; during the hundred and sixty-seven years studied by Professor Salmon, the Roman Empire was under fourteen rulers, if we count Galba, Otho, and Vitellius. Obviously, it is not these accidents that count but the manner of handling the substance behind the accidents. Time was when reputable American historians wrote the history of this country by presidential administrations. Schouler is perhaps the best-known example; Von Holst is another. If history is past politics, Schouler and Von Holst were right. But if it is more than politics, other ways and means are needed to draw a more adequate picture of the growth of America. If presidents, no matter how richly endowed with the quality of leadership, are, after all, put up by parties, carry out the program of parties, and are morally responsible to parties, the rule of a party rather than the term of a president would have been a more fitting subject of investigation and a more logical division for the treatment of American history. Surely, the tariff question is infinitely more revealing in the light of the party in power than in the shadow of a presidential term. But one is grateful that even this

approach, if ever considered, was rejected. One can only smile at the thought of treating the Federalist, old-style Republican, Whig, Democrat, Republican, and Democratic regimes as organic stages in the growth of industry, commerce, agriculture, labor, transportation, education, etc. The newer histories not only give no chapters to the various presidents, but not even to political eras, as, let us say, the Republican rule from Lincoln to Arthur or from McKinley to Taft. The chapters of the Beards' *Basic History*, to cite but one example, deal almost exclusively with broad movements which would have been little affected if a Blaine instead of a Cleveland had occupied the White House or Congress had been dominated by tweedledee Democrats instead of tweedledum Republicans. A few titles taken at random, "Expansion to the Pacific," "Rise of National Democracy," "Centralization of Economy," "Realizations in Social Improvement," illustrate this sounder approach to the study of American history.

But historians of the Roman Empire are still happy under the yoke of the annalistic-biographical method—the method Tacitus adopted from previous writers and himself used with such brilliant results. They still must have their chapter on every emperor—on Augustus, who during a reign of nearly half a century shaped the destiny of Europe for thousands of years to come, as well as on Titus, who ruled only two years and did nothing to deserve special treatment.

The chapter on Titus in this work has three sections. The first, "His Popularity," deals with the period before the accession; the third is entitled "The Death of Titus." The second, presumably designed as the core of the chapter, is called "Eruption and Fire." Who cares nowadays in which presidential administration the telegraph was invented or under which party rule Galveston or San Francisco suffered disaster? But whoever writes of Roman history seems to feel that he will have leprosy if he does not associate Vesuvius with Titus. The reason for making these two inseparable is not clear. May it be that Titus, fearing that otherwise he would be an obscure emperor,

persuaded the volcano to stage its performance during his reign so that historians might have something big to record about him? Or did the mountain have the instinct of timing its wicked deed during an administration which, being easygoing and gentle, would not stop it from making the headlines? But one can never be sure of a volcano. Quite possibly Vesuvius was put to work by Fate, who (to paraphrase a famous sentence about Titus' brother) would allow the memory of no Roman emperor to be associated with anything of good repute. To be sure, it may have carried out no apocalyptic decree at all but acted on its own initiative, or conceivably in collusion with the anti-imperial party, just for the devilment of besmirching an otherwise fair name. Vesuvius, Stromboli, and Etna do sometimes seem to be in league with politicians. One of them is believed to have been responsible for the earthquake which completely destroyed Messina and ruined scores of towns in Calabria in 1908, while Giolitti was prime minister. Some days later a cartoon hinted that the same wily statesman who had done other diabolical things to the kingdom had contrived this disaster also.

It should be clear to the reader that these observations deal with a problem in historiography. They are not meant, and they should not be interpreted, as criticism of Professor Salmon's work for such as he intended to write. Judged by his aim, his work is excellent indeed. It is the product of an extremely well-informed and discriminating scholar. It would be churlish to look for slips in a performance every page of which shows competence, care, and fine critical handling. These observations are solely in response to the historiographical problem posed by a good draftsman when with open eyes he chose for "the framework of the present volume . . . the traditional one of the lives of the various Emperors." The craftsman knew that some readers would regret that decision; for, to quote again, "nowadays it is often fashionable to decry historical works in which individual personalities seem to be given undue attention. . . ." By clinging to the antiquated method of his choice, Professor Salmon has missed an op-

portunity to advance a more rational and, let it be said, more realistic interpretation of Roman imperial history. If the biographical approach does not lend itself to a systematic investigation of the process of growth and decay of the thought, the life, and the institutions of a people, then Professor Salmon has wilfully hampered his own capacities and hedged his fine powers as historian. After all, if titles mean anything, his purpose was not to write the history of the Roman emperors from 30 B.C. to A.D. 138 but the *History of the Roman World*. A postscript to the publisher: the price of \$5.50 for a book of 363 pages is exorbitant.

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Beda's Opera de temporibus. Edited by CHARLES W. JONES. Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1943. Pp. xiii + 416. \$8.00.

The Venerable Bede, whom Manitius terms "der bedeutendste Gelehrte des früheren Mittelalters," is perhaps best known today as the author of the first memorable history of England, the *Historia ecclesiastica gentis Anglorum*, which was also the first important historical composition to employ the chronological system that had been devised by the piety of Dionysius Exiguus and thus has left to all modern historians of antiquity the unwelcome legacy of an awkward chronology in which dates must be reckoned backward and forward from a supposititious Year of the Incarnation and labeled "B.C." or "A.D." Among the very numerous other works written by, or attributed to, the early medieval polymath, which range from a manual of Latin prosody, doubtless compiled for the use of his own pupils, to seemingly interminable books of scriptural exegesis and hagiological edification in verse and prose, are several treatises and letters that deal primarily with computistics, i.e., the method for determining the date of Easter and the other movable days of the ecclesiastical calendar. To these works Jones has devoted long and intensive study. His *Beda's Pseudepigrapha* (Ithaca, 1939) was an analytical exami-

nation of the confused mass of material on scientific and pseudo-scientific subjects attributed to Bede in the manuscripts or by early editors; and from this study it clearly appears that the only computistical works which authentically bear Bede's name are the two comparatively short treatises and two letters critically edited in the present volume.

The longest and most important is the *De temporum ratione*, of which the first sixty-five chapters are reproduced in this volume and occupy one hundred and nineteen of the one hundred and fifty-two pages of Latin text. (The last seven chapters, an extensive chronicle of world history, were omitted, partly to avoid duplication of the editorial labors of Mommsen, who included these chapters, detached from the rest of the treatise, in his *Monumenta Germaniae historica*.) The short tractate *De temporibus* is merely an early and condensed version of the longer treatise. The brief *Epistola ad Pleguinam* is a refutation of charges of heresy made by persons whom Bede had offended by calculating that the five ages of the world from the Creation to the Advent totaled only 3,952 years, thus rendering uncertain the duration of the sixth, and last, age. The *Epistola ad Wicthedum* discusses the date of the vernal equinox and thus forms a sort of appendix to the *De temporum ratione*.

Computistical writings impinge on so many historical and philological disciplines, from paleography, for which they provide examples that can almost always be dated with precision and certainty, to studies of medieval science and education, that their importance to scholarship will scarcely be questioned; but it would require more sympathetic imagination than most of us can command to find them other than dreary as general reading. Bede's work, however, partly because it is the product of a superior mind and partly because its Latinity is, on the whole, quite acceptable,¹ is certainly

¹ The Latin of Bede's computistical writings, aside from a few words of technical jargon and neologisms, such as *dies epagomenae* ("intercalary days") and *mašina* (*māšina*? "flood tide"), conforms to the practice analyzed by D. R. Druhan, S.J., in *The Syntax of Bede's Historia ecclesiastica* (Washington, 1938)—a practice which "only occasionally admits constructions not sanctioned in the best writers of prose" (*ibid.*, p. 212). Bede has frequently been described as

the least tedious representative of this class of compositions and contains many passages which are sufficiently personal or discursive to interest even readers who are least tolerant of theological questions or otiose computations. There was in Bede a certain freshness and spontaneity of spirit that introduced even into a treatise *De temporum ratione* touches of color that relieve the monotony of the subject. Thus in seeking to explain (chap. xxvi) as an optical illusion the phenomenon which really results from the fact that the moon's apparent path in the heavens does not coincide with the sun's but is inclined at an angle of a little more than 5° to the ecliptic, Bede suddenly presents us with a vivid picture of a spacious and splendidly illumined church. After describing the Greek and Roman months, Bede confesses (chap. xv) to a certain racial patriotism and gives an account of the Anglo-Saxon year, although this had become obsolete long before the time at which he wrote. And, at least to the reader who approaches the text after having read Jones's sympathetic Introduction, Bede's treatise incidentally conveys something of the majestic simplicity of the faith that flourished in the seventh and eighth centuries in the Insular monasteries, from whose ruins a contemporary American poet, Thomas S. Jones, Jr., drew inspiration for his *Sonnets of the Saints*.

The passage which will, perhaps, be of greatest interest to the strictly classical scholar is the first chapter of the *De temporum ratione*, in which Bede gives a succinct but full description of the method of representing numbers and thus performing arithmetical problems by the use of conventional gestures. Positions of the fingers of the left hand expressed numbers of less than one hundred; fingers of the right hand served for 100-9,000; and 10,000-1,000,000 were indicated by positions of the hands relative to the body. The most familiar

of the various allusions in classical literature to this curious mnemonic and visual device is probably Juvenal's description of a centenarian (x. 248 f.):

felix nimirum, qui tot per saecula mortem
distulit atque suos iam dextra computat annos.

With the possible exception of certain brief anonymous tracts, such as the *Romana computatio* (edited by Jones in his *Beda's Pseudepigrapha*, pp. 106 ff.), Bede's is the earliest and presumably the most accurate description of the system.² The editor should have mentioned in his commentary on this passage the article by Dr. Wüstemann in Jahn's *Archiv für Philologie und Pädagogik*, XV (1849), 511 ff., with four lithographic plates following page 620; the plates, drawn from a manuscript found at Regensburg, are the most complete and generally accessible illustrations of the arithmetical gestures.

In this connection it may be proper to notice a curious ambiguity in Jones's notes which has seemed quite confusing to at least one reader. In his commentary on the first chapter he cites without comment, and therefore presumably with approbation, Solomon Gandz's article on "The Origin of the Ghubār Numerals" in *Isis*, XVI (1931), 393 ff., and Miss Mary Welborn's addenda to that article in the same journal, XVII (1932), 260 ff. Now the *ghubār* numerals have nothing to do with Bede. Gandz's extremely interesting demonstration that the *written* forms of the numerals 1-9, which we call "Arabic," seem to have been called "Roman" by the Arabs themselves and closely resemble numerical symbols given in the curious *Geometria* which circulated under the name of Boëthius,³ leads to conclusions of great significance in the history of occidental numeration; but οὐδὲν πρὸς τὸν Διόνυσον. Miss Welborn, it is true, refers to Bede but makes two assumptions which seem to me extremely dubious: that Bede describes two systems of

a "humanist"; if the epithet implies no more than that he was a scholar, that he sought to write correctly and lucidly, and that he was interested in the phenomenal world, it may stand; but the term must not convey the impression that Bede was an aestheticist, was primarily interested in the human as distinct from the divine, or was a devotee of classical literature (see M. L. W. Laistner, "Bede as a Classical and a Patristic Scholar," *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, IV, XVI [1933], 69 ff.).

² The Ἑκφρασις δακτυλικῶν μέτρων of Nicolaus Smyrnaeus is said to describe a different system (see Edward A. Bechtel, "Finger-counting among the Romans in the Fourth Century," *CP*, IV [1909], 30).

³ Incidentally, if the *Geometria* is to be admitted in evidence, it should be noted that it contains also a symbol resembling zero which has, apparently, the value of 10.

finger-reckoning of *general* application and that he uses the word *articulatum* in a technical sense. She states⁴ that Bede "after discussing . . . the old system of finger-reckoning, in which he does *not* use the word *articuli*, . . . says, 'Est et alterius modi computus, *articulatum* decurrens, qui, quoniam specialiter ad paschae rationem pertinet, cum ad hanc ex ordine ventum fuerit, opportunus explicabitur. . . .'" Bede, of course, does not describe the standard finger-reckoning as "old" or obsolete, and I should freely translate the passage quoted by Miss Welborn as follows: "There is also another method of computation which proceeds from finger-joint to finger-joint and which, since it is a special method for the computation of Easter, will more appropriately be explained when in the course of our work we have reached that subject." The subject is reached in chapter Iv, where Bede's description of the "computus articularis utrarumque epactarum" makes it clear, I think, that the method is one peculiarly adapted to, and probably specifically devised for, Paschal computations, since its use is based on the fact that the number of joints and nails of the fingers and thumb of one hand equals nineteen, the number of years in the Metonic cycle, while the number of joints of both hands equals twenty-eight, the number of years in the cycle in which the days of the month recur on the same days of the week. If this is so, then *articulatum* can have no specifically mathematical meaning in Bede and has no connection with a putative knowledge of Arabic *written* numerals on the part of Theodore of Tarsus. Jones's silence on this matter gives the impression that he concurs in Miss Welborn's quite forced interpretation of the passage in question.

The text has been edited conservatively and with great care and will doubtless be definitive. For the *De temporum ratione*, Jones lists one hundred and thirty-six manuscripts, of which he examined one hundred and four; the text is based on the fifteen best manuscripts, with occasional citation of readings from others. By taking the predominant usage of the best manuscripts as a standard, the editor has given us an orthography that is quite normal

Latin; and the prospective reader need have no fear of being confronted by the ugly and confusing malformations which some medievalists lovingly reproduce, presumably under the impression that misspellings add a touch of esoteric splendor to their editions. Bede's text has been clearly and adequately, but not excessively, punctuated. Names of persons are capitalized; it would, perhaps, have been as well to capitalize also names of places and peoples and adjectives formed from proper nouns.

The apparatus exhibits, apparently with great accuracy, the significant variant readings of all the manuscripts collated. The few misprints that have been observed seem to affect the disposition of the apparatus, rather than the reported readings, e.g. lines 21 and 22 have been telescoped in the apparatus on page 275. The general arrangement of the apparatus is one that is commonly used in critical editions; but there is an innovation which calls for remark, particularly since it does not seem to have been used quite consistently. The diagonal bar is employed as a special, but undefined, symbol; and when the reader finds, for example, in the apparatus on page 322 the entry

solem] sol et / in B sol et L,

he infers that in manuscript B the word *sol* is followed by a sign or by blurred letters which may represent either *et* or *in*. Sometimes, however, it is difficult to see how there could be doubt of the reading, if the writing is legible at all, e.g. (p. 187), "post / inquit K" or (p. 236) "iulias / dies B." A very large number of entries, furthermore, have the following form:

p. 184: semis / sive sextus C2^b

p. 214: ideo / vel propterea M,

p. 240: sentimus / vel sortimur P.

If the conjunctions are editorial explanation, the diagonal bar is unnecessary; it is, in fact, sometimes omitted, e.g., "legis vel legalis K2" (p. 288). If the readings thus reported are

⁴ From the context it appears quite possible that here we are to understand that the words *sive sextus* were added after the word *semis* by the second hand of manuscript C. If this is so, the diagonal bar is a bi-valent symbol and, as such, quite objectionable.

⁴ *Op. cit.*, p. 261.

variae lectiones appearing between the lines or in the margins of the manuscripts, the bar is a convenient device; but in the absence of a formal explanation, we are still in doubt whether the *in* in the example first cited is a gloss, an ambiguity, or a correction.

The Latin texts are preceded by concise descriptions of all the noteworthy manuscripts. It is, of course, to be expected that the manuscripts of works so widely circulated in the Middle Ages should show much conflation, but there is one phenomenon which deserves the attention of all who are interested in the practices of medieval scriptoria. The *De temporum ratione* and the *De temporibus* occur together in a large percentage of the manuscripts, but in many of these manuscripts the two texts stem from quite different traditions.

In two brief chapters Jones has given a concise account of Bede's scientific interests and attainments and of the composition and purpose of the computistical works. There will, of course, be some differences of opinion and interpretation. Some readers may feel that Bede's "combined fear and irritation" at the charge of heresy refuted in his *Epistola ad Pleguinam* is overemphasized, if not exaggerated, in this account. Bede's words, "exhorruui . . . et pallens percunctabar," etc., may be no more than the hyperbole that is more or less conventional in Christian writings when heresy is in question, while the defensive tone of the Preface of the *De temporum ratione*, written seventeen years later, can be sufficiently explained by the fact that Bede's chronology was, after all, a radical departure from the generally accepted chronology of Eusebius and Jerome. Again, Jones's inference (p. 135) that "the passage on speaking with the fingers, with its aids for games for juveniles, shows that he wrote [the *De temporum ratione*] for some very young students," is not cogent and is certainly no basis for the deduction that "possibly students were expected to master a few sections [of the book] each year." Like the modern "deaf-and-dumb alphabet," Bede's dactylology was primarily a means for transmitting information tacitly, not for amusing children. He does say, in the passage to which Jones refers, that the art may be practiced "tam in-

genii exercendi quam ludi agendi gratia"; but, even if *ludus* must here mean "a game for juveniles," a quite serious use of the art is implied by the example which Bede proceeds to give: "si amicum inter insidiatores positum ut caute se agat admonere desideras. . . ." Immediately thereafter he describes a kind of crude cryptography to be used in writing "si causa secretior exigit."

A little less than a third of the present volume is devoted to an introductory history of the development of the ecclesiastical calendar used by the Roman church, and of the furious Paschal controversies which played an important part in the convulsive evolution of Christian doctrine. This part of the volume is a notable contribution in itself and probably exceeds in value even the definitive edition of the texts themselves. The history is certainly more complete and perspicuous than any other account known to me. A comparison of Jones's work with others amply confirms the statement in his Preface: "Judged by the evidence I have collected, much of the history [of the ecclesiastical calendar] previously known is erroneous in detail and warped in pattern" (p. viii). And although he warns the reader (p. x) against "more than the most tentative acceptance" of theories which he himself advances, the sound and ample scholarly method displayed in his work so carries conviction that—subject, of course, to the conclusions of those competent to judge the relatively recalcitrant matters of dogma and ecclesiastical politics involved—his essay will probably be accepted as the standard and authoritative treatment of the difficult subject with which it deals. It should be added that, in discussing questions which the modern mind approaches with a *rechignement* as pronounced as the passion which they excited in bygone ages, Jones has written with charm as well as lucidity—a stylistic achievement that appropriately accompanies his meticulous scholarship. In this context the monstrously acephalic sentence which begins the last paragraph on page 64^a and perhaps a few quite minor infelicities of

* "Having written a 532-year table by accident, it soon combined in men's minds with another accident, that Dionysius Exiguus began his table in the year which he called 532."

expression must be the result of typographical errors.

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A Concordance of Statius. By ROY J. DEFERRARI and SISTER M. CLEMENT EAGAN. Published by Roy J. Deferrari, 1303 Quincy St., N.E., Brookland, D.C., 1943. Litho-printed; paper binding. Pp. viii + 926. \$8.00.

As the authors of this *Concordance* point out in their Preface, an accurate, up-to-date *index verborum* or concordance of Statius has long been needed. The only indexes in print¹ antedate scientific work upon the text and are defective in other ways, too. The unpublished index compiled under the direction of W. A. Merrill and deposited in the library of the University of California at Berkeley² is relatively inaccessible and, moreover, covers only the *Silvae*. Finally, the complete index which L. V. Jacks and J. F. O'Donnell have been preparing for several years³ is not yet ready; as a result of the war, its completion and publication have been indefinitely postponed.⁴

The general plan of the present *Concordance* is the same as that which Deferrari and his associates used in two earlier works, *A Concordance of Ovid* (1939) and *A Concordance of Lucan* (1940). Since their method has been discussed at length in reviews which have appeared in this *Journal*,⁵ it is unnecessary to describe it again.

When one considers the amount of labor which this *Concordance* represents, criticism seems, at first, somewhat ungrateful. But inasmuch as errors in books of this sort, though almost inevitable, are liable to vitiate the work of scholars who rely upon them, a reviewer's

principal duty is to call attention to such defects as he may discover.

"The present *Concordance*," the authors say in their Preface, "is based on the texts of the Oxford Series—the *Silvae*, Ed. 2, by J. A. [read S.] Phillimore, and the *Thebais* and *Achilleis* by H. W. Garrod." This choice was unwise. The ideal procedure would have been to consult several standard editions. Granting, however, that this was not feasible and that the work had to be based upon a single edition, it is axiomatic that the edition chosen should have been the best one available. Hence it is difficult to see why the authors did not use Klotz's edition in the Teubner series instead of the Oxford text.

In the first place, a careful reading of the Oxford text reveals a number of misprints. Their nature is such that it is seldom difficult to remove them by *divinatio*, if one has no other text at hand. Accordingly, it is surprising to find that the authors of the *Concordance* (hereafter referred to simply as "the authors") failed to eliminate such errors from their basic text before beginning their own work.

For example, at 3. 10-12⁶ Garrod's text reads:

.... an sceleris data fama per urbis
finitimas? paucosne, pater Gradive, manu
legimus indecores?

Now it is fairly obvious that there is something wrong, metrically, with verse 11—that a syllable is missing at the end of the line. A glance at the text of Wilkins, Klotz, or Mozley confirms this suspicion and shows that the correct reading is *manuve*. But the authors took Garrod's unmetrical text at face value, with the result that this example of the enclitic *-ve* is not listed in the *Concordance* (s.v., p. 887), while the verse itself appears in its mutilated form, e.g., s.vv. GRADIVUS, PATER, and PAUCUS, -A, -UM.

At 8. 373 f. Garrod's text has "sedi am bella vocant: alias nova suggere viris, / Calloiope." Here it is hardly necessary to turn to another edition to see that the verse should read "sed iam" But apparently the authors saw

⁶ References to the *Achilleis* are prefixed with "A."; those to the *Silvae*, with "S." All other references are to the *Thebais*.

¹ One of these originally formed part of C. Beraldu's edition in *usum Delphini* (Paris, 1685) and was reprinted in various later editions. The other, compiled by N. E. Lemaire, forms the bulk of Volume IV of Amar and Lemaire's edition of Statius (Paris, 1925-30).

² Cf. PAPA, LXVII (1936), xx.

³ Cf. *ibid.*

⁴ Personal letter from Professor Jacks (November 21, 1945).

⁵ Cf. Richard T. Bruère's reviews, CP, XXXV (1940), 79-82, and XXXVI (1941), 304-6.

nothing amiss. The verse appears in this form under *BELLUM* and *VOCO*, -ARE. This example of *sed* is not listed in the *Concordance* (s.v., p. 764), and the *iam*, too, is missing (s.v., p. 428). On the other hand, Garrod's *sedi* appears as the dat. sing. of *sedes* (s.v., p. 765), while the ghost-word *am* has been carefully listed under the special heading *AM* on page 39!

In their Preface the authors state that "the *apparatus critici* of the two texts have been examined for all variant readings which might possess some importance in the establishment of new texts, and these have been included [in the *Concordance*]." In this aspect of their work, too, the authors' exclusive reliance upon the Oxford editions has proved detrimental.

Occasionally, the *apparatus* itself fails to make the facts clear. For example, in 2. 188 Garrod's text reads "*hic interfatus et alter / subicit.*" But his *apparatus* does not indicate that *hic* is merely Lachmann's emendation of *sic*, the reading of the manuscripts. Klotz retains *sic*, and so does Mozley, who does not even mention Lachmann's conjecture. But the *Concordance* gives no hint that *hic* is, to say the least, doubtful.

Even when the *apparatus critici* are satisfactory, there are signs that the authors have given too little attention to their choice of variants. For example, Garrod and Phillimore not infrequently abandon the *consensus codicum* in favor of a conjectural emendation. In such cases it would have been well for the authors to include the readings of the manuscripts, above all when other editors of Statius have actually preferred to retain them; for it seems obvious that manuscript readings which have been approved by modern editors should be prominent among "variant readings which might possess some importance in the establishment of new texts."

In 1. 72, for instance, *misera*, the reading of all the manuscripts, is accepted by Klotz, Mozley, and Heuvel. Garrod emended it to *miseros*. The authors follow Garrod but include no variant. In 1. 470 the manuscripts agree in reading *animorum in pignora*, which is accepted by Klotz, Mozley, and Heuvel. Garrod, following Lachmann, deletes *in*. The authors, however, do not include this interesting use of *in* with

the accusative as a variant under either *IN* or *PIGNUS*. In S. 1. 3. 51, *est experta*, the reading of M, is accepted by Vollmer, Saenger, Klotz, and Mozley. Phillimore changed it to *expertura*. The authors, following Phillimore's text, disregard the variant. Again, in S. 1. 5. 32, *neu*, the reading of M, which is accepted by Vollmer, Saenger, Klotz, Mozley, and Slater (cf. his note *ad loc.* in his translation of the *Silvae*), is emended by Phillimore to *ne*. The authors, however, give no sign of a variant under either *NE* or *NEU*.⁷ But since the listing of important variants was not, after all, the chief aim of the authors, it seems unnecessary to point out other examples of this sort.

THE HEADINGS

A few improvements seem worth recommending. Page 106: *breviter* (S. 1. 4. 67) is listed separately, but examples of *leviter* are scattered about among those of *LEVIS*, -E (pp. 460 f.). There may be similar inconsistencies elsewhere. Page 368: If the authors preferred to list examples of *honor* separately, a cross-reference should have been given to *HONOS*, and vice versa. There are other instances in which such cross-references seem imperative. Cf. the treatment of *arbor* and *arbos* (pp. 60 f.). Page 381: Examples of *ignotus*, -a, -um, should have been segregated from those of *IGNOSCO*, -ERE. Page 554: The heading *NEMAEUS* should read *NEMAEUS* and should be put after *NEMEA*. Page 710, line 18: for *inter. read indef.* Page 829: *Tegea* should be distinguished from *Tegeaeus*; *Tegeatis* from *Tegeaticus*.

WORDS OMITTED

There are a few omissions in addition to those already mentioned. *Armata* (7. 53) is not listed under *ARMATUS*, -a, -um, or under *ARMO*, -ARE. Seven successive examples of *GENS* are missing under that heading, viz. *gentis* (7. 12), *gentes* (7. 56), *gentis* (7. 179), *gentibus* (7. 186), *gentis* (7. 249), *gente* (7. 381), *gens* (7. 666). Under *IN* (c. acc.) there is no reference to 6. 458 ("is furor in laudes").⁸

⁷ Phillimore's *ne* is listed as an adverb. It is a conjunction.

⁸ The variant "*in laude est*" deserves to be listed under *IN* (c. abl.).

WORDS WRONGLY CLASSIFIED

Errors of this type are so numerous that we may group them in subclasses. First, there are the instances in which the necessary distinctions must depend upon the context, since the word under consideration resembles another word in form. If the author's meaning is not grasped, disaster follows: the word, like *Arethusa*, vanishes from its proper place to come bobbing up in strange surroundings.

Take one verse (7. 77) as an example: "Quod Iovis imperium, magno quid ab aethere portas?" When one finds that *quid* has been classified as nominative and *portas* as a form of *PORTA* ("gate"), one wonders how the authors construed this sentence.

Page 32: The substantival and adjectival uses of *ales* are slightly confused. In S. 5. 1. 102 *ales* is an adj.; but in S. 205, 8. 675, and 12. 213 it is used substantivally.

Page 364: In "*haec Pavor attonitis*" (7. 127) *haec* is acc. pl. neut. and not nom. sing. fem.

Page 391: The following examples of *in*, now classed under *IN* (c. abl.), belong rather under *IN* (c. acc.): 2. 580, 4. 430, 6. 681, 8. 361, 10. 745, 10. 928, A. 1. 132, A. 2. 25, A. 2. 154. Others, now classed under *IN* (c. acc.), belong under *IN* (c. abl.): 7. 179, S. 2. 2. 150, S. 4. 9. 46. A remaining example involves a double error. In the reference to "5. 505 (*bis*)" under *IN* (c. acc.), the second *in* belongs under *IN* (c. abl.), while the line number is 504.

Page 443: Three examples of the noun *labor* are wrongly listed under *LABORO*, -ARE, viz., 9. 632, 9. 660, and A. 1. 160.

Page 456: *lectis* (1. 606) should be listed, not under *LECTUS* ("bed"), but under *LEGO*, -ERE.

Pages 719 f.: The following examples of the noun *reditus*, now listed under *REDEO*, -IRE, should be put under a special heading: 3. 369, 10. 51, 11. 760, S. 2. 1. 92, S. 2. 6. 57.

Page 742: Two examples of the noun *rota* have been classed under *ROTO*, -ARE: 6. 284 and S. 4. 3. 29.

In the second group are words whose very form, apart from the context, shows that they do not belong where they now stand.

Page 32: *alis* (A. 1. 620), now under *ALES*, belongs under *ALA*.

Page 74: *artīs* (A. 2. 90), now under *ARTUS* ("joints"), is acc. pl. of *ARS*.

Page 200: *derigit* (9. 773), now under *DERIGESCO*, -ERE, belongs under *DERIGO*, -ERE.

Page 343: *genitum* (A. 1. 650) belongs under *GIGNO*, -ERE, not under *GENS*.

Page 461: *lavare* (9. 436) is incorrectly listed under *LEVO*, -ARE (1).

Page 649: The forms *placata* (4. 613), *placabat* (7. 92), and *placabit* (7. 329) are from *PLACO*, -ARE, not from *PLACEO*, -ERE.

Page 720: A heading *REDIMO*, -ERE, should be added on this page to provide for *redimunt* (7. 139), which now appears under *REDEO*, -IRE (p. 719).

Page 742: *rotarum* (6. 420), now under *ROTO*, -ARE, should stand under *ROTA*.

Finally, there are words which superficially resemble other words but whose distinction becomes apparent when we pronounce them correctly. However obscure the author's meaning may be, if one will but scan the troublesome verse, the necessary distinctions will emerge automatically. So numerous are the errors of this type in the *Concordance* that one suspects that the authors frequently neglected this simple expedient.

Page 22: *āra* (S. 1. 3. 54) is from *āer*, not from *aes*.

Page 73: *artē* (6. 535, 12. 183) is not the adverb *artē* but the abl. sing. of *ars*.

Page 118: *cānēntis* (A. 1. 575) is from *cāno*, -ere, not from *cāneo*, -ere.

Pages 182 f.: *cupīdo* (3. 58, S. 4. 2. 40) is not the noun *cupīdo* but a form of *cupīdus*, -a, -um.

Page 192: *decīsa* (S. 1. 5. 36), from *decīdo*, -ere, should be distinguished from examples of *decīdo*, -ere.

Page 193: Of the examples of *decor*, -ōris, two (10. 642, 11. 318) belong under *decus*, -ōris.

Page 193: Five examples listed under *decōrus*, -a, -um (5. 424, 6. 391 [*bis*], A. 1. 775, S. 1. 4. 24), belong under *decus*, -ōris.

Page 194: Of examples of *decus*, -ōris, two (S. 1. 2. 272, 1. 2. 275) belong under *decor*, -ōris.

Page 209: *dicēnt* (12. 79) is from *dīco*, -are, not from *dico*, -ere.

Page 225: *dēdere* (S. 3. 5. 51) is not from *do*, *dare* (perf. *dēdi*), but from *dēdo*, -ere.

Page 242: Of the six examples listed under *edūco*, -ere, three belong under *edūco*, -are, viz., S. 1. 4. 101, S. 2. 6. 46, and S. 4. 4. 77.

Page 299: *fīdes* (S. 3. 1. 8) is not from *fīdo*, -ere. It belongs under *fīdes* (1).

Page 395: Examples of *incīdo* and of *incido*

are lumped together under the single heading INCIDO, -ERE.

Page 460: The authors have not distinguished *lêvis*, -e, from *lêvis*, -e. The following examples of *lêvis* must be separated from those of *lêvis*: 2. 710, 8. 565.

Page 461: *lêvare* (S. 3. 1. 119) belongs under LEVO, -ARE (2), not under LEVO, -ARE (1).

Page 493: *mānent* (S. 2. 7. 133) is from *māno*, -are, not from *māneo*, -ere.

Page 566: *nostrā* (7. 26) is listed as nom. sing., but the scansion, as well as the context, shows that it is abl. sing.

Page 650: The following example of *plāco*, -are, is wrongly listed under *plāceo*, -ere: S. 2. 2. 111.

Page 660: *pōpulus* ("poplar tree") (S. 2. 3. 52) has been confused with *pōpulus* ("people"). The word will require a special heading in the proper place.

Page 710: In 11. 701-3 ("... habes Thebana regasque / moenia quo Cadmus, quo Laius omine rexit / quoque ego; sic...") the two *quo*'s in verse 702, now listed under *quo* (p. 710) are really relatives, abl. sing., agreeing with *omine*, while *quōque* (vs. 703) is not the adverb *quōque* but = *quō + que*, wherein *quo* parallels the *quo*'s in the preceding verse, while the enclitic -que should be listed in its proper place on page 702.

Page 721: *rēfert* (10. 798, 11. 696) is the impersonal verb and does not belong under *rēfero*, -ferre.

Page 725: *reliqui* (9. 833) is not from *relinquo*, -ere, the perfect of which is *reliqui*, but from *reliquus*, -a, -um.

Page 757: *satīs* (4. 456), wrongly listed under *satīs*, is from *sero*, -ere.

Page 763: *sēcuri* (2. 609) is from *sēcuris*, not from *sēcurus*, -a, -um.

Page 896: The form *verīs* (10. 788, A. 1. 288, S. 4. 4. 12) is gen. sing. of *ver*. It is wrongly listed under *verus*, -a, -um.

Page 905: *vincimur* (7. 774), now listed under *vincio*, -ire, belongs under *vinco*, -ēre.

Page 908: *vīris* (4. 760) is from *vis*, not from *vīr*.

Page 912: *vīris* (5. 4) is from *vīr*, not from *vis*.

Purely typographical errors are remarkably few. They are seldom likely to cause trouble, and therefore I shall list only a portion of those which I happened to notice. Page 139: Under CINITIS, for S. 2. 3. 37 read S. 3. 3. 37. Page 392, column 2, line 57: for 355. 87 read 3. 5. 87; *ibid.*, line 58: for 4. 4. 364. 4. 36 read 4. 4. 3; 4. 4. 36. Page 861: Under TREPIDUS, for 5. 6187 read

6. 187. Page 896: Under VERUS, -A, -UM, for 10. 732 read 10. 722.

An index or concordance which was free from errors would doubtless be a superhuman achievement. But when errors reach a certain magnitude, they cease to be venial. They are attributed to ignorance or gross carelessness or both. How they should be regarded in this instance each reader may best decide for himself.

The *Concordance*, then, in its present form, must be used with great caution. It supplements the old indexes; it does not supersede them. Before it can be recommended to scholars, it should be thoroughly revised.

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The Clausulae in Cassiodorus. By SISTER MARY JOSEPHINE SUELZER. (Dissertation, Catholic University of America.) ("Studies in Medieval and Renaissance Latin Language and Literature," Vol. XVII.) Washington, D.C.: Catholic University of America Press, 1944. Pp. xv+47.

Both Cassiodorus and *clausulae* have been popular subjects among writers of dissertations at the Catholic University of America. Within the last eleven years, four candidates for the doctorate at this institution have produced studies of the syntax of Cassiodorus' *Variae* and of the cases and prepositions in the *Historia ecclesiastica tripartita* (which was translated at his request), as well as studies of the vocabulary of his *Institutiones* and of his *Variae*. Within the last twenty-one years four other candidates at the same institution have investigated the *clausulae* of St. Augustine's *De civitate Dei* and of the works of Augustine, Hilary of Poitiers, and Jerome.

The present study is based on a solid foundation. It consists primarily of an examination, from both metrical and accentual points of view, of 9,837 endings gathered from five works of Cassiodorus—the *Variae* (T. Mommsen's critical text of 1894), the *Institutiones* (R. A. B. Mynors' critical text of 1937), the *De anima* (J. P. Migne's 1865 reprint of Garet's

unsatisfactory 1679 edition), the *Expositio in psalterium* (Migne's 1865 reprint), and the *Complexiones in epistulis Sancti Pauli* (Migne's 1865 reprint). The numerous borrowings in Cassiodorus' *Institutiones*, Book ii (a treatise on the seven liberal arts), are properly excluded from consideration (see Suelzer's p. 11, n. 7). There are separate examinations of the clausulae of the *De orthographia* (the critical text printed in H. Keil's *Grammatici Latini* of 1880) and of the clausulae of the *Historia ecclesiastica tripartita* (Migne's 1865 reprint), a work translated under the direction of Cassiodorus' assistant, Epiphanius, from the Greek of Socrates, Sozomen, and Theodoret.

While every clausula has been studied in the three critical texts, only a few of the clausulae have been studied in Migne's versions. The last eight syllables before every strong pause have been considered as entering into the formation of possible clausulae. In the critical texts all periods, exclamation points, question marks, colons, and semicolons, as well as all long dashes or parentheses used to designate the end of a parenthetical remark, have been interpreted as marking a strong pause; in the noncritical Migne texts, because of the arbitrary character of the punctuation, the only clausulae considered are those which are followed by a period, an exclamation point, or a question mark. Clausulae which occur in direct quotations, in phrases which introduce quotations, or in extremely short sentences have been excluded from study.

A series of tables and a commentary make clear the fact that in his choice of clausulae Cassiodorus was guided primarily by a feeling for accent and secondarily by a feeling for meter: while every ending but one forms an accentual clausula, only 93 per cent of the endings are metrical. The five metrical forms preferred by Cassiodorus—the cretic spondee, $\bar{\text{v}} \sim \bar{\text{v}}$ followed by the dichoree, the double cretic, the cretic tribrach, and $\bar{\text{v}} \sim \bar{\text{v}}$ followed by the double spondee—satisfy the demands of the four chief forms of the universally recognized medieval cursus: the planus, the velox, the tardus, and the trispondaicus.

The separate examinations of the clausulae of the *De orthographia* and of the *Historia ec-*

clesiastica tripartita reveal usages totally different from the usage in the other works. Our author accounts for the divergence in the first work by citing the technical nature of the treatise and the possibility ("likelihood" would be a better word) that sections of it were verbatim borrowings. She accounts in part for the divergence in the second work by citing the probability that Epiphanius was handicapped in his translation by his retention of Greek word order; in my opinion, however, there is no reason why one should assume that Epiphanius ought to have followed Cassiodorus in matters of style.

There is a detailed investigation of the clausulae of the *Variae*, in which appear many styles of writing, most of them florid. A consideration of the more normal Book i of the *Institutiones* would in many ways have been preferable. Among the problems treated are the distribution of the metrical forms under the accentual, the typology of accentual forms, elision and hiatus, doubtful quantities, syncope, hyperbaton, and interior clausulae. The reader will find the statistics summarized on pages 42-44.

The dissertation ends with a comparison of the usages of Cassiodorus and other Latin prose writers from the first century B.C. to the sixth century A.D. Cassiodorus uses the metrical cretic spondee more frequently than do most of the writers surveyed; he uses the four forms of the accentual cursus more frequently than any of the writers except Ammianus Marcellinus, Leo the Great, and Pomerius.

Though our author's work is bound to be useful, it is subject to a number of criticisms. It is hard to see, for example, exactly why Section II of the selected bibliography ("Selected Works on Cassiodorus," p. xiii) should include works written by F. A. Bieter, M. G. Ennis, P. Lehmann, B. H. Skahill, T. Stangl, and A. van de Vyver, and by no other scholars. Scores of pertinent items could easily be added. The present selection is injudicious, if not haphazard. Again, it is hard to justify the study, "for the sake of completeness" (p. 13), of the clausulae of the *Orationes* and of the *Acta synodorum habitarum Romae*—short works which are appended to Mommsen's

edition of the *Variae*, since no one has ever proved that Cassiodorus wrote them. In connection with these two works, the statement on page 13, "where differences do occur they are never in excess of 9 per cent," should be amended to read "where differences in the two forms which reveal close agreement, etc."; the differences in the other three forms range as high as 40 per cent.

There can be no doubt that a study of clausulae may sometimes be helpful in determining the authorship of a work of some size, providing, of course, that account be taken of such phenomena as the character of the work and the extent of possible borrowings. That a study of clausulae may be helpful in determining the authenticity of textual variants is quite another matter. Our author holds (pp. 31-32) that "in those cases where variants involve only transpositions or spelling not affecting meaning the evidence of the clausulae is surely important. It is significant that in 10 out of 13 instances of transposition in cadences the readings adopted by Mommsen are supported by clausulae which are metrically and accentually preferable to those rejected." Let us examine our author's evidence. In each item cited below the accepted reading is placed first and the rejected reading second. Preferred clausulae are designated by asterisks.

15.20.—*videbantur armari* *LRPMOZNE. *armari videbantur* K(*manus* 1). The choice of the accepted reading has been dictated not primarily by the type of clausula but by two other considerations. First, in sense *videbantur* is a weak word and *armari* a strong one; the strong word (that is, the one which needs an emphatic position) is normally placed at the end of a clause. Second, *armari* at the end of its clause balances the *crediti* at the end of the preceding clause. The text reads: "erigebat constantia sua partes timentes, nec inbelles sunt *crediti*, qui legatis talibus videbantur *armari*."

17.4.—*vincat naturam* *LRKMOZNE. *naturam vincat* PD. The accepted reading puts the important word in the emphatic position at the end of its clause. The text reads: "... ut vñis colludentibus illigata naturalem

faciem laudabiliter mentiantur. de arte veniat quod vincat naturam. . . ." The text concerns the use of marble in decoration.

31.23.—*peregrinos abicite* LRPMNE. *abicate peregrinos* *K. Both the accepted and the rejected readings place an important word in the emphatic position at the end of the clause. The text reads: "mores peregrinos abicate." The clausula of the accepted reading is inferior to that of the rejected reading.

35.27.—*praestatur invitis* *LRKMNE. *invitis praestatur* PD. Again, the accepted reading puts the important word in the emphatic position at the end of its clause: "Non est beneficium quod praestatur invitis."

143.27.—*fuisse suscepta* *LKP. *suscepta fuisse* REF. The accepted reading avoids placing the weak copula *fuisse* in an emphatic position: "... quae a vobis per harum portitores directa sunt, grato animo fuisse suscepta."

161.20.—*gloriatur conversatione* (LRE)K. *conversatione gloriatur* *PDFA. The clausula of the accepted reading is inferior to that of the rejected reading.

192.17.—*reverentur ceteri* LRP. *ceteri reverentur* *KEF. The clausula of the accepted reading is inferior to that of the rejected reading.

192.23.—*nostro palatio* *LRKE. *palatio nostro* PA. Either *nostro* or *palatio* is suitable in an emphatic position. As Suelzer points out, however (p. 32, n. 10), though the accepted *tardus* has a better caesura than the rejected *planus*, the *planus* is more frequent in the *Variae* than the *tardus*. The evidence of the clausulae is therefore inconclusive.

298.12.—*favete iudicio* *BZNH. *iudicio favete* KE(*manus* 1)FA. The complete sentence reads: "suscipite itaque affectuosis mentibus et nostra primordia et domnae sororis nostrae, cui singulariter studetis, favete iudicio." In this instance it is likely that the type of clausula is a valid criterion for determining the true reading.

317.24.—*esse rectorem* *BH. *rectorem esse* ZNKEA. *Rectorem* is the important word in the emphatic position at the end of its clause; *esse*, a copula even weaker than the *fuisse*

cited above (p. 143, l. 27), would be completely out of place at the end.

330.24.—*principis bona* *BZNKE. *bona principis* HGI. This is the second instance in which it is likely that the type of clausula is a valid criterion for determining the true reading. The text reads: "quaeratis forsitan sequestratim principis bona."

354.4.—*habitare temporibus* BHGI. *temporibus habitare* ZNKEFA. The complete text follows: "o si tecum liceret longis habitare temporibus!" On stylistic grounds either of the readings is acceptable. The evidence of the clausulae as a criterion, however, is inconclusive, since, as Suelzer points out (p. 32, n. 11), the rejected reading is a form accentually superior (a *velox*—a type of higher frequency than the accepted reading's *tardus*) but metrically inferior.

355.9.—*probetur evadere* *BZNKE. *evadere probetur* (H)GI. *probetur evadere* is really a periphrasis for *evadat*: "... ut qui sibi captus non potest subvenire, alterius solacio probetur evadere." (Cf. similar periphrases in *probor esse compulsus* for the aorist perfect *compulsus sum* ["I was driven," *Inst.* i, pref. i] and *reliquisse cognoscor* for the present perfect *reliqui* ["I have left," *Inst.* ii. 2. 10]; *monstro, nosco*, and *cerno* are commonly used in the *Institutiones* in expressions of this sort.) In its weakened sense, therefore, *probetur* would hardly be suitable at the end of its clause.

The net result of our examination has been to invalidate 8 of our author's 10 instances in which the testimony of the clausulae is supposedly helpful in determining the authenticity of the text. I shall not bother to treat the 12 examples of variants (p. 33) which involve spellings that do not affect meanings, since it is obvious that in this group, as well as in the first, one must consider not merely types of clausulae but grammatical usages and stylistic preferences. Though the mathematical incidence of preferred types of clausulae may be calculated exactly, an editor cannot always be sure which of several preferred types a writer has used in a particular instance. As a matter of fact, quantitative statistical data in general are of little value in deciding the correctness of a particular textual reading.

Future investigators of clausulae will do well to include in their studies an analysis of the clausulae which occur in several connected paragraphs and to print the full text (as I have attempted to do above) so that the reader may see that style, grammar, and sense all have a share in influencing an author's choice and arrangement of words.

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Les Mythes romains: Horace et les Curiaces. By GEORGES DUMÉZIL. Paris: Gallimard, 1942. Pp. 142.

Let me say at the outset that this is a scholarly and provocative work the reading of which brings ample returns on the time invested, although the author's thesis hardly carries conviction. According to Dumézil, the victory of Horatius over the Curiatii belongs to a group of Indo-European myths which account for the initiatory ritual of young warriors: fight against a triple adversary, meeting with an impudent kinswoman, and conflict of the sexes, the rite by which the "possessed" hero is reintegrated into society. The thesis is built on mythological and ethnological parallels and is presented with great skill. I fear, however, that it is more attractive to the sociologist, who may deal in broad analogies, than to the historian of Rome, who has to particularize about the subject. To begin with, in the Roman fable, Horatius' victory is only the finale of the combat between three Horatii and three Curiatii, who represent Rome and Alba Longa, respectively; and the result of the contest is accepted as the final decision of the struggle between two cities. That is quite different from an initiation ritual. It is a form of ordeal by combat, a widely known sociological phenomenon. Let me cite as an example the combat between five champions of Light and five sons of the Prince of Darkness in Iranian folklore (E. Bénéviste, *Persian Religion* [1929], pp. 89 f.). As this instance shows, the motif is related to ceremonial fights for some magic purpose, e.g., for producing rain (E. Westermarck, *Ritual and Belief in Morocco*, II, 272). A Hittite text written about 1200

B.C. already describes such simulated battle between the champions of the Hatti and those representing a foreign city (H. Ehelolf, *Sitz.-Ber. preuss. Akad.*, 1925, p. 267). We may suppose that the tale of the Horatii and the Curiatii is a rationalist explanation of such a ceremony. In any case, the Roman fable clearly describes the wager of battle, and it has been classed by Hugo Grotius accordingly (*De jure belli*, III, 20, 43, 1). Dumézil does not even mention this interpretation but indulges in the invention of hypothetic forms of the story which would suit his own theory, e.g., that the adversary was originally thought of as a three-headed monster (p. 132), that originally Horatius alone opposed his triple adversary (p. 104), etc. A scholar has no right to expect such reconstructions to be accepted unless he first proves that the received story breaks down when an attempt is made to explain it in the form in which it has been transmitted. But Dumézil leaves this preliminary task undone.

As to the second part of the Roman story, namely, Horatius' crime and atonement, Dumézil assumes that the rites performed by Horatius to expiate the slaying of his sister originally were carried on to free from his "fury" the warrior returning from the initiation (p. 111) and that Horatius was originally punished for slaying a three-headed monster (p. 123). Such speculations will hardly bring the reader to abandon the current explanation that the Roman story is an etiological invention, unrelated to the fable of the combat between the Horatii and the Curiatii, and purporting to account for some expiatory sacrifices performed by the *gens Horatia* (cf., e.g., A. B. Cook, *Zeus*, I, 35).

But it is not enough, as Aristotle says somewhere, to be right; one should explain the causes of error. If I am not mistaken, the causes of the error of a very ingenious and learned author are two logical fallacies. There is, first, the overlooking of negative instances in his induction. In the Irish saga of Cuchulainn, which serves Dumézil as a kind of mythological standard, the hero, having killed three sons of Nechta, in his fighting fury threatens his own people. So naked women are sent to meet him, and while he averts his face, he is seized and plunged successively into

three basins of cold water to extinguish his wrath. On the other hand, after his victory over the three Curiatii, Horatius meets his sister and slays her for mourning over her lover, one of the Curiatii. This crime Horatius expiates by sacrifices and rites. Dumézil coolly assures the reader that both tales are equivalent, that you may almost superimpose one upon the other (pp. 108-9). I am impressed rather by the very considerable difference between the killing of a woman you have met and avoiding looking at her. Moreover, I am very skeptical about the presence in both tales of "sexual antagonism" (p. 47), of the conflict between Femininity and Virility (p. 48), a subject suited to Euripides (p. 49). Let us observe, first, that a conflict between man and woman need not be a sexual one. Thus, there are the contest between Athene and Poseidon for Attica and the conflict between the fiery goddess Anath and Aqhat for the bow belonging to the latter (H. L. Ginsberg, *Bull. Amer. Schools Orient. Research*, Nos. 97 and 98 [Feb. and April, 1945]). On the other hand, nudity, per se, is not a sexual provocation. In a "clothed" society, where garments are a social obligation, nakedness is an exception and, as such, a monstrosity. Being anomalous, it becomes, like, let us say, the hunchback, a center of forces. Hecuba shows her breasts to her son, beseeching him not to fight with Achilles. Showing her secret parts, Baubo brings laughter to the bereaved Demeter. This motif, which has spread from ancient Egypt to medieval Japan (Isid. Lévy, *Mélanges Cumont*, II, 819) is, by the way, only a form of the well-known theme of international folklore: the sad-faced princess must be brought to laughter. The Irish poet uses the motif of looking upon that which is tabu (Lady Godiva) to explain how the angry hero can be mastered. Likewise, Cuchulainn himself, to seize Aife the Amazon, brings her, by a stratagem, to look away. This motif of distracting the attention is, in turn, well known in folklore. The unclotting may, of course, have a sexual meaning. But even for an Irish hero, the heat of whose body melts the snow around him, a hundred and fifty naked women sent to meet him would be too much of a seduction. The enchantress, in life as well as in fairy tales,

prefers a tête-à-tête. In any case, the motif of meeting a woman as antagonist is nonexistent in the procedures of initiation of savage tribes, as quoted by the author (p. 42) or in any other initiatory ritual, so far as I know. One of the things most strictly forbidden during the initiation is to see a woman's face. Now, as the whole construction of Dumézil is based on two equations: Roman fable = Irish tale = ethnologic rite, his interpretation fails through overlooking or ignoring the fact that the central part of the myth does not have any correlative in the ritual of initiation.

Why this error of observation? Because the fallacy of induction is here subordinated to a formal fallacy. The author is convinced that legends concerning Rome's origins are metamorphoses of Indo-European sociological myths. Consequently, "it is almost necessary" (p. 8) that Tullius must belong to the same system; that the Horatii and the Curiatii, a priori, should exemplify the function of Tullius as the king-warrior (p. 8); that there "must" have been in Roman legends a tale concerning the military force and the principle of fecundity (p. 75). Now, even in linguistics, such a deduction would be dangerous. No Latinist seeks for an instrumental ending in Latin because Indo-European has it. As to folklore, let me quote an instance from the domain in which Dumézil is at home and the present writer has no expert knowledge. I have just read in the volume in memory of N. J. Marr (in Russian) a paper (by V. I. Abaev) emphasizing the astonishing similarity between the fable of Romulus and Remus and the tale of the origins of the fabulous Narti as still told in the Caucasus. Is the presence of such a tale in Caucasian folklore a sufficient reason for presupposing the existence of the story of the combat of the Horatii and Curiatii in the Caucasian cycle? Dumézil's reasoning is vitiated by this subtle and dangerous form of *petitio principii*, where one assumes universally that which has to be proved in particular (Arist. *Top.* 8. 13), as Dumézil himself has brilliantly proved the functional analogy between the *flamines* and the Indian Brahmins and the role of Luperici as an age-grade fraternity (G. Dumézil, *Mitra-Varuna* [1940]). But perhaps these very dialectical errors make his

books so suggestive; and differences of opinion sharpen the reader's enjoyment. If I quarrel with the author, my Eris is the elder sister, who is "good for men," as Hesiod says, because she arouses us to activity.

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Hermes der Seelenführer: Das Mythologem vom männlichen Lebensursprung. By KARL KERÉNYI. ("Albae Vigiliae," Neue Folge, Heft 1.) Zürich: Rhein-Verlag, 1944. Pp. 111. Fr. 6.50.

The researches of the Swiss jurist and antiquarian, J. J. Bachofen, carried on far from the main roads followed by nineteenth-century classical scholarship, for that very reason passed largely unnoticed. They were resuscitated shortly after the first World War and republished in the form of reprints and anthologies, and they attracted more attention than they had during the learned author's lifetime: Bachofen had clearly been too far in advance of his own time to be understood and appreciated by his contemporaries.

The author of the present monograph is definitely a disciple of Bachofen and an imitator of the Basle patrician's method, outlook, and mode of approach. His *Hermes* is the counterpart of Bachofen's *Mutterrecht* and *Antiquarische Briefe*: if the Swiss scholar stressed the eternal feminine as the origin and basis of all life, Kerényi makes the same claim for the male principle. To him, Hermes is the counterpart of Bachofen's Omphale, Tanaquil, etc.

With this position no fault could be found, but for two facts. First, one would in fairness expect to find, in his book, some reference to Bachofen's life-work, the more so because it was published in Bachofen's own country. Second, one would look for some improvement on Bachofen's method—for the great Swiss scholar died in 1887. In both expectations one is disappointed. Bachofen's name is not mentioned once, though the author makes a total of forty-six references (on a total of 107 pages) to his own previous publications. He seems never to have heard of Goethe's observation:

Denn was man ist, das blieb man ändern
schuldig. . . .

If this censure merely raises a question of good manners and good taste, my second criticism—the author's failure to deepen Bachofen's method and to arrive at more concrete results than his predecessor—bears on the work itself.

It may be readily admitted that the cosmogonical constructions—the German *Gedankengänge* is a better term—of Bachofen and Kerényi represent with a fair degree of fidelity those at the basis of ancient mythologems and, as such, familiar to the adepts of the mystery cults, the Orphics, etc. It is equally certain—and was tacitly acknowledged by Bachofen—that they must have been of slow growth and are ultimately derived from a very ancient and relatively simple nature cult. Bachofen, who started from an agricultural society, believed he had found this principle in a primeval cult of Mother Earth. There is some truth in that inference, though it is not the whole truth.

Kerényi makes no attempt to discover that principle. He discusses the various functions and cult forms of Hermes, without trying to find the common denominator, though the material lay ready at hand, thanks to E. Siecke¹ and W. H. Roscher,² to say nothing of the greatest of Bachofen's followers, the Belgian Robert Briffault.³ There can indeed be little doubt that the functions of Hermes as reviewed and analyzed by the author are an outflow of the god's original lunar nature: Hermes is the male moon, comparable with and closely related to the Anatolian Men.

There is only one feature for which the god's lunar origin may seem dubious: his connection with the herm and the etymology of his name (from ἑρμα). The matter becomes clear if it is recalled that the oldest stones worshiped were, for obvious reasons, meteors and that meteors were believed (down to the eighteenth century!) to have been dropped from the moon. In fact, all the great lunar goddesses of the Near and Middle East: Astarte-Asteria, Kybele, Allāt, etc., were worshiped in the form of conical stones of meteoric origin.⁴

The Moon is both a giver of fertility (the

Lord of Waters, the Lord of Women) and a chthonian, a fact which sufficiently explains the two seemingly contradictory functions of Hermes. What gave such persistence to the connection of phallicism with death and the tomb throughout antiquity is probably no deep mystery (as Kerényi seems to think) but a fairly obvious consideration best expressed (after Heraclitus of Miletus) by Béranger:

Du champ que ton pouvoir féconde,
Vois la mort trancher les épis;
Amour, réparateur du monde,
Réveille les cœurs assoupis.
A l'horreur qui nous environne
Oppose le besoin d'aimer;
Et si la mort toujours moissonne,
Ne te lasse pas de semer.

To sum up, the author's reasoning will be easily accessible and plausible enough to those familiar with Bachofen's line of thought and general mode of approach (which the reviewer accepts, albeit with reservations and modifications). To those not familiar with the Swiss antiquarian and his work it will mean little; to those who reject Bachofen a *limine* it will presumably remain a book of seven seals.

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Problems of New Testament Translation. By EDGAR J. GOODSPEED. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1945. Pp. xx+215. \$2.50.

Readers of *Classical Philology* are, or should be, aware of the many shortcomings of the Authorized Version of the New Testament, but they will find in Dr. Goodspeed's work 115 examples, set forth and dissected with his usual skill. Goodspeed has been influential in the field of New Testament literature for nearly half a century, and his latest book shows the same care and precision as ever. Some of the more interesting examples are these: the translation of μάγοι as "astrologers" in Matt. 2:1; the explanation, following President Colwell, of ῥακά (better, ῥαχᾶ) in Matt. 5:22; the correction in Matt. 18:22 of "seventy times seven" to "seventy-seven"; "after the Sabbath" for ὀψὲ σαββάτων in Matt. 28:1; "entering into him" for καταβαίνειν εἰς αὐτὸν in Mark 1:10; and "to keep accounts" for διακορεῖν τραπεζαῖς in Acts 6:2.

Eleven of the examples are simply transla-

¹ *Hermes der Mondgott* (Leipzig, 1908).

² *Hermes der Windgott* (Leipzig, 1878).

³ *The Mothers* (London, 1927).

⁴ *Review of Religion*, VIII (1944), 115 ff.

tions of a better, more modern (i.e., more ancient) text than was available three centuries ago. One of these, however, is based on a not altogether convincing emendation of I Pet. 3:19. Following M. R. James and J. R. Harris, Goodspeed believes that the name of Enoch has dropped out after *ἐν ᾧ*. But the text is quite intelligible as it stands; as in I Pet. 4:6, the author is discussing the work of Christ, not of Enoch. It was Christ who became "a life-giving spirit" (I Cor. 15:45). Four more examples concern the misunderstanding of the idioms *τὰ ἴδια* (Luke 18:28, John 1:11) or *ἐν οἴκῳ* (Mark 2:1; cf. 3:19), which mean "home" or "at home."

Certain points involve broader problems and require discussion. Perhaps originally the pilgrims of Matt. 21:19 meant simply "God bless the Son of David" but surely Matthew, writing for a Christian community, is aware of the liturgical overtones of "Hosanna." Again, in John 1:5, Goodspeed translates, "the darkness has never put it out"; but in view of the Johannine stylistic trait of repetition without development, as in the long discourses, we should probably interpret verse 5 in the light of verses 10 and 11, rendering it "comprehend." So the recent commentary of Rudolf Bultmann (Göttingen, 1937—) takes it. Similarly in John 21:15-17 it is not the translation which reduces the conversation to "mere iteration" (p. 118); it probably is iteration. The translation "Helper" for *παράκλητος* in John 14:16 does not take account of the work of N. Johansson, *Parakletoi: Vorstellungen von Fürsprechern für die Menschen vor Gott in der alttestamentlichen Religion, im Spätjudentum und Urchristentum* ([Lund, 1940], reviewed by R. Marcus in *Review of Religion*, 1943, pp. 284-93; I am acquainted with it only through this review). The translation "made upright" for *δικαιοῦσθαι* in Rom. 3:28 ignores the Septuagintal studies of C. H. Dodd, *The Bible and the Greeks* ([London, 1935]; see also his commentary on Romans, pp. 51-53), where he shows that the word has implications of salvation or vindication by God. The translation "the man who marries the girl he is engaged to" in I Cor. 7:38 ignores the fairly early Christian practice of "spiritual marriage" as dis-

cussed, e.g., by H. Achelis, *Virgines subintroductae* (Leipzig, 1902).

What is the environment of early Christian literature, after all? To be sure, Christians make use of materials from all sorts of sources. But ultimately their environment is the church, the holy congregation of the new Israel, whose sacred literature is the Old Testament. For this reason "this is my blood which ratifies the agreement" is not wholly satisfactory as a translation of Matt. 26:28; for, while it does clarify the function of the blood, it does not remind the reader of God's covenants in the Old Testament, which the author had in mind. Finally, Goodspeed's discussion of the *Pericope adulterae* (John 7:53-8:11), with his conclusion, "I would omit this anecdote entirely" (p. 109), neglects the fact which he himself set forth in *The Formation of the New Testament*, that the New Testament was the creation of the church over a very long period of time. "Authenticity" and canonicity are two entirely different matters. As he points out (p. 107), the pericope "is . . . firmly established in Christian use."

Our criticisms, however, do not detract from the high value of Dr. Goodspeed's work. It deserves a wide circulation among specialists and laymen alike, for it proves that classical philology—especially in the Koiné field—is essential to the understanding of the New Testament. Philology may not be the skeleton key which can unlock every door, but without it all the doors must remain closed.

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Studies in the Commercial Vocabulary of Early Latin. By OSCAR SCOFIELD POWERS. (A dissertation submitted to the Faculty of the Division of the Humanities in candidacy for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy, Department of Latin Language and Literature, University of Chicago, August, 1940.) Chicago, Ill. 1944. Pp. iv+89.

All scholars are, by definition, men of leisure, but most are merely lazy. Of the lazy, a few are actually truthful; and these tell me that to read a doctoral dissertation, even by a pupil—not to mention the reviewing of one by

somebody else's pupil—is to them to sup on as abhorrent and insult a mess as only doctoral candidates, in sadness and revulsion, know how to cook. Mr. Powers is an exception, and so am I. This dissertation was written when Prescott was still alive and active at Chicago; he directed the study, and we must give this meed of honor to his memory. But one or two others have had a finger in the pie; and as for me, who like pie, I have enjoyed eating this one.

Mistyping, if rare (p. 4, n. 3, for *aut* read *auf*; underscore *incettare*), occurs; and there should have been an index of words. But there is little else to yaup at. The Appendix, on *dies* feminine, hardly settles the matter. Powers convincingly refutes Ernout's "masculin ou féminin indifférent au singulier"; had he been graveled by that, he would be no Latinist, the evidence is too plain against Ernout. *Dies* f. is conspicuous in contexts that have to do with the date of payments. The gender was originally masculine, and the feminine must be due to contamination of some kind. Well, the feminine is conspicuous in expressions of date (e.g., *calendae*, on the gender of which see Svennung, *Untersuchungen zu Palladius* [Uppsala, 1935], pp. 254–59; *nundinae*, *nundina*), and here may be the clue.

Page 25: The constructions of *praestare*, "guarantee," favor Buecheler's explanation, notwithstanding Powers' doubt. Page 11: *Conciliare* is in its most literal sense, "to get under the same roof with," cf. *cilium*, *supercilium*, related to *cēlare*. Page 6: Discussion of *coemptio* would have been in point here. Page 35: Powers does not stop to discuss *-a-* for *-e-* in *comparare* (cf. *imperare*¹). The compound, not being late, must be recomposite. This close association with *parare* ("buy") is semantically significant and thus bears on Powers' problem. Page 64: The difficulty about *rationem putare* is factitious. To cut out dead wood (cf. *amputare*) is to clean up; to clean up your account-book is to make the debit and credit sides balance. Hence "to reckon, to calculate, to

think." But I will not cavil at independence of judgment; blessed is he who has it, if he has it.

There are three chapters in this dissertation: "Verbs of Buying and Selling," "Terms for Money," "Accounting Terms." The words in use, up to and including Lucilius, are fully discussed (in their contexts, as is but right and proper), with the chief emphasis on their semantic evolution. This is sound; perhaps more might have been said about peripheral meanings, but also perhaps that would have led too far afield now and then. Some generalization, too, might justly be asked. In fact, it would have helped Powers over some difficulties, e.g., in the history of *probus* (p. 51). Such a term (cf. *δόκιμος*) is appropriately applied to barter (*κριθᾶς κοθαρᾶς δοκιμᾶς*), thence to specie (*argentum probum*), and so becomes a term of moral approval (or disapproval, cf. *παράσημος*). Powers' contribution, however, is a valuable addition to the long list of semantic investigations that have come from Chicago. The author has kept his feet on the ground, and so kept his head well below the nebulous mists of theoretical (but fruitless and speculative) "linguistics." *Euge, optime!*

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Michigan Papyri, Vol. V: *Papyri from Tebtunis*, Part II. By ELINOR MULLETT HUSSELMAN, ARTHUR E. R. BOAK, and WILLIAM F. EDGERTON. ("University of Michigan Studies, Humanistic Series," Vol. XXIX.) Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1944. Pp. xx+446+6 pls. \$5.00.

This volume nearly completes the publication of the documents from the grapheion of Tebtunis in the Michigan collection, begun in 1933 with *P. Mich.*, II. It contains documents numbered 226–356, ranging in date from A.D. 7 to A.D. 56. Fourteen of the documents exist in duplicate or triplicate, and in these instances the editors have chosen quite properly to print only once the text as derived from all available copies, with appropriate critical apparatus. It is unfortunate that the plan originally adopted for numbering the Michigan papyri made it necessary to assign numbers in advance to the papyri, so that in these instances

¹ The recent nonsense that would see *impar*, not *parare*, in *imperare* is shown to be what it is by constructions such as *alicui frumentum imperare*, i.e., "make ready supplies on (the shoulders of) someone, require some to make supplies ready." This is not news, and it is unseemly to have to say it; but it should silence etymological novices.

the text bears a series of two or three numbers. This scheme can lead to unnecessary complications in reference. Two-thirds of the documents in the collection of King Fuad I published in *PSI*, VIII, are duplicated in *P. Mich.*, V; and the editors have availed themselves of the Italian publication to establish more accurate and complete texts.

Any group of documents so localized both chronologically and geographically as the present collection, and so unified in content, throws valuable light on the life of the place and time with which they deal. These documents date largely from the time of Kronion, whose administration as nomographos is discussed by Professor Boak in the Introduction. Kronion held this office for at least eight years (A.D. 44-52), and this length of time is interpreted to mean that the post of nomographos was not liturgical at this time.

Dr. Husselman, through a study of the numerous subscriptions, concludes that the contracts were drawn up by employees of the grapheion; the original copies were kept on file in the office, and copies (*ἐκδόσιμα*) of it were made for the contracting parties. The custom differed from that of the late Ptolemaic period in that the original, not the *ἐκδόσιμον*, was the essential copy. Dr. Husselman furnishes, also, a careful study of the prosopography of the documents. From the descriptions of real estate in these and other documents from Tebtunis, it ought to be possible now to supplement appreciably our knowledge of the topography of the Polemon District.

A half-dozen demotic papyri in this collection are edited by Professor Edgerton, whose careful treatment of them makes them very usable to papyrologists and doubtless equally valuable to demotic scholars. Plate II reproduces the best preserved of the demotic texts. Possibly a demoticist might regret the lack of an index of demotic words, but the total extent of the texts is not great enough to make the lack of an index a serious handicap.

In format and typography this volume upholds the tradition of excellence established by the "Michigan Humanistic Series." The only errata I observed are in 226. 33, where the accent should be *εἰσαγαγῖν*, and possibly 229. 5 read *ἐνεστῶτος* (but cf. p. 13).

The individual documents vary, of course, in value and interest. The greater interest and significance are found in the cumulative effect of a large number of documents; and when a group of homogeneous papyri are published together, as in the present volume, the importance of such a publication is at once evident. The editors of this volume and the staff of the Plimpton Press amply prove that they not only realize their responsibility in this connection but are fully capable of discharging it.

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The Byzantine Hoard of Lagbe. By EDWARD T. NEWELL. ("Numismatic Notes and Monographs," No. 105.) New York: American Numismatic Society, 1945. Pp. 22+7 pls. \$1.00.

This is the publication of a hoard of one hundred and two Byzantine gold *solidi*, dating from Leo III to Theophilus, which were acquired by the Marchese di Ruffano in the early spring of 1920 near the small village of 'Ali Fachreddin Koj in the *Sandjak* of Adalia. Ninety-seven of these pieces came into the possession of the author; the remainder are in the National Museum at Rome. The coins were seemingly contained in a bronze receptacle which corroded away. Newell assesses the evidence for the identification of the modern site of discovery with the classical and Byzantine Lagbe (pp. 4-6) and gives a detailed catalogue with description of each coin (pp. 6-22). Seven beautiful plates conclude the little monograph.

In the Foreword, Mrs. Newell explains that the monograph was written shortly after her husband had acquired the hoard and suggests that it may be incomplete and, since it was not submitted to the press, that the author may have intended to add more to the text. One can only remark that *The Byzantine Hoard of Lagbe* seems quite evidently to be characterized by those superlative standards of numismatic scholarship which will always be associated with the name of Edward T. Newell.

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BOOKS RECEIVED

[Not all works submitted can be reviewed, but those that are sent to the editorial office for notice are regularly listed under "Books Received." Books submitted are not returnable.]

- BOWRA, C. M. *From Virgil to Milton*. London: Macmillan & Co., Ltd., 1945. Pp. viii+248. \$4.00.
- CLARKE, M. L. *Greek Studies in England, 1700-1830*. Cambridge: At the University Press; New York: Macmillan Co., 1945. Pp. iv+255. \$4.50.
- FESTUGIÈRE, A.-J. *La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste*, Vol. I: *L'Astrologie et les sciences occultes*. Paris: Librairie Lecoffre (J. Gabalda & Cie, éds.), 1944. Pp. xiv+424+1 pl.
- FINK, ZERA S. *The Classical Republicans: An Essay in the Recovery of a Pattern of Thought in Seventeenth Century England*. ("Northwestern University Studies in the Humanities," No. 9.) Evanston: Northwestern University, 1945. Pp. xii+225. \$4.00. (Remittances should be made payable to Northwestern University and should be sent with orders to the Graduate School, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.)
- JASNY, NAUM. *The Wheats of Classical Antiquity*. ("The Johns Hopkins University Studies in Historical and Political Science," Vol. LXII, No. 3.) Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1944. Pp. 176. \$1.75.
- LAKE, KIRSOPP and SILVA. *Dated Greek Minuscule Manuscripts to the Year 1200. Indices, Volumes I to X*. Boston: American Academy of Arts and Sciences, 1945. Pp. xxxvi+185.
- MUSKENS, GEORGIUS LAURENTIUS. *De vocis ἀναλογίας significatione ac usu apud Aristotelem*. Groningae, Bataviae: J. B. Wolters, 1943. Pp. 99.
- NORBERG, DAG. *Beiträge zur spätlateinischen Syntax*. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri A.-B.; Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, Ltd., 1944. Pp. ii+136. Kr. 7.
- . "Faire faire quelque chose à quelqu'un": *recherches sur l'origine latine de la construction romane*. Uppsala: Almqvist & Wiksells Boktryckeri A.-B., 1943.
- . *L'Olympionique, le poète et leur renom éternel: contribution à l'étude de l'ode I, 1 d'Horace*. ("Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift," 1945, Fasc. 6.) Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln; Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1945. Pp. 42. Kr. 1. 75.
- . *Syntaktische Forschungen auf dem Gebiete des Spätlateins und des frühen Mittellateins*. ("Uppsala Universitets Årsskrift," 1943, Fasc. 9.) Uppsala: A.-B. Lundequistska Bokhandeln; Leipzig: Otto Harrassowitz, 1943. Pp. 285. Kr. 10. 50.
- NORWOOD, GILBERT. *Pindar*. ("Sather Classical Lectures," Vol. XIX.) Berkeley: University of California Press, 1945. Pp. x+302. \$2.50.
- OPSTELTEN, JOHANNES CORNELIS. *Sophocles en het griekse Pessimisme*. (Dissertation, Leiden, 1945.) Leiden: A. W. Sijthoff's Uitgeversmaatschappij N.V., 1945. Pp. xvi+226.
- PESTALOZZI, HEINRICH. *Die Achilleis als Quelle der Ilias*. Erlenbach-Zürich: Eugen Rentsch Verlag, 1945. Pp. 53.
- RYAN, GEORGE J. *The "De incarnatione" of Athanasius, Part I: The Long Recension Manuscripts*. ("Studies and Documents," ed. Kirsopp and Silva Lake, Vol. XIV.) London: Christophers; Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1945. Pp. xii+125. \$4.00.
- TRELL, BLUMA L. *The Temple of Artemis at Ephesos*. ("Numismatic Notes and Monographs," No. 107.) New York: American Numismatic Society, 1945. Pp. x+71+28 pls. \$2.00.
- Universidad de Antioquia*, No. 73 (August-September, 1945.) Medellín, Colombia: Universidad de Antioquia.
- VERDENIUS, WILLEM JACOB. *Parmenides: Some Comments on His Poem*. (Dissertation, Utrecht, 1942.) Groningen: J. B. Wolters' Uitgevers-Maatschappij N.V., 1942. Pp. iv+88.
- VAN DER WIELEN, WILLEM. *De Ideegetallen van Plato*. (Dissertation, Amsterdam, 1941.) Amsterdam: D. B. Centen's Uitgevers-Maatschappij N.V., 1941. Pp. xii+271.
- YOUNG, ARTHUR M. *Apuleius: Cupid and Psyche, with Introduction, Notes, and Vocabulary*. Akron, Ohio, 1945. Lithoprinted. Pp. iv+144. \$1.50. (Order from the author, c/o University of Akron, Ohio.)

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